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xABSTRACT
Akgul, Zeynep PhD, Purdue University, May 2015. Modeling, Empirics and Policy
Implications of Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade. Major Professors: Nelson
B. Villoria and Thomas W. Hertel.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are essential computational tools
for trade policy analysis. While traditional CGE models based on the Armington
assumption of national product differentiation have been successfully applied to various
policy scenarios, they also have significant limitations in explaining the firm-level
information prevalent in the recent international trade literature. The pioneering work
of Melitz (2003) has provided a firm heterogeneity theory that can help address the
shortcomings of Armington-based CGE models by introducing additional productivity
mechanisms and extensive margin effects. Incorporation of firm heterogeneity in
mainstream CGE models offers great potential to improve computational policy
analysis. Even though there have been some efforts to incorporate firm heterogeneity
into CGE modeling, a readily accessible Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
implementation is currently not available. This dissertation addresses this gap by a
combination of theory, calibration, estimation and simulation to develop and implement
a firm heterogeneity module executed within the GTAP environment.
Chapter 2 presents the newly developed firm heterogeneity module with a stylized
tariff removal scenario and compares the model predictions with those of monopolistic
competition and perfect competition frameworks previously established in the standard
GTAP model. Chapter 3 proposes a theoretically-consistent way to parameterize
the firm heterogeneity module with a focus on the elasticity of substitution across
xi
varieties. Results show that the elasticity values that are consistent with the firm
heterogeneity theory are considerably lower than Armington elasticities used in the
standard GTAP model. Finally, Chapter 4 applies this newly developed module and
parameterization to policy analysis in order to investigate the implications of reducing
non-tariff measures associated with the beef hormone ban imposed by the European
Union on imports from the United States based on the negotiations taking place for
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement. The firm
heterogeneity module predictions of welfare changes in the United States are distinctly
different from those predicted by the standard GTAP model. This is explained by
the endogenous productivity and variety effects implied by the firm heterogeneity
theory. Results also suggest that the choice of policy instrument is an important
factor in determining which one of these effects dominates in the final welfare outcome.
This dissertation introduces the first implementation of firm heterogeneity into the
standard GTAP model which I hope will serve as a powerful tool for policy analysis
with improved abilities in tracing out the productivity changes and entry/exit of firms
following trade liberalization episodes.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
As globalization continues to bring countries together, international trade gains
momentum and new trade challenges begin to emerge. There is a worldwide con-
vergence of interests on policies that would address those modern trade problems.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP) and the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) are two major examples of ongoing efforts to design
new international trade policies which will have significant implications for global
welfare and the global trade architecture (Petri et al., 2012; ECOYRS, 2009; CEPR,
2013). The ability to accurately predict the outcomes of these international trade
policies will help improve policy designs and potentially increase worldwide economic
gains.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are essential computational tools
used extensively in trade policy analysis (Devarajan S. and Robinson, 2002). They
facilitate policy analysis by laying out the main mechanisms that govern trade-induced
economic changes in a tractable fashion. The traditional approach in CGE studies
is to model trade based on the Armington (1969) assumption of national product
differentiation. While this approach has provided many insights into static welfare
effects of trade policies as well as other economic outcomes, it also has significant
limitations in explaining the firm-level information prevalent in the recent international
trade literature.
Stylized facts documented in this literature show that (i) there is significant
heterogeneity across firms with respect to their products, productivities, markets they
2serve, costs they incur etc. (Eaton et al., 2004); and (ii) exporting is a rare event
accomplished by only a small subset of firms that are larger and more productive than
non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard et al., 2003; Bernard and Jensen,
2004). The pioneering work of Melitz (2003) has provided a modeling framework that
can explain those empirical findings by consideration of firm heterogeneity. This novel
trade model gives new insights about the underlying mechanisms at play in trade
liberalization scenarios where trade improves aggregate productivity by stimulating
efficient firms to expand into export markets while simultaneously forcing inefficient
firms to exit the industry. This results in a unique productivity channel through which
trade affects welfare.
Armington-based CGE models fail to capture these important firm-level mecha-
nisms. As a result, they do not account for trade growth due to changes in the number
of varieties traded, i.e. extensive margin, or account for productivity growth due
to compositional changes within the industry. Consequently, welfare predictions of
Armington-based CGE models can be inaccurate. Incorporating the firm heterogeneity
theory into Armington-based CGE models can overcome those shortcomings and
strengthen computational policy analysis.
There have recently been some efforts to incorporate Melitz (2003) into CGE
modeling (Zhai, 2008; Dixon et al., 2015; Balistreri et al., 2011; Balistreri and Ruther-
ford, 2012; Oyamada, 2013). While each of these studies illustrate the workings of
firm heterogeneity in computational policy analysis under stylized models, a readily
accessible, policy-oriented CGE model has not been made available yet. The Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) provides an Armington-based CGE model often used
by policy makers and research institutions. In order to improve its explanatory power
and versatility, it is highly desirable to incorporate the firm heterogeneity theory into
the GTAP model.
3Implementing firm heterogeneity into GTAP is a multi-dimensional task which re-
quires not only a working multi-region, multi-sector CGE model but also a theoretically-
consistent parameterization. Pinning down the structural parameters is paramount for
policy analysis, as quantitative results heavily depend on parameter values. However
previous firm heterogeneity CGE models have often used Armington elasticities that
are not appropriate in a firm heterogeneity model (Dixon et al., 2015). The traditional
gravity equation that delivers Armington elasticities do not control for the impact
of firm self-selection into export markets which is the main micro mechanism for
productivity and variety induced gains from trade. In the absence of firm behavior the
resulting coefficient estimates confound the demand-side effects with the supply-side
effects resulting in inaccurate elasticities. In order to be consistent with the underlying
firm heterogeneity theory, there is a need for new elasticity parameters that distinguish
between the demand-side and supply-side effects.
This dissertation contributes to the international trade literature by addressing the
above issues through the incorporation of firm heterogeneity into the GTAP model,
the determination of parameter values consistent with the underlying theory, and an
application of the developed module to policy analysis based on a case study in the
context of TTIP.
Chapter 2 presents the modeling and implementation of firm heterogeneity theory in
the GTAP model. The new mechanisms are illustrated with a stylized scenario in which
a tariff removal policy is analyzed. Switches between different model specifications
are incorporated to allow for comparisons with the results from a monopolistically
competitive model based on Krugman (1980) and a perfectly competitive model based
on the Armington (1969) assumption of national product differentiation. The results
are contrasted with the monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive GTAP
modules. This comparison shows that incorporation of firm heterogeneity allows
4for additional economic forces to come into play. In particular, in addition to the
traditional allocative efficiency and terms of trade effects of Armington as well as the
variety and scale effects of monopolistic competition, the theory of firm heterogeneity
incorporates endogenous productivity effects to welfare change.
Chapter 3 explores a host of issues related to the parameterization of the newly
proposed firm heterogeneity model. A method to obtain structural parameters that
are theoretically consistent with firm heterogeneity models is presented with a focus
on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The intensive and extensive margins
of trade are distinguished in a multi-sector, multi-country firm heterogeneity model
resulting in two estimating equations. The elasticity of substitution consistent with
the theory of firm heterogeneity is obtained based on these equations and the shape
parameter estimates of Spearot (2015). Results show that the elasticity values that are
consistent with the firm heterogeneity theory are considerably lower than Armington
elasticities used in the standard GTAP model.
Chapter 4 mobilizes the model of Chapter 2 and the parameters of Chapter 3 in
an applied policy analysis study that focuses on the hormone ban imposed by the
European Union (EU) on beef imports from the United States (US) in the context of
TTIP negotiations. The ban on hormone-treated beef sales in the EU has become
a critical issue in the debate over the rules and regulations concerning agricultural
trade policies. Chapter 4 investigates the implications of a possible reduction of
this ban by using two alternative policy instruments: fixed export costs and tariff
equivalents of the hormone ban. A unique aspect of this study is that it takes firm-
level heterogeneity and extensive margin effects prevalent in the monopolistically
competitive beef market into account. Important productivity and variety effects are
observed under firm heterogeneity which results in different welfare implications of
the same policies compared to the Armington-based GTAP model.
5CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCING FIRM HETEROGENEITY INTO THE GTAP
MODEL
2.1 Introduction
Traditional Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE) rely on the Armington
(1969) assumption of national product differentiation (e.g. GTAP) to distinguish
preferences between domestic and imported products. Changes in trade flows in these
models are conditioned by pre-existing trade shares; therefore, they can only capture
the trade adjustments that occur due to changes in export volumes. This is at odds
with the empirical trade literature that highlights the contribution of new varieties in
export markets to explain the expansion of trade following trade liberalization episodes
(Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Chaney, 2008). The firm heterogeneity trade model
proposed in the pioneering work of Melitz (2003) combines trade volume changes with
expanding varieties as a result of trade liberalization by capturing the self-selection of
firms into export markets based on their respective productivity levels. The resulting
framework is solidly supported by empirical evidence (Eaton et al., 2004; Bernard et al.,
2006). Including firm-level heterogeneity in CGE models can improve their ability
to trace out trade and welfare implications of trade policies which were previously
unexplored in traditional models.
There have recently been some important efforts to incorporate Melitz (2003) into
CGE modeling (Zhai, 2008; Dixon et al., 2015; Balistreri et al., 2011; Balistreri and
Rutherford, 2012; Oyamada, 2013). However, a readily accessible GTAP implementa-
tion with firm heterogeneity has not yet become available. Our paper addresses this
6gap by incorporating firm heterogeneity into the GTAP model, calibrating it to the
GTAP Data Base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012) and illustrating this framework with a
stylized scenario. A comparison with the Armington-based standard GTAP model,
as well as a GTAP-based model of monopolistic competition allows us to shed light
on the new elements which the Melitz model brings to bear on trade liberalization
impacts.
One of the stylized facts shown by micro-level data is that there is significant
variation across firms of the same industry. In particular, firms vary by their pro-
ductivity, size, profitability, the number of markets served and responses to trade
shocks (Bernard et al., 2003; Eaton et al., 2004; Bernard et al., 2007; Balistreri et al.,
2011; Melitz and Trefler, 2012). Moreover, only some firms export and they tend to
be larger and more productive than non-exporters (Balistreri et al., 2011; Bernard
et al., 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 1999). These stylized facts are captured by Melitz
(2003) who examines the intra-industry reallocation effects of international trade in
the context of a model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. In
his framework, opening the economy to trade or increasing the exposure to trade
generates a redistribution of production across firms within the industry based on the
productivity differences of firms. In particular, firms with higher productivity levels
are induced to enter the export market; firms with lower productivity levels continue
to produce for the domestic market and the firms with the lowest productivity levels
are forced to exit the industry. These inter-firm reallocations generate a growth in
the aggregate industry productivity which increases the welfare gains of trade. This
channel is a unique feature of the firm heterogeneity model (Zhai, 2008). The main
premise of the Melitz model is that aggregate productivity can change even though
there is no change in a countrys production technology. As opposed to the allocative
efficiency gains in the firm heterogeneity model, aggregate productivity changes in
7traditional trade models with homogeneous firms and Armington assumption are
brought about by changes in firm-level technology.
Melitz (2003) builds on Krugmans (1980) monopolistic competition framework
to model trade; while it draws from Hopenhayn (1992) to model the endogenous
self-selection of heterogeneous firms. Likewise, we build on Swaminathan and Hertels
(1996) monopolistically competitive GTAP model where variety effects (changes in
the number of firms and hence distinct varieties offered) and scale effects (changes in
output per firm) are captured. We draw from the work of Zhai (2008) in modeling
certain features of firm heterogeneity such as teasing out productivity thresholds for
market entry and calibration of fixed export costs, etc. This allows us to endogenize
aggregate productivity in the monopolistically competitive sectors of the model,
thereby capturing the intra-industry reallocation of resources in the wake of trade
liberalization.
In contrast to Zhai (2008) we assume endogenous firm entry and exit. This
extension allows tracing out the direct effect of changes in the productivity threshold
on entry and survival in export markets. Another simplification in Zhai (2008) is the
assumption of no sunk-entry costs of production in the monopolistically competitive
industry. In contrast, our model incorporates fixed entry costs following Swaminathan
and Hertel (1996), we assume that fixed costs are only comprised of value added inputs
which are calibrated using the zero profits condition. An additional contribution of
our model is the decomposition of the welfare implications of trade policy. This is
an extension of the existing GTAP welfare decomposition (Huff and Hertel, 2000),
which now includes, in addition to allocative efficiency and terms of trade effects,
scale, variety, and endogenous productivity effects derived from the firm heterogeneity
model.
8In addition to the firm heterogeneity model, we also explore other model structures
to highlight how trade policy impacts differ across various frameworks. These include
monopolistically competitive GTAP model motivated by Krugman (1980) and perfectly
competitive GTAP model motivated by the standard GTAP model with Armington
(1969) assumption. Occasionally, we refer to them as Armington (1969) and Krugman
(1980) models. However, the reader should keep in mind that even though these GTAP
modules are motivated by Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980), they do not exactly
follow the same structure as these seminal works. We bring the main features of these
theories into applied work. In addition, we make some changes where necessary since
numerical implementation of highly theoretical models requires making additional
assumptions and extensions to the original structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief intro-
duction to the theory of firm heterogeneity. Section 2.3 details the implementation of
firm heterogeneity theory into the standard GTAP model. Section 2.4 describes the
data requirement for the firm heterogeneity model. Alternative closure rules for model
switches are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 illustrates this framework with a
stylized trade liberalization scenario. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Main Mechanisms in Firm Heterogeneity Theory
In this framework, we assume that there can be two types of industries: monopo-
listically competitive industries with heterogeneous firms that produce differentiated
varieties and perfectly competitive industries with identical firms that produce homo-
geneous products which are assumed to be differentiated only at national scale. The
characteristics of the standard GTAP model industries are retained in the perfectly
competitive industries where a representative firm produces at constant returns to
scale technology. The characteristics of firms in the monopolistically competitive
9industry, on the other hand, are quite different than the standard GTAP model and
this warrants a detailed discussion concerning the treatment of production, cost, and
especially productivity at the firm level.
The presence of firm heterogeneity in an industry is characterized by a continuum
of firms each producing a unique variety that is an imperfect substitute in demand to
other varieties. Therefore, in what follows we use firms and varieties interchangeably.
While firms are free to enter or exit, entering the market requires covering fixed costs
that are associated with expenses made during initial development of the differentiated
variety. The existence of fixed costs is a large impediment for start-up firms; however,
it also creates potential scale economies in the monopolistically competitive industry.
Until each firm makes a commitment to enter the industry and pays these fixed costs,
there is no information about their efficiency. Hence firms are assumed to be identical
before entering the industry. Once they enter, their productivity levels are revealed
and we observe that productivity is heterogeneous across firms within the industry.
In this context, productivity is defined as how much a firm can produce per
composite input. It is inversely related to the marginal cost of production; therefore, a
high-productivity firm is the one producing a similar variety at a lower marginal cost
which follows from the simplification of Melitz (2003). Firm productivity is assumed to
be identically and independently distributed with productivities following the Pareto
distribution. Each firm draws its productivity out of this distribution and finds out
where they stand on the productivity spectrum.
Once they know their productive capabilities, firms are now able to choose whether
or not to operate in the market. The decision to produce depends on the potential
for making profits given the productivity of the firm and the fixed costs they have
already incurred. Firms are assumed to face symmetric fixed costs, while they differ
with respect to their productivity. Thus, production is carried out only by firms
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that are productive enough to afford staying in the market given the fixed costs.
High-productivity firms have a better chance of survival since they produce more
output and earn higher profits by charging a lower price compared to less productive
firms in the market. The competition in the market, therefore, forces low-productivity
firms to exit and high-productivity firms to expand their market shares.
Where does trade stand in this framework? Once a firm secures its niche in the
domestic market, it has the choice to supply foreign markets as well as satisfying
home demand. The decision to export or not has its own challenges. Just as firms
incur fixed costs to start producing, they incur fixed costs to start exporting. Fixed
export costs are destination specific. They may arise due to expenses associated with
distinguishing the firm’s variety to make it compatible with regional standards in
the destination market. In addition, they may be associated with the expenses of
finding local dealerships or doing market research on the rules and regulations of
exporting into specific destinations. For example, automobile companies incur the
costs of redesigning certain features of their models in order to meet the needs of
consumers in the destination market. The battery pack and the number of rows of
seating in Prius 2010 differ between the European and Japanese markets. Another
example can be the keyboard requirements of personal computers in different regions.
A Dell sold in the Japanese market has a different keyboard design than the same
Dell sold in the US market because consumers speak different languages.
Independent of their nature, the very existence of fixed export costs is the reason
why not all firms export and why firms self-select into export markets based on
their respective productivity levels. This mechanism works through the endogenous
determination of the productivity threshold to export. Only the firms with productivity
levels equal to or higher than this threshold find it profitable to supply that specific
market. Hence the distribution of firms is such that while the most productive firms
11
serve in the export markets, firms with lower productivity levels supply only the
domestic market, and the lowest-productivity firms do not produce.
Self-selection of firms, first into the domestic market, then into export markets is
a unique mechanism in the firm heterogeneity model and offers additional gains from
trade due to improvements in industry productivity through inter-firm reallocation
of resources. This is a channel that was previously unexplored in trade models. In
conventional theory, trade leads to inter-sectoral reallocation of resources with scarce
resources shifting towards the more profitable industry. However, in firm heterogeneity,
competition for resources also occurs within the industry where high-productivity firms
expand their market share and absorb the factors released by low-productivity firms.
The expansion of high-productivity firms together with the exit of low-productivity
firms in the face of trade liberalization, increases the productivity of the industry on
average, generating additional gains from trade.
Everything we have said so far is based on the fact that productivity levels of
firms are assumed to be constant. Of course, one could argue that trade also leads to
‘learning by exporting’ so that firms become more productive as they export. This is
plausible and there is a vast literature on the very issue of causality of productivity
and exporting, i.e. whether firms self-select into export markets due to their initial
productivity levels, or rather firms become more productive as they export. However,
as with Melitz (2003), we abstract from endogenous changes in firm productivity levels
in this framework.
2.3 Modeling Framework of Firm Heterogeneity in GTAP
This section describes the theoretical structure of firm heterogeneity and its imple-
mentation into the standard GTAP model. In this paper, we follow the conventions
that were used in previously published work in an effort to facilitate the comparison of
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our methodology with other Melitz-type CGE models. In addition we explicitly show
how to bring the theory into GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996) by providing
code snippets where applicable. The definition of variables and value flows used in
the code is presented in Table A.1.
2.3.1 Production Structure
In this section we offer a brief introduction to the production technology in the
firm heterogeneity module of GTAP. Similar to the standard model, production in the
monopolistically competitive industry is modeled based on a nested structure which
is laid out in Figure 2.1. There are two parts to Figure 2.1: (i) on the left, panel
A, we show the modeling of fixed costs and (ii) on the right, panel B, we show the
production tree. We should note that not all the branches in this figure represent a
nest. Particularly, only the solid lines specify a nest, while the dashed lines specify
a market clearing condition. This will become clear as we explore the production
structure further below.
The key characteristic that distinguishes production technology in this industry
from the perfectly competitive one is the difference between the variable and fixed
component of costs. Following Swaminathan and Hertel (1996), we assume that a
portion of the value-added inputs of heterogeneous firms are devoted to cover fixed costs
and intermediate inputs are not used in this process. These assumptions warrant a
brief discussion about the nature of fixed costs explored in this work. As we mentioned
before, in order to differentiate their varieties for domestic and export markets, firms
invest in research and development as well as market research and advertising. Each of
these activities require the employment of labor or capital. Particularly, the equipment
used in the research and development lab is considered as capital, while the firm hires
labor to advertise their products in foreign markets. A point to note here is that land
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is not part of the endowment factors that constitute fixed costs merely because land
is only used in the production of unprocessed agricultural goods in GTAP and these
goods are identical as long as they are not processed.
Due to the distinction between fixed and variable costs, total value-added composite,
qva(j,s) in Figure 2.1, has two components: variable value-added, qvav(j,s), and
fixed value-added, qvaf(j,s)1. Variable value-added is used in the production of the
differentiated variety and therefore is proportional to output. Demand for variable
value-added increases as firms expand production. On the other hand, fixed value-
added is incurred only once and is invariant to how much the firm produces.
The fixed value-added is further split into domestic and export components based
on whether the primary factors are employed to cover fixed domestic costs, qvafd(j,s),
or fixed export costs, qvafx(j,r,s). This is shown at the bottom level of the tree
in Figure 2.1 where both domestic and export components of fixed value-added are
produced by labor and capital according to a CES technology. The same applies
to the variable value-added nest in production. An important thing to highlight is
that substitution elasticity, σV A (ESUBVA(j) in GTAP), between labor and capital is
identical in each of these nests since the labor/capital intensity in fixed and variable
value-added composite are assumed to be the same (Swaminathan and Hertel, 1996).
This simplifying assumption is largely based on the data availability pertaining to the
composition of fixed costs as opposed to variable value-added.
Under certain conditions it can be more appropriate to consider research and
development as more capital intensive and marketing as more labor intensive compared
to production. In that case it becomes necessary to allow for varying labor/capital
intensity across different components of the value-added composite. While this can be
achieved in the current model with only minor modifications, it also requires industry-
1Lower-case letters denote percentage change in the upper-case counterparts.
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specific information that is currently not available in our data base. Therefore, in this
study we restrict ourselves to the assumption of equal intensities.
The domestic and export composites determine the fixed value-added composite
based on their respective weights in total fixed costs which then determine the total
value-added bundle together with variable value-added composite according to their
respective weights in total value-added costs. Note that this aggregation is not based
on a production technology. It just adds up the total factor requirements which
highlights that total value-added is either used as variable input in production or used
as inputs to cover fixed costs of domestic and export markets.
Returning back to Figure 2.1B, we see that output is produced by a combination
of the variable value-added and intermediate input composites at the top level of
the production tree depending on a constant returns to scale technology. We should
emphasize that the assumption of constant returns to scale technology in combining
variable inputs does not mean that we abstract from potential scale economies. The
existence of fixed costs generate internal increasing returns to scale in sales as firms
expand production. Firms take advantage of falling average costs when they operate
at a larger scale since each additional input brings about a more than proportional
increase in output when fixed costs are present. Hence the economies of scale.
In the lower nest of Figure 2.1B, the intermediate input composite, qf(i,j,s), is
composed of differentiated and homogeneous goods. Each firm has the choice to use
a differentiated variety, qfmc(i,r,j,s), which is produced in the monopolistically
competitive industry or a homogeneous product, qfpc(i,r,j,s), which comes out of
the perfectly competitive industry. We assume that there is no substitution between
these inputs, i.e. σT = 0. For the homogeneous goods we retain the standard GTAP
model assumption of domestic and import distinction where imports are sourced at
the border. However, we also use the information on how much of the homogeneous
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intermediate inputs are actually sourced from particular exporters since the data base
is transformed accordingly. A more detailed discussion about data transformation is
provided in Appendix A.2. Contrary to homogeneous goods, there is no domestic and
imports distinction for differentiated varieties; therefore, there is no additional nest to
show their composition. Imported varieties are assumed to compete with domestic
varieties at the market based on the corresponding elasticity of substitution, σ.
2.3.1.1 Markup Pricing
Representative firms operate under constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive
industry and set their prices equal to their marginal costs. However, firms in the
monopolistically competitive industry are price setters for their particular varieties
and can afford to set prices higher than their marginal costs. In particular, the optimal
pricing rule for such firms is to charge a constant markup over their marginal costs. Let
Pir indicate the supply price of product i in the monopolistically competitive industry
in region r, Cir indicate the cost of the input bundle that is used for producing one
unit of output in industry i of country r, and let ϕ˜ir indicate the average productivity









σi−1 gives the markup in industry i which is greater than one as σi > 1. This
equation shows that the price set by the representative firm is higher than its marginal
cost by the amount of the markup in the industry. Since we assume that the elasticity
of substitution across varieties is constant, the markup charged by firms is also a
constant. There is a negative relationship between the markup and the elasticity of
substitution. As σi increases, varieties of the same product become more similar which
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reduces the power of the firm to charge a higher markup. Hence the markup decreases
with the elasticity of substitution.
The second component in equation (2.1) is the marginal cost of the representative
firm captured by the fraction Cir
ϕ˜ir
. Unit cost of production is normalized by the
average productivity in order to account for the heterogeneity across firms and the
resulting endogenous productivity changes in the industry. Equation (2.1) reduces to
the familiar pricing rule of Pir = Cir in the perfectly competitive industry since firms
have identical productivity levels, i.e.ϕ˜ir = 1, and, do not have markup power.
Simplifying equation (2.1) and adopting GTAP notation, we obtain:
PSir = MARKUPirMCir, (2.2)
where PSir is the supply price (excluding taxes and transportation costs), MARKUPir
is the constant markup which corresponds to σi
σi−1 , and MCir is the marginal cost
which corresponds to Cir
ϕ˜ir
in equation (2.1).
Since we assume that production occurs under constant returns to scale technology,
average variable cost equals the constant marginal cost of production. Substituting
the average variable cost, AV Cir for MCir in equation (2.2) we obtain:
PSir = MARKUPirAV Cir. (2.3)
Total differentiation of (2.3) yields2:
psir − avcir = markupir = 0 (2.4)
2Lowercase letters denote percentage changes in the corresponding uppercase variables.
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According to equation (2.4), changes in the producer price is directly proportional
to changes in average variable cost at constant markup. We implement this in the
code as:
Equation MKUPRICE
#markup pricing (with constant markup) in the monop. comp. ind. j in r#
(all,j,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
ps(j,r) = avc(j,r) + mkupslack(j,r) ;
where ps(j,r) is the price received by the firm in the monopolistically competitive
industry j in region r, avc(j,r) is the average cost of production in industry j in region
r, and mkupslack(j,r) is a slack variable which is exogenous in the closure. Equation
MKUPRICE determines the level of output per firm. The slack variable is included in
order to allow for alternative closures for different trade policy applications where
firm-level output is not endogenous. For example, if we want to change the industry
structure to perfect competition, we need to remove the effect of scale economies and
fixed costs. This translates as constant output per firm and no markup. In the absence
of fixed costs, AV C = ATC = P which is ensured by zero profits condition. Hence
Equation MKUPRICE is simply redundant. Therefore, we eliminate it by fixing output
per firm and endogenizing mkupslack(j,r). Firm-level output does not change in a
competitive model and mkupslack(j,r) absorbs the difference between supply price
and average variable cost. Since in a competitive model AV C = ATC = P , the value
of mkupslack(j,r) will be close to zero in equilibrium. The use of slack variables is
revisited in Section 2.5.
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2.3.1.2 Productivity Draw of Firms
Firms are assumed to draw their productivity level, ϕ, from a Pareto distribution with














where ϕmin indicates the lower bound of productivity and γ indicates the shape
parameter. We assume that ϕ ∈ [1,∞) where the minimum productivity, ϕmin, is
one. The shape parameter, γ, is an inverse measure of the firm heterogeneity. A
higher value means that the firms are more homogeneous, i.e. firms have similar
cost structures. We assume that the relationship between the shape parameter and
elasticity of substitution is such that γ > σ − 1. This condition is enforced to ensure
that the size distribution of firms has a finite mean (Zhai, 2008). Let ϕ∗ indicate the
productivity threshold of producing in a specific market. In other words, it is the level
of productivity required to enter the market. The proportion of firms that have higher
productivity levels than the threshold is given by 1−G(ϕ∗) which is governed by
1−G(ϕ∗) = (ϕ∗)−γ, (2.7)
The firms that pass the threshold are actively participating in the destination-
specific market. Hence, we can interpret equation (2.7) as the proportion of successful
entry to the destination market, which is given as Nirs
Nir
where Nirs is the number of
firms in industry i that export from source r to destination s, and Nir is the total
number of firms that produce industry i of region r. We revisit the discussion about
productivity threshold and firm entry/exit in the following sections.
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2.3.1.3 Firm Profits: Productivity Threshold to Enter Markets
Each firm with productivity ϕirs makes the following profit from selling variety i on







for all r, s where Qirs is the sale of product i from source r to destination s, Pirs is
the tax inclusive sale price of product i from r to s, (Pirs = PirTirs), Tirs is the export
tax/subsidy, Cir is the unit price of the composite inputs, Wir is the price associated
with fixed costs and Firs is the input demand for covering fixed costs of exporting
from r to s. The first component, Qirs(ϕ)
Pirs(ϕ)
Tirs




, gives the variable cost and the third component, WirFirs,
gives the fixed cost of exporting from r to s. Substituting the optimal demand and













Firms in industry i of region r export into region s as long as the variable profit
they make covers the fixed cost of exporting. The firms with high productivity levels
set a lower price with a higher markup, produce more output; thereby, earn positive
profits. The only firm that exports on the r − s link and makes zero profits is the
marginal firm which has a productivity level equal to the productivity threshold.
At that threshold, variable profit only covers the export costs; therefore, the firm
makes zero economic profit. The condition that determines the zero-cutoff level of
productivity for exporting from region r to s is:
πirs(ϕ
∗
irs) = 0. (2.10)
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Any firm that has a productivity level below ϕ∗irs cannot afford to produce in that
market, and therefore exits. On the other hand, any firm that has a productivity level
above ϕ∗irs expands its market share. Total differentiation of equation (2.11) yields:
ϕ̂∗irs = cir +
σi
1− σi (pirs − tirs) +
1
σi − 1(wir + firs − qirs). (2.12)
Equation (2.12) shows that the change in cutoff productivity level depends on the
change in unit cost of production, cir , change in price net of taxes and transportation
costs, pirs− tirs, and change in fixed cost per sale, wir + firs− qirs. The same equation
is used to determine the productivity threshold for export markets as well as the
domestic market with the only difference being the treatment of fixed costs. While
fixed domestic costs are used for the domestic productivity threshold, fixed export
costs are used to determine the export productivity threshold for export markets.
For the domestic market (r = s), equation (2.12) is implemented as:
Equation PRODTRESHOLDD
# productivity threshold for the domestic market #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
aodt(j,r)
= sum{i,TRAD COMM, SVC(i,j,r) ∗ [pf(i,j,r) − af(i,j,r)]}
+ SVAV(j,r) ∗ [pvav(j,r) − avav(j,r)]
+ [MARKUP(j,r)−1] ∗ [fdc(j,r)−qs(j,r,r)]
− MARKUP(j,r) ∗ ps(j,r) + dthreshslack(j,r);
where aodt(i,r) is the productivity threshold for the domestic industry i in region r,
SVC(i,j,r) is the share of intermediate input i in variable costs of j in r, pf(i,r)
is the demand price for composite tradeable i by firms in industry j of region r,
af(i,r) is the intermediate input i augmenting technical change in industry j of
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region r, SVAV(j,r) is the share of variable value-added cost in variable costs of j
in r, pvav(i,r) is the demand price for composite variable value-added by firms in
industry j of region r, avav(i,r) is the variable value-added augmenting technical
change in industry j of region r, fdc(i,r) is the fixed cost of production for the
domestic industry i of region r, qs(i,r,r) is the domestic sales of product i in region
r, ps(i,r) is the supply price of product i in region r, and finally dthreshslack(i,r)
is a slack variable that is exogenous in the closure.
Note that fdc(i,r) is a product of price and demand for fixed value-added
composite. It is implemented in the code as:
Equation FIXEDDC
# fixed domestic costs to enter the monop. comp. industry i in r #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
fdc(i,r) = pvafd(i,r) + qvafd(i,r);
where pvafd(i,r) and qvafd(i,r) are the composite price and demand that is
associated with the domestic component of fixed value-added. As dictated by this
equation, domestic fixed costs increase proportionately with associated price and
demand for fixed factors.
Similar to the domestic market, the productivity threshold for each export market
(r = s) is determined according to equation (2.12). It is implemented in the code as:
Equation PRODTRESHOLDX
# productivity threshold for the export market #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
aoxt(j,r,s)
= [1 − DELTA(r,s)]
∗ {sum{i,TRAD COMM, SVC(i,j,r) ∗ [pf(i,j,r) − af(i,j,r)]}
+ SVAV(j,r) ∗ [pvav(j,r) − avav(j,r)]
+ [MARKUP(j,r)−1] ∗ [fxc(j,r,s)−qs(j,r,s)]
− MARKUP(j,r) ∗ [pfob(j,r,s) + tx(j,r) + txs(j,r,s) + to(j,r)]}
+ xthreshslack(j,r,s);
where DELTA(r,s) is called the Kronecker delta which is equal to one when r = s.
It is used in order to calculate the productivity threshold for export markets only.
23
aoxt(i,r,s) is the productivity threshold for exporting product i from the source
region r to the destination market s, SVC(i,j,r) is the share of intermediate input
i in variable costs of j in r, pf(i,r) is the demand price for composite tradeable i
by firms in industry j of region r, af(i,r) is the intermediate input i augmenting
technical change in industry j of region r, SVAV(j,r) is the share of variable value-
added cost in variable costs of j in r, pvav(i,r) is the demand price for composite
variable value-added by firms in industry j of region r, avav(i,r) is the variable
value-added augmenting technical change in industry j of region r, fxc(i,r,s) is the
fixed cost of exporting from r to s, qs(i,r,s) is the export sales of product i from
region r to s, pfob(i,r,s) is the fob price of product i, tx(i,r) is the destination
generic tax/subsidy, txs(i,r,s) is the tax/subsidy associated with exporting from r
to s, to(i,r) is the output tax/subsidy, and finally xthreshslack(i,r,s) is a slack
variable that is exogenous in the closure.
Similar to the domestic market, fixed export cost is a product of value added price
and fixed value-added inputs. It is implemented in the code as:
Equation FIXEDXC
# fixed export costs in industry i to enter the export market s #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
fxc(i,r,s) = pvafx(i,r,s) + qvafx(i,r,s);
where pvafx(i,r,s) and qvafx(i,r,s) are the composite price and demand that is
associated with the export component of fixed value-added.
Equation PRODTRESHOLDD and PRODTRESHOLDX give us productivity thresholds at
the firm-level for the domestic and export markets, respectively. There are two factors
at play in these equations: (i) competition, and (ii) market access. Competition is a
combined effect of the changes in average variable cost and prices. For example, an
increase in average variable cost causes the firm to lose competitiveness against more
efficient firms and makes it more costly to enter a new market. Hence it raises the
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productivity threshold for the domestic and export markets. This increase is somewhat
reduced by the possibility of scale economies brought about by larger market access.
For instance, in trade liberalization scenarios, as markets integrate firms gain access
to a larger market. This increases the potential for exports and reduces fixed export
costs per sale. As a result, productivity threshold declines.
The competition and market access effects determine the change in the productivity
threshold and how different firms respond to this change. For low-productivity firms the
competition effect dominates since their costs are too high to take advantage of bigger
market access. Hence they exit the market. On the other hand, high-productivity
firms benefit from the larger market and are able to expand their production and
sales.
2.3.1.4 Average Productivity in the Industry
In equilibrium, only the firms that have productivity levels above the threshold, ϕ∗irs,
afford to supply the destination market s. Since only surviving firms matter for the
industry, aggregate productivity is a weighted average of the productivity levels of the




1−G(ϕ∗) if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
0 otherwise
(2.13)
where g(ϕ) is the probability density of the productivity distribution. μ(ϕ) can
be thought of as a conditional distribution of g(ϕ) on [ϕ∗,∞) which refers to the
productivity distribution of firms that are active in the market. This is another way of
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saying that average productivity of the industry depends only on successful entrants.




















where ϕ˜irs is a CES weighted average of firm productivity and the weights reflect the
relative output shares of firms with different productivity levels. Substituting ϕ∗irs













where γi > σi − 1. Total differentiation of equation (2.16) yields:
̂˜ϕirs = ϕ̂∗irs, (2.17)
where ̂˜ϕirs is the percentage change of average productivity of firms that are active
on the r − s market and ϕ̂∗irs is the percentage change in the threshold for exporting
product i from r to s. According to Equation (2.17) there is a one-to-one mapping
between the productivity threshold and average productivity in the market. We use
Equation (2.17) to determine the average productivity in the domestic market and
export markets separately.
For the domestic market (r = s):
Equation AVEPRODD




where aod(i,r) is the average productivity in the domestic market. For the export
market (r = s),
Equation AVEPRODX
# average productivity for the export market#
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
aox(i,r,s) = aoxt(i,r,s);
where aox(i,r,s) is the average productivity in the export market. Average produc-
tivity in each market contributes to the overall industry efficiency depending on their
relative importance for the industry sales. Aggregate industry productivity is then
simply a weighted average of average productivity in the domestic and export markets.
It is implemented in the code as:
Equation AOHET
# computes aggregate productivity of the monop. comp. industry with
het. firms #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
ao(i,r) = SHRSMD(i,r,r) ∗ aod(i,r)
+ sum(s,REG, SHRSMD(i,r,s) ∗ aox(i,r,s))
+ prodslack(i,r);
where ao(i,r) is the percentage change in the aggregate productivity of industry
i in region r, SHRSMD(i,r,r) is the share of domestic market in total sales, and
SHRSMD(i,r,s) is the share of each export market in total sales. According to
Equation AOHET, aggregate productivity rises with an increase in average productivity
in the domestic or export markets. Moreover, an increase in the share of domestic or
export markets in total sales also boosts aggregate productivity in the industry.
A point to note here is that ao in Equation AOHET only captures the changes in
industry productivity due to changes in the market share of firms. A positive ao does
not mean that the firms are getting more productive. Rather the expansion in the
market share of high-productivity firms improves the efficiency of the industry on
average. In other words, it means that more productive firms constitute a larger part
of the market than before.
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2.3.2 Endogenous Entry and Exit
In this section, we examine the zero profit condition of the industry and the
endogenous entry/exit of firms. Each firm in the monopolistically competitive industry
produces a differentiated variety that gives them a market power over their unique
product. Hence firms have the potential to make positive profits in each market
conditional on their productivity levels and the fixed costs they face. This attracts
new firms into the industry. As new firms operate in the market, profits of existing
firms decline. Firm entry continues until there are profits to make in the market.
Therefore, at the industry level, free entry fully exhausts all the potential profits until
the zero profit condition in the industry is restored in equilibrium. Hence the total
number of firms in the industry is endogenous and is determined by the zero profits
condition which is sometimes referred as the ”entry condition”. Conversely, if firms
make losses, the movement is out of the industry as firms exit. This continues until
all the firms in the industry make zero profits.
2.3.2.1 Industry Profit: Zero Profit Condition
Total industry profit is composed of each active firm’s profit from operating in the
domestic market and selling in export markets. The profit of the representative firm
in each export market is governed by equation (2.8). Aggregating over all available














Expression (2.8) relates export profits to the revenue generated by exporting,
QirsPirs
(1+tirs
, variable costs of production, QirsCir
ϕ˜irs
, and fixed export costs incurred in each
export market WirFirs. At the industry level, only the successful entrants contribute
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to total profits. Therefore, equation (2.18) needs to be adjusted by the number of
active firms. However, note that each new firm also incurs sunk entry costs to begin
production. These costs need to be included in the calculation of industry profits,
as well. Let Hir be the component of value-added composite that is used on fixed
domestic costs for each successful entry in industry i and Nir be the total number of













Note that in order to obtain the total profit made in each market, we simply
multiply the profit of the representative firm with the number of active firms. This
ease in aggregation follows from average productivity. As discussed in Melitz (2003),
the aggregate outcome of an industry with N representative firms, i.e. firms that have
identical productivity levels ϕ˜, is the same as the aggregate outcome of an industry
with N firms of any distribution of productivity levels μ(ϕ) that yields the same
average productivity level ϕ˜.
There is free entry and exit in the monopolistically competitive industry. Therefore,
all the potential profits are exhausted as firms enter the market. Conversely, all the
potential losses are recovered as firms exit. Entry/exit continues until the marginal
firm in the industry makes zero profits which means that the industry profit is zero in
equilibrium. Implementing this condition in equation (2.19), we obtain the zero profit















Equation (2.20) determines the total number of firms in the industry, Nir, as firms
enter/exit to satisfy the zero profit condition. We rewrite expression (2.20) using
GTAP notation as follows:
V OA(j, r) =
∑
i∈TRAD




V AFX(j, r, s) + V AFD(j, r), (2.21)
where V OA(j, r) is the value of output in industry j of region r, V FA(i, j, r) is the
value of purchases of intermediate input i demanded in industry j of region r, V AV (j, r)
is the value of purchases of variable value-added composite purchased by industry j in
region r, V AFX(j, r, s) is the value of fixed costs associated with exporting product j
from source r to destination s, and V AFD(j, r) is the value of fixed costs associated
with entering the domestic market j in region r. These value flows correspond to
specific components in equation (2.20). For example, V OA(j, r) is the total cost of
production and exporting which is equal to total revenue generated by selling in






equation (2.20). Similarly, j,
∑
i∈TRAD V FA(i, j, r) + V AV (j, r) is the total variable





in equation (2.20). Finally,∑
s∈REG V AFX(j, r, s) corresponds to fixed export costs aggregated over all markets
given by
∑
sNirsWirFirs and V AFD(j, r) corresponds to total sunk-entry costs in the
industry given by NirWirHir in equation (2.20).
30
Total differentiation of Equation (2.21) and use of the Envelope Theorem yields:
V OA(j, r) ps(j, r) =
∑
i∈TRAD
V FA(i, j, r) [pf(i, j, r)− af(i, j, r)]
+ V AV (j, r) [pvav(j, r)− avav(j, r)] + V AF (j, r) pvaf(j, r)




V AFX(j, r, s) [qox(j, r, s) + avafx(j, r, s)]
− V C(j, r) ao(j, r), (2.22)
where V AF (j, r) is the total cost of fixed value-added in industry j of region
r, pvaf(j, r) is the demand price of fixed value-added in industry j of region r,
V AFD(j, r) is the fixed domestic cost of production in industry j of r, qof(j, r)
is output per firm in industry j of region r, avafd(j, r) is the fixed value-added
augmenting technical change in the domestic industry j of region r, V AFX(j, r, s)
is the bilateral fixed cost of exporting product j from source r to destination s,
qox(j, r, s) is output per exporting firm in industry j, avafx(j, r, s) is the fixed
value-added augmenting technical change in export markets. For details of this
derivation we refer the reader to the appendix A.1. Equation (2.22) relates output
price to output per firm and factor prices. The important difference between this zero
profit condition from that in a perfectly competitive market is the effect of per firm
output. Everything else constant, as output per firm increases, the difference between
price and average total cost at constant scale declines.
Equation (2.22) is implemented in the code as:
Equation ZEROPROFITSMC





= sum{i,TRAD COMM, VFA(i,j,r) ∗ [pf(i,j,r) − af(i,j,r)]}
+ VA(j,r) ∗ pva(j,r) − VAV(j,r) ∗ avav(j,r)
− VAFD(j,r) ∗ [qof(j,r) + avafd(j,r)]
− sum(s,REG, VAFX(j,r,s) ∗ [qox(j,r,s) + avafx(j,r,s)])
− VC(j,r) ∗ ao(j,r) + VOA(j,r) ∗ profitslackmc(j,r) ;
where profitslackmc(j,r) is the exogenous slack variable which allows for alternative
closures. For instance, if there is no entry/exit in the industry, the number of firms
is fixed. In that case, the industry profit may be positive in the short-run. This is
captured in the closure by allowing the slack variable to be non-zero, i.e. endogenizing
profitslackmc(j,r).
2.3.2.2 Number of Firms in the Domestic and Export Markets
This section focuses on two different free entry conditions: (i) domestic and (ii)
export market. As mentioned in section 2.3.2.1, entry/exit of firms in the industry is
determined by the zero-profit condition. In fact, the zero-profit condition together
with the markup equation dictates the change in output per firm, qof(j,s), which
then determines the change in the total number of firms in the industry. This closely
follows from Swaminathan and Hertel (1996).
Total output in the industry is a product of output per firm and the number of
active firms in the industry given by:
Qir = NirQ˜ir, (2.23)
where Nir is the total number of firms snd Q˜ir is the output of the representative firm
in the monopolistically competitive industry. We assume that each firm produces the
same amount of product. Total differentiation of equation (2.23) yields:
qir = nir + q˜ir. (2.24)
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Equation (2.24) is implemented in the code as:
Equation INDOUTPUT
# industry output in the monopolistically competitive industry #
(all,j,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
qo(j,r) = qof(j,r) + n(j,r) ;
According to Equation INDOUTPUT if output per firm rises less than the industry
output, new firms enter the industry to ensure that the zero-profit condition in the
industry is restored. On the other hand, if output per firm rises more than the industry
output, then some firms must be forced out of the industry.
Entry and exit of firms in the domestic market is based on the interaction between
the industry and the representative firm. The export market is a little different.
It depends directly on the productivity threshold of the export market. Given the
productivity distribution, the number of firms that successfully export is given by:
Nirs = Nir[1−G(ϕ∗irs)], (2.25)
where Nirs is the number of firms that export product i from region r to s, and
[1 − G(ϕ∗irs)] is the proportion of firms that are active in the export market. This
representation recognizes that not all firms in industry i are able to export on the
particular r − s link. Among all the firms in the industry only the firms that pass the
threshold productivity level of exporting are able to enter the export market, given
the productivity distribution.






nirs = nir − γi(ϕ∗irs), (2.27)
33
where γi denotes the shape parameter of Pareto distribution. It is implemented in the
code as:
Equation NXFIRM
# number of active firms in export markets #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
nx(i,r,s) = n(i,r) − SHAPE(i) ∗ aoxt(i,r,s) + entryslack(i,r,s);
According to Equation NXFIRM, if the productivity threshold for the marginal firm
in the export market increases, the firms that do not make the cut are forced to exit
the market. This is, of course, based on the heterogeneity of the particular industry
which is captured by the shape parameter of Pareto distribution. Recall that γi is
an inverse measure of heterogeneity. Therefore, as γi increases, productivity becomes
more uniform and firms become more homogeneous. This means that firms in the
same industry now have more similar cost structures. In a more homogeneous industry,
more firms must exit the export market given a constant productivity threshold and a
constant mass of firms since there are more firms with similar productivity levels.
2.4 Calibration of Fixed Costs
We use GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012) for the illustrative experiments
in this paper. There are several changes we made to the standard GTAP data base to
make it compatible with the requirements of the firm heterogeneity module. The most
fundamental change is the transformation of the data base to account for sourcing
of imports by agents which follow from the monopolistically competitive industry
structure. In this context, consumers make a decision between many varieties of the
same good which are slightly different from each other. Hence the choice is between
different brands such as Honda versus Hyundai as opposed to a car sourced in Japan
versus one sourced in South Korea. Therefore, in contrast to the import-domestic
distinction in the standard data base where composite imports are imperfect substitutes
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for the domestic commodity, imported varieties compete directly with domestic ones
in the firm heterogeneity module. In addition, imports are sourced by the agent in
the transformed data base which means that we distinguish between the purchases of
imported varieties of private households from that of firms and government. These
changes follow from Swaminathan and Hertel (1996) and we outline the details in
Appendix A.2.
There is additional information required for the firm heterogeneity model which is
not available in the standard GTAP data base. These include elasticity of substitution
between varieties, shape parameter of Pareto distribution, and data for fixed costs.
Table 2.1 presents the parameters used in this model.






Manufacturing FH 6.96 7.75
Non-Manufacturing PC 6.60 6.20
Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition
Source: GTAP Data Base V8 Narayanan et al. (2012) and Zhai (2008).
For the elasticity of substitution, we adopt the values of the Armington elasticity
for our particular aggregation in the GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012), i.e.
ESUBM in GTAP. Note that these have been estimated using cross-section variation
in trade costs. For the shape parameter of Pareto distribution, we use the values
provided in Zhai (2008) where the shape parameter is calibrated to match the profit
ratio in total markup. While the parameter values are taken from the literature, fixed
costs are calibrated to the GTAP data base. In this model, we need information for
two types of fixed costs: domestic and export. For fixed export costs we follow the
calibration in Zhai (2008). In particular, we use a gravity equation which determines
the bilateral trade flows. For fixed domestic costs we adopt an indirect approach.
First we calibrate total value of fixed costs in the industry following the treatment
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of Swaminathan and Hertel (1996). Fixed domestic costs are, then, the difference
between total fixed costs and fixed export costs aggregated over all markets.
As explained before, value added costs are composed of a fixed, VAF(i,r), and a
variable, VAV(i,r), portion. Initial value for the fixed component of value-added is
calibrated by using the mark-up pricing rule. It follows that fixed cost is proportional




VAF(i,r) = VOA(i,r) ∗ [1 / SIGMA(i,r)]};
Fixed costs decrease with the elasticity of substitution. As preferences become
more homogeneous, i.e. higher σi, demand for variety is lower which reduces the
need for differentiating the product. Therefore, firms cut down the budget on R & D
leading to lower fixed costs. In the extreme case where products are perfect substitutes,
i.e. perfect competition with σi approaching ∞, fixed costs reduce to zero since all
value-added is allocated to production of the identical variety.
The rest of the value-added costs, VA(i,r), are attributed to variable value-added,
VAV(i,r), which are used in the production process as follows:
formula (all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
VAV(i,r) = VA(i,r) − VAF(i,r);
Recall that in the firm heterogeneity model, fixed value-added cost, VAF(i,r), is
split into two parts: (i) fixed domestic cost, VAFD(i,r), and (ii) fixed export cost,
VAFX(i,r,s). The initial value of the fixed export costs is calibrated to the base year
bilateral trade flows following Zhai (2008). Fixed costs are proportional to trade flows








The left-hand side in equation (2.28), NirsWirFirs, gives the fixed cost of exporting
good i from source r to destination s aggregated over all firms that are active in that
market. The right hand side has two components. The first one, PirsQirs
Tirs
, gives the
total revenue of exporting good i from r to s which equals total cost of exporting
that particular good to market s. The second component, γi−σi+1
σiγi
, is a proportionality
constant that depends on preferences and the heterogeneity of the industry. As
preferences become more homogeneous, i.e. higher σi, firms have little incentive to
invest in differentiating their varieties because the markup gets smaller. As a result,
fixed export costs decrease with the elasticity of substitution. Similarly, a higher shape
parameter, i.e. less heterogeneity across firms, reduces fixed costs of exporting.
This calibration is implemented in the code as:
Formula (initial)(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
VAFX(i,r,s) = [1 − DELTA(r,s)]
∗ VSMD(i,r,s)
∗ [SHAPE(i) − SIGMA(i) + 1] / [SHAPE(i) ∗ SIGMA(i)]} ;
where DELTA(r,s) is the Kronecker delta which is equal to one when r = s. Once
fixed export costs are calibrated, fixed domestic cost is obtained as the difference
between total fixed costs and fixed export costs aggregated over all markets. It is
implemented in the code as follows:
Formula (all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
VAFD(i,r) = VAF(i,r) − sum(s,REG, VAFX(i,r,s));
2.5 Closure: Differences across Armington, Krugman, and Melitz Specifications
So far we have focused on how to introduce firm heterogeneity theory into the
standard GTAP model. In order to discuss the additional insight offered by this
framework, we also explore monopolistically competitive GTAP model motivated by
Krugman (1980) and perfectly competitive GTAP model motivated by the standard
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GTAP model with Armington (1969) assumption. A comparison between Armington
(1969), Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in CGE models is warranted since the
industry structures they adopt are extremely different. In an applied CGE work, it is
important to choose the specification which best matches the industry in question.
The research on this front is still active and there is increasing evidence supporting
the relative strengths of each mechanism depending on the industry, initial conditions
and the trade policy being explored. Especially, the ongoing work by Dixon et al.
(2014) highlights the connections between these three structures and allows for nesting
between them. Motivated by this approach, we allow for comparisons across firm
heterogeneity, monopolistic competition and perfect competition by using closure
swaps. We start with the firm heterogeneity module of GTAP and impose certain
restrictions to derive the monopolistically competitive module of GTAP. We should
note that, unlike Krugman (1980), we retain the difference between fixed export costs
and fixed domestic costs in the monopolistic competition structure. Finally, further
restrictions on the model delivers the perfectly competitive module of GTAP.
In order to determine which assumptions need to be imposed on the firm het-
erogeneity module to retrieve monopolistic competition or perfect competition, we
first need to outline the key differences across them. The formulation based on the
Krugman (1980) theory assumes the industry to be monopolistically competitive with
fixed setup costs where identical firms produce differentiated varieties. Krugman
(1980) theory differs from Melitz (2003) on two fronts: (i) there are no fixed costs
associated with exporting, (ii) firms are identical with respect to their productivity
levels which means that all producing firms are active in all destination markets.
In contrast, we observe endogenous productivity changes in the firm heterogeneity
module and the number of firms in export markets are a subset of the total firms in
the industry. In order to reduce the firm heterogeneity module to the monopolistically
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competitive one we need to remove the endogenous productivity changes. This is
achieved by setting the productivity thresholds as well as the aggregate productivity
as exogenous. This also ensures the equality between the number of exporting firms
and total firms through equation (2.25).
The slack variables we have in the governing equations in the TABLO code come
in handy at this point. Our first objective is to shut down the endogenous productivity
thresholds which are determined in Equations PRODTRESHOLDD and PRODTRESHOLDX.
This is achieved by the swap command as follows:
swap aoxt(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = xthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
swap aodt(MCOMP COMM,REG) = dthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG);
swap ao(MCOMP COMM,REG) = prodslack(MCOMP COMM,REG);
This command ensures that the productivity threshold in the domestic market
and export markets, aodt(MCOMP COMM,REG) and aoxt(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG)
are exogenous, while the slack variables in those markets are endogenous,
xthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG), dthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG). With
exogenous productivity thresholds the marginal firm no longer makes zero profits from
selling in the market. The zero profit condition of the marginal firm is restored by the
endogenous slack variables which absorb the accumulating profit of the marginal firm.
In addition, this closure rule has further implications for the number of exporting
firms. Since there is no change in the productivity threshold of exporting and firms
are assumed to have identical productivity, the changes in the number of exporting
firms is equal to the changes in the number of total firms in the industry governed by
equation (2.25).
As a result of constant productivity thresholds, we do not observe any changes in the
average productivity in the domestic market or in export markets according to equation
(2.12). Needless to say their contribution to changes in aggregate productivity is also
zero based on equation (2.17). Aggregate productivity is automatically exogenous
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since the components that determine it are exogeneous by the closure. Although it
seems redundant to add this as a condition in the closure we retain it in order to allow
for alternative closure possibilities.
We impose further restrictions to the monopolistically competitive module to
obtain the Armington-based perfect competition module. The formulation based on
the Armington assumption entails the standard GTAP model assumptions of perfect
competition, and constant returns to scale, where a representative firm produces
identical products with identical productivity. Since there is no product differentiation,
there are no fixed costs associated with production in this framework. Neither the
firm, nor the industry makes positive profits. The key difference between the Krugman
and Armington-based trade model is twofold: (i) the products are identical therefore
we do not observe the love-of variety in demand, and (ii) there are no fixed costs
associated with production in the perfectly competitive industry ; therefore, there are
no economies of scale. Hence the two things we need to do in order to reduce the model
to the Armington-based perfect competition module is to shut down the love-of-variety
effect and the scale economies. This is achieved by imposing the following closure rule:
swap vp(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = vpslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
swap vg(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = vgslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
swap vf(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = vfslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
swap qof(MCOMP COMM,REG) = mkupslack(MCOMP COMM,REG);
The first three swap operators remove the impact of changes in the available
varieties in consumer demand by setting the variety indexes as exogenous and the
associated slack variables as endogenous. We should highlight that this does not mean
that there is no change in the number of firms in the industry. Output variations
in the industry is accommodated by the variation in firm numbers. However, these
changes no longer create a love-of-variety effect due to the closure rule we imposed.
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The last swap operator addresses the issue of increasing returns to scale by
removing scale economies. In a perfectly competitive market with no fixed costs, there
is no wedge between average total cost and average variable cost which means that
AV C = ATC = P . As a result, the markup equation becomes redundant and the
associated slack variable, mkupslack, is set to be endogenous in the closure. Moreover,
in a competitive market all output expansion occurs by adding more identical firms at
constant costs. Therefore, output per firm remains fixed in the closure.
2.6 Policy Application
In this section, we investigate the behavioral characteristics of the firm heterogeneity
module of GTAP and compare it with that of perfect and monopolistic competition
modules in the context of a tariff removal scenario. The numerical implementation of
these highly theoretical models are carried out by a stylized model which provides a
more transparent interpretation of results.
Our model is calibrated to GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012) for 2007.
We aggregate the data base to 3 regions: USA, Japan and ROW; and 2 commodi-
ties: manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The manufacturing sector is treated as
monopolistically competitive with heterogeneous firms, while the non-manufacturing
sector retains the perfect competitive structure with Armington assumption. The
policy experiment is to eliminate the tariffs levied by Japan on the import of US
manufacturing goods, which is a 3.66% decrease in the power of tariffs imposed on US
manufactures.
Simulation results for the three models are presented in Table 2.2. In the first
three sub-sections, we focus on analyzing the additional insight obtained from the
tariff removal scenario in the firm heterogeneity module (FH). Then, we move on to
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comparing them to that of monopolistic (MC) and perfect (PC) competition modules.
We conclude the policy analysis by offering a brief discussion of welfare implications.
2.6.1 Impacts on the US
The direct effect of tariff removal is a reduction in the price of US manufactures in
the Japanese market by 3.69% which is accompanied by an increase in sales of US
manufactures in Japan by 67.35%. This significant rise in Japanese demand for US
manufactures diverts sales from the home and ROW markets (-0.21% and -2.01%,
respectively). These results constitute a familiar narrative of the immediate effect of
tariff removal in an exporting region.
Additional insights can be gained from examining endogenous firm entry/exit
and productivity changes. Regarding the former, Table 2.2 shows that the total
number of firms in the US manufacturing industry declines by 0.26%. This loss of
variety is due to an increase in output per firm relative to total output. As per firm
production increases faster than industry output, there is no need for all firms to
continue producing. Therefore, some firms exit the market and the total number
of firms in the US manufactures industry decreases. In order to learn more about
which firms cease to exist, we need to take a closer look at the marginal firm and the
productivity changes in the industry.
Figure 2.2A shows the percentage change in productivity thresholds for each US
export destination and percentage change in the number of exporting firms. We observe
that the productivity threshold to produce in the US manufacturing industry increases
by 0.15%. A higher threshold means that the productivity level of the marginal firm
that was able to produce for the home market in the pre-tariff cut US economy, is now
too low to make zero profits given the associated variable and fixed costs of production.
In fact, US manufacturing firms face a more intense foreign competition in the home
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market after the tariff cut in Japan. As factors of production become more expensive
in the US due to higher foreign demand, domestic firms become less competitive
against cheaper imports coming from Japan and the ROW. As a result, US firms lose
sales in the home market by 0.21%. This makes production even more costly for the
US firms since the fixed domestic costs they face are spread over fewer output. In
other words, the sunk entry cost per domestic sale increases by 0.18%. Consequently,
low-productivity firms incur negative profits and the productivity threshold for the
domestic market increases in the US, forcing them out of the market. Only the firms
that are more productive than the new threshold level survive and expand their market
share.
This is an example of inter-firm reallocation of resources within the industry as
more-productive firms absorb the factors released form the exiting firms while gaining
a larger share of the home market. Firm exit continues until the zero profit condition
of the industry is satisfied again, which happens when the total number of varieties
decline by 0.26%.
Figure 2.2. Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decom-
position of Industry Productivity in the US.
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Within industry firm reallocation extends to export markets through the shifts
in bilateral productivity thresholds. In particular, the tariff cut in Japan lowers the
productivity threshold for US manufacturing firms exporting into the Japanese market
by 3.64% as depicted in Figure 2.2A. Unlike in the home market case, the marginal
firm on the export threshold benefits from this tariff cut since its productivity level
is now considered low enough to make positive profits by exporting to Japan. Same
applies to the mass of firms that are below the pre-tariff cut threshold, but above the
post-tariff cut one.
There are two factors at play for US manufacturing firms exporting into Japan: (i)
competitiveness, and (ii) bigger market access. As mentioned above, US manufacturing
firms are less competitive in domestic and ROW markets due to higher factor costs. On
the other hand, the tariff cut allows US firms to be more competitive in the Japanese
market and take advantage of bigger market access. As a result, sales to Japan rise
by 67.35% which lowers fixed export cost per sale by 34.13%. This significant drop in
fixed cost per exports raises the potential for positive profits and induces a rise in the
number of US firms exporting into the Japanese market by 32.92%.
It is appealing to think that higher competitiveness and bigger market access
should benefit all US firms by creating positive profits. However, in practice, the
impact of the tariff cut on each firm is different depending on the firm’s pre-existing
cost structure. In the case of low-productivity firms, the impact of higher competition
on firm profits dominates since their costs are too high to take advantage of bigger
market size. Facing negative profits in the Japanese market, high-cost firms do not
export to Japan, but continue to produce for the domestic market. On the other hand,
firms with productivity levels above the new threshold are competitive enough to
make use of the larger market. Therefore, they start exporting to Japan. Entry into
the Japanese market continues until all potential profits from exporting are exhausted.
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As a result, even though there are less manufacturing firms in total, more of them
export to Japan.
Importantly, even though the new exporters have higher productivity levels com-
pared to non-exporters, they are relatively less productive than the existing exporters.
As a result, the lower productivity threshold reduces average productivity in export
markets. In order to determine the average exporter productivity, the productivity
of exporters to the ROW are also taken into account. As depicted in Figure 2.2A,
there is an increase in the productivity threshold for exporting into the ROW market
by 0.20%, which in return generates a drop in the number of exporters by 1.78%.
Compared to the Japanese market, this is a rather low response rate which is less
effective in shaping the average productivity in export markets.
The overall effect on aggregate productivity of the manufacturing industry is
shown in Figure 2.2B where the percentage change in the industry productivity is
decomposed into average productivity in home and export markets depending on
the respective shares of home and export markets in total sales. We observe that
the rise in share-weighted domestic productivity by 0.13% dominates the decrease in
share-weighted export productivity of 0.01%. This is due to the fact that home market
has a much bigger share in sales compared to export markets. Therefore, aggregate
productivity in the US manufacturing industry increases by 0.13%. This is purely a
gain of inter-firm reallocation within the manufacturing industry.
2.6.2 Impacts on Japan
Impacts of tariff removal on the Japanese economy are presented in Table 2.2 and
Figure 2.3. We observe that increasing competition by US firms crowds out Japanese
firms from the market and causes a drop in domestic sales by 0.55%.
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Although some firms are replaced by US competitors in the home market, surviving
Japanese firms benefit from the cheap US manufactures. There is, in fact, a large
increase in the demand for intermediate inputs sourced from the US, a 66.62% rise
in the manufacturing industry demand and a 67.94% rise in the non-manufacturing
industry demand for US manufactures. Lower prices for intermediate inputs reduce
the average cost of production in Japan by 0.48%. This is good news for the high-
productivity Japanese exporters. In particular, Japanese exports to the US and ROW
markets rise by 2.69% and 1.92%, respectively. As Japanese exporters face larger
markets, their fixed export cost per sale declines. This together with the declining
average variable costs, leads to reductions in productivity threshold of exporting to
US as depicted in Figure 2.3A.
Figure 2.3. Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decom-
position of Industry Productivity in Japan.
Even though the threshold is now lower, the number of exporters to the US market
drops by 0.44% since there are fewer firms in the Japanese manufacturing industry.
In fact the total number of manufacturing firms in Japan decreases by 0.77%. On the
other hand, the productivity threshold of exporting into the ROW market increases
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since prices are too low for exporters to profit from higher sales. The higher threshold
reduces the number of exporters to the ROW market by 0.87%. Note that despite
many Japanese firms exit the export markets, total sales to the US and ROW actually
increase. This is merely due to the expansion of high-productivity firms. As less
productive exporters exit, high-productivity firms expand and export more to the US
and ROW markets.
Similar to the loss of Japanese varieties in export markets, the home market also
suffers from the loss of domestic varieties. As is shown in Figure 2.3A, the productivity
threshold of producing in the domestic market increases by 0.44%. This change is
largely caused by rising fixed costs. Even though firms enjoy lower factor costs, the loss
of sales in the domestic market raises fixed cost per domestic sale leading to a decrease
in their profits in the face of intensified competition in the home market. In the
meantime, the scale of the firms increase by 0.82% which makes the low-productivity
firms redundant in the industry given the small increase in manufacturing production.
As a result, less productive firms are forced to exit the domestic market, while more
productive firms survive and expand.
Like in the US, tariff removal reallocates market share by shifting resources
towards more productive firms improving the aggregate productivity in Japan. This is
highlighted in the decomposition depicted in Figure 2.3B. Average productivity in the
domestic market rises by 0.34% overcompensating for the 0% change in the average
productivity of export markets. Consequently, industry productivity rises by 0.34%.
Overall, tariff liberalization improves the industry efficiency not only in the US,
but also in Japan. This is a good example of the importance of within industry
reallocation of firms in facilitating trade through international supply chains.
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2.6.3 Impacts on the ROW
The impact of this tariff cut on the ROW is less pronounced when compared
to other regions. Figure 2.4A summarizes the percentage change in productivity
thresholds and firm entry/exit in ROW.
Figure 2.4. Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decom-
position of Industry Productivity in the ROW.
The most striking change is observed in the trade between ROW and Japan. The
productivity threshold for exporting into Japan increases by 0.41% which is largely a
result of the US competition. Demand for ROW manufactures in the Japanese market
is displaced by US varieties leading to a drop in the number of ROW exporters by
3.09%. While there is some trade diversion in the Japanese market, exports into the
US market rises by 0.95%. There is a slight decrease in the productivity threshold by
0.08% which raises the number of ROW exporters into US by 0.71%. Finally, contrary
to US and Japan, the ROW market experiences a decline in the domestic productivity
threshold by 0.03%. Lower productivity threshold together with declining scale of
firms attract less productive firms into the manufacturing industry. The total number
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of firms increase by 0.07% until all the potential profit is eliminated in the market
restoring the zero profit condition.
Figure 2.4B shows the decomposition of aggregate productivity into average
productivity in domestic and export markets. Contrary to the previous cases, the
decomposition shows that average productivity in the domestic market has a negative
contribution to aggregate productivity while that of the export markets has a positive
contribution. Since the domestic market has a larger share in overall demand, the
contribution of domestic average dominates. Consequently, aggregate productivity
in the ROW manufactures sector declines by 0.03%. In practical terms, this is a
negligible change and likely indistinguishable from zero. However, its negative sign
shows that firm reallocation in the ROW is opposite of the experiences in Japan and
US. In particular, the tariff cut leads to a loss of efficiency in the industry where low
productivity firms expand their share in the domestic market.
2.6.4 Comparison across different Model Specifications
We start with firm heterogeneity and successively restrict the model to yield simpler
forms, such as monopolistic and perfect competition. Then, we explore the same tariff
removal scenario between the US and Japan in the context of each model. Table 2.2
reports the findings. A quick look at the results from each model illustrates that
the firm heterogeneity model captures the changes that occur in a conventional CGE
model with the Armington assumption. Moreover, it includes the effect of changes in
varieties as well as economies of scale delivered by the monopolistically competitive
structure and still incorporates a unique productivity channel that is linked with factor
reallocation across firms within the same industry.
The implications on production, prices, costs and sales are mostly similar across
these models. In monopolistic and perfect competition, bilateral trade between US and
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Japan rises; the manufacturing sector expands in the US, while it contracts in Japan;
the cost of production increases in the US, while it decreases in Japan. Contrary
to US and Japan, changes in the ROW are negligible in each model. A striking
difference in the firm heterogeneity model is the declining cost of production in the
US. This is mainly due to the increase in aggregate industry productivity. As the
share of high-productivity firms in the industry increases with the tariff-cut, industry
productivity rises which reduces the average variable cost as well as the supply price
in the US.
Even though the direction of change in most of the variables is similar across
models, the amount of change is magnified in the firm heterogeneity module given
the substitution parameter3. This is especially true for trade between US and Japan.
While US exports to Japan rises by 26.90% in the monopolistically competitive model,
it rises by 67.35% in the firm heterogeneity model. This is almost a threefold increase
in the trade response. In contrast, when we compare the export changes in the
monopolistically competitive model to the perfectly competitive one, we see that they
are quite similar in magnitude. This suggests that the contribution of expanding
varieties in firm heterogeneity is bigger than that of the monopolistically competitive
model. In fact, we observe that while the number of US firms exporting into Japan
increases by 0.001% in monopolistic competition, it increases by 32.92% in firm
heterogeneity. This striking difference is a consequence of the self-selection of firms
into export markets.
The monopolistic competition model dictates that if a firm produces, it also exports
into all destination markets. This is reflected in the results reported in Table 2.2. The
3We should note that Melitz (2003) tends to magnify the effects of Armington (1969) for a given
value of the trade substitution parameter. This result should not be generalized to the case where
the substitution parameters in Armington (1969) and Melitz (2003) are chosen to be different. For
example, Dixon et al. (2014) argue that welfare implications are close if the Armington (1969) and
Melitz (2003) elasticities are chosen so that the models give the same trade responses.
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percentage change in the number of exporters in each market, nx(j,r,s), equals to
the percentage change in the number of total varieties n(j,r). However, it does not
take the specific circumstances of each firm and each destination into account. Once
we factor in the heterogeneity of productivity across firms, we observe that not all
firms are able to export into all destinations. In fact, the number of US exporters
increase in Japan, while it declines in the ROW in contrast to the monopolistically
competitive model which predicts an equal increase in exporters to all destinations.
Another different result in firm heterogeneity is the effect of tariff cut on the number
of total varieties in the US. Even though total number of firms in the US increases
by 0.001% in monopolistic competition, it decreases by 0.26% in firm heterogeneity.
This is due to the relative changes in firm scale compared to industry output. In firm
heterogeneity, per firm output increases by 0.36% which exceeds the increase in total
industry output and leads to the exit of low-productivity firms. On the other hand, in
monopolistic competition, the relative increase of firm scale, 0.034%, is lower than
total industry output, 0.035%, which means that new US firms enter the domestic
market.
2.6.5 Welfare Effects
There is, currently, no consensus in the literature on the welfare implications of
the Melitz model compared to those from traditional models with the Armington
assumption. In order to do accurate policy analysis in a CGE setting, we need to
understand how these models differ. Are there additional gains from trade that we
are not accounting for when we choose one model over the other? If there are, do
they matter in the overall welfare response? Do they contribute to aggregate welfare?
These questions are getting more attention in the CGE world as traditional models
do not provide satisfying explanations for the changes in welfare in the face of trade
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policies. There is a growing literature that explores these questions in the context of
CGE models.
In related work, welfare changes in the Melitz (2003) model are found to be larger
than the Armington (1969) benchmark (Balistreri et al., 2011; Kancs, 2010; Zhai,
2008). In fact, incorporating firm heterogeneity into standard CGE models raises the
gains from trade liberalization by a multiple of two in Zhai (2008) and by a multiple
of four in Balistreri et al. (2011). However, Arkolakis et al. (2008) argue that the
impact of trade cost reductions is similar across models once their trade responses
are equalized via the calibration of parameters. This argument suggests that the
Melitz (2003) model does not offer additional gains from trade conditional on equal
trade patterns. A similar finding is discussed by Dixon et al. (2014). Having started
from an undistorted initial equilibrium, they observe that gains from productivity
and preferences in firm heterogeneity offset each other which results in equal welfare
change once the observed trade pattern is fitted with higher substitution elasticities
in the Armington formulation.
In this paper, we explore three additional channels through which trade liberaliza-
tion induces welfare changes in the firm heterogeneity module of GTAP. They can
be summarized as: (i) productivity effect, (ii) love-of-variety effect, and (iii) scale
effect. The productivity effect is described by Melitz and Trefler (2012) as a new
source of gains from trade created by the reallocation of factors of production from less
productive firms into more productive ones, thereby generating an improvement in the
overall efficiency of the industry. The love-of-variety effect is the ability of the model
to capture the trade growth due to expanding varieties and to link it with consumer
utility. As new firms enter the market, more varieties are available to consumers
contributing to the overall welfare. Kancs (2010) states that even though there are
lost domestic varieties, the empirical findings in the literature show that consumers
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usually benefit from the trade policy. However, if we account for the preference bias,
we see that the loss of domestic varieties are more highly valued since consumers like
domestic varieties more than imported varieties. The scale effect is associated with
increasing returns to scale technology. As the gap between average total costs and
average variable costs widens, the scale of the firm expands generating additional
gains from trade.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of regional welfare changes and decomposition in
each model. From a quick look at the results, we observe that the tariff removal in
Japan improves the welfare in the US, while it causes a welfare loss in Japan and the
ROW in the monopolistic and perfect competition models. On the other hand, firm
heterogeneity results show that not only the US, but also Japan gains from trade.
Moreover, the welfare gain in US is much higher in firm heterogeneity. Digging deeper
into the decomposition, we observe a quite different picture across model structures.
While the perfectly competitive GTAP model only provides information about the
classical terms of trade4 and allocative efficiency effects, the firm heterogeneity model
captures the additional information on variety, scale and productivity which have
significant effects on the magnitude of the welfare change.
Exploring the welfare implications in the US, we observe that improvements in the
efficiency of the manufacturing industry contributes positively to the welfare in US,
$6172 million. This is accompanied by the positive scale effect of $2345 million. Scale
effect in the firm heterogeneity model is determined by a combined effect of output
per firm and output per exporting firm. We observe that lower export thresholds
in the US leads to an increased number of exporters. However, they operate on a
smaller scale which is welfare reducing. On the other hand, the domestic market is
supplied by fewer US firms which operate on a larger scale increasing welfare. Since
4The contribution of terms of trade is the combined effect of changes related to the terms of trade
and the investment-saving balance.
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the drop in export scale is far below the rise in domestic scale. the overall impact is
a welfare enhancing scale effect in the US. In contrast, the variety effect is negative,
$742 million, as consumers suffer from a loss in domestic varieties. Even though US
enjoys a wider selection of ROW varieties, the decreasing number of US varieties more
than offsets this positive contribution. This confirms the home bias as loss in domestic
varieties is more dominant in the final variety effect.
Contrary to monopolistic and perfect competition, Japan gains from this tariff
removal scenario in the firm heterogeneity model. Similar to the US results, we see
that the productivity effect derives the welfare change. Despite the negative terms of
trade (-$2636 million) and variety effects (-$1396 million), the positive productivity
($8202 million) and scale effects ($3339 million) increase the welfare in Japan. Even
though Japan benefits from expanding US varieties, the loss of domestic varieties as
well as the ROW varieties dominate the variety effect.
The welfare loss in the ROW is much bigger compared to the Krugman and
Armington cases. This is mostly due to the bigger negative impact of productivity.
There is a small decline in the aggregate productivity of the manufacturing industry
in the ROW which reduces the overall welfare ($6837 million). Contrary to the US
and Japan, the scale effect is negative in the ROW ($2714 million) due to the smaller
scale of firms in the domestic market as opposed to the bigger scale of exporters. The
variety effect in the ROW is also negative ($804 million). It is largely driven by the
declining varieties sourced from the US. Even though the number of domestic varieties
increases, the drop in US varieties accompanied by the loss in Japanese varieties
dominates the variety effect. This is mostly dictated by the loss of intermediate inputs
used by ROW firms. Even though 95% of the intermediate input demand of ROW
firms is met by domestic suppliers, the increase in the number of domestic varieties is
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no match for the decline in US and Japanese varieties supplied to the ROW. Hence
the negative variety effect.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discuss how to implement monopolistic competition with firm
heterogeneity into the GTAP model. Different from the standard GTAP model
with Armington specification, the firm heterogeneity module includes the effect of
new varieties in markets (extensive margin), the effect of scale economies, and the
effect of endogenous productivity. We build on Zhai (2008) for firm heterogeneity;
however, compared to his approach we incorporate endogenous firm entry/exit, and
we distinguish between sunk-entry costs, and fixed export costs.
The model is calibrated to GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012). There are
three pieces of information not contained in the GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al.,
2012) that are needed in firm heterogeneity approach: (i) the elasticity of substitution
between varieties, (ii) the shape parameter of the Pareto productivity distributions,
and (iii) the magnitude of fixed costs. We use the Armington elasticity values in the
GTAP data base for the elasticity of substitution across varieties, while we use the
values provided in Zhai (2008) for the shape parameter. In order to calibrate fixed
export costs, we adopt Zhai’s (2008) approach of using a gravity model of trade based
on bilateral trade flows. In order to calibrate total fixed costs we use the markup
equation following Swaminathan and Hertel (1996). Model results in firm heterogeneity
module depends on the choice of substitution elasticity and shape parameter. For
future work, we aim to combine econometric work on model parameters with policy
analysis to obtain more robust results.
To illustrate the behavioral characteristics of the model, we analyze the effects of
eliminating Japanese tariffs on the import of US manufacturing goods under a three
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region - two sector aggregation. This is a highly stylized FTA scenario in TPP with
the aim of laying out the mechanics of this Melitz-type GTAP model. We observe
that productivity threshold for the US-Japan export market reduces mostly due to
the reduction in fixed export costs per sale. This scale effect is the dominant factor in
threshold reduction and a subsequent increase in the number of US manufacturing
firms exporting in Japanese markets. This firm reallocation in US-Japan link is in
favor of lower-productivity firms. On the other hand, the within firm reallocation
in the domestic market is such that low-productivity firms are forced to exit due to
higher average variable costs. As a result of exit of firms in the domestic market, the
productivity of US manufacturing sector rises.
By incorporating monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity, we are able
to capture and analyze the previously unobserved effects of trade agreements. The
question to ask at this point is whether these effects matter for trade policy implications.
An initial comparison of model responses to tariff elimination across GTAP models
with Armington, Krugman, and Melitz specifications show that the firm heterogeneity
module capture additional gains from trade that result in more pronounced welfare
responses.
The main premise of new trade negotiations, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP), is to develop comprehensive, high-quality rules in trade that
harmonize standards and thereby reduce barriers to trade. The variation in trade
standards across regions force firms to incur significant fixed export costs. Reduction
in these costs are expected to generate huge gains for the member countries. As a
future work we aim to analyze a more comprehensive trade liberalization scenario with
fixed export costs as the policy instrument. The GTAP model with firm heterogeneity
responds to fixed export cost reductions by changing industry productivity as a result
of shifts in productivity thresholds.
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICALLY-CONSISTENT PARAMETERIZATION OF A
MULTI-SECTOR GLOBAL MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
3.1 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical developments in the trade literature show that account-
ing for firm heterogeneity within an industry improves our understanding of how
trade barriers affect trade flows and economic welfare by providing a new margin
of adjustment through self-selection of firms into and out of markets. Due to this
added explanatory power, firm heterogeneity theory has begun to be incorporated into
computable general equilibrium models (CGE) (Akgul et al., 2014; Balistreri et al.,
2011; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012; Dixon et al., 2015; Zhai, 2008).
In Chapter 2 we laid out the firm heterogeneity theory and implemented it into the
GTAP model with the objective of making this theory accessible for practical policy
analysis. However, the remaining obstacle to achieving this goal is the lack of an
appropriate set of estimates for the key parameters of the model at the disaggregated
industry level. Particularly, the information that is key to the firm heterogeneity model
such as the shape of the productivity distribution, which determines productivity
heterogeneity across firms, and the degree of markups, which is a function of the
elasticity of substitution across varieties, are not available in the GTAP data base.
What is available instead are Armington elasticities which may not be appropriate in a
firm heterogeneity setting as the estimates incorporate both the demand-side and the
supply-side heterogeneity. Due to this lack of information, we search for parameters
which are consistent with the firm heterogeneity model and which we can put into
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use for practical policy analysis within this framework. Therefore, our objective in
this paper is to discuss the challenges in the parameterization of a multi-region global
CGE model with heterogeneous firms with an empirical illustration.
Parameterization of a firm heterogeneity model is a complicated problem which
has been addressed in numerous studies. However, it has not yet been satisfactorily
solved in the literature because of the difficulty in identification of the key parameters
of the model. The main issue with estimating the key parameters of firm heterogeneity
is that there is not enough information in country-level data to disentangle parameters.
For example, as trade costs are not observed in the data it is not possible to separate
distance elasticities from substitution elasticities because small trade flows can be the
result of either large trade barriers and small elasticities or small trade barriers and
large elasticities (Simonovska and Waugh, 2014). Therefore, we need reliable measures
of trade barriers independent of trade flows to disentangle parameters. Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014) among many others address this
issue by using price gaps in product-level data and estimate productivity parameters.
Even with firm-level data, identification is not a straightforward task. For example,
Arkolakis et al. (2013) uses firm-level data and tariff variation across locations of
firms to estimate the parameters of the firm heterogeneity model. However, they, too,
rely on existing information to separate parameter values. In particular, they use
markup ratios provided in previous studies (Martins et al., 1996; Domowitz et al.,
1988) to obtain elasticities. Since there is not sufficient information in firm-level data
to separate parameters one needs to run additional regressions Crozet and Koenig
(2010). Due to these challenges parameterization of firm heterogeneity models has
remained to be an outstanding issue.
Chaney (2008) extends the seminal work of Melitz (2003) and demonstrates that
in models with heterogeneous firms changes in trade barriers affect both the volume of
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sales by existing exporters (i.e., the intensive margin of trade) as well as the number
of firms in the export market (i.e., the extensive margin of trade) due to productivity
differences across firms. An important finding in the literature is that the extensive
margin is quantitatively very important in governing growth in international trade
flows (Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Yi, 2003). As a result, estimates of the elasticity of
substitution by models that ignore changes in the extensive margin are biased (Chaney,
2008; Helpman et al., 2008). This finding contrasts with the traditional Armington
(1969) view of the world, whereby changes in trade barriers only affect the intensive
margin of trade, which is governed by the elasticity of substitution across varieties, σ
(Hillberry and Hummels, 2013). However, in firm heterogeneity models there is an
additional parameter of interest, namely the shape parameter of Pareto distribution,
γ. The shape parameter is an inverse measure of heterogeneity in productivity across
firms within an industry and it governs the supply-side effects of trade policies. In
fact, the distribution of firm productivity significantly affects aggregate trade response
to reduced trade costs as demonstrated in Chaney (2008), Bernard et al. (2003) and
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013). Therefore, to work with a firm heterogeneity
model, we need to have estimates of the shape parameter as well as the elasticity of
substitution amongst varieties.
Empirical studies of international trade flows rely on gravity equations in order to
estimate the structural parameters of trade models. Gravity models relate the volume
of bilateral trade to distance and other determinants of trade. In a gravity model, the
marginal effect of distance on trade volumes is given by −δ (σ − 1), where δ is the
distance elasticity of trade. Identification of −δ (σ − 1) requires knowledge on either
δ or σ. However, bringing in an additional parameter to reflect firm heterogeneity, i.e.
γ, introduces further complexities in identifying the elasticity of substitution. Crozet
and Koenig (2010) show that, in the firm-heterogeneity setting of Chaney (2008), the
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marginal effect of distance on the probability of a bilateral trade flow taking place is
given by −δγ. Therefore, there are three parameters to estimate, i.e. δ, σ and γ,
which implies that an exogenous source of information is needed to identify all of
them.
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) and Eaton et al. (2011) circumvent this difficulty
by imposing the prior values of σ on the model in order to calibrate the values of
γ. This method has two drawbacks: (i) Often, estimates for σ are obtained from
Armington-type models which are fundamentally inconsistent with firm heterogeneity
theory. (ii) The resulting values for γ typically are not sector and region-specific
and therefore do not capture the significant variation of heterogeneity along these
dimensions. For example, the shape parameter estimates in Spearot (2015) show that
electrical machinery is a more heterogeneous industry where productivity differences
across firms is more pronounced, while petroleum refining is a much more homogeneous
industry. Moreover, according to his estimates, even though electrical machinery is
heterogeneous in the US, it is much more homogeneous in Chile. Not accounting for
these drawbacks is likely to lead to biased estimates of parameters in the calibrated
model.
A theory-consistent approach to estimating the shape parameter is offered by
Crozet and Koenig (2010) and Spearot (2015). Both studies present estimates of
γ at the product level in a firm heterogeneity model. The model in Crozet and
Koenig (2010) is based on Chaney (2008), while the model in Spearot (2015) is based
on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Even though Spearot (2015) provides values for
γ by industry and by region, he does not estimate elasticities that are consistent
with γ. Only Crozet and Koenig (2010) have a rich enough dataset to identify both
parameters. Interestingly, their estimates of the elasticity of substitution are lower
when compared to the traditional Armington elasticity estimates in the GTAP model
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(Hertel et al., 2003). Unfortunately, their estimates are of limited use for a global
general equilibrium model because they are based only on French firms and cover a
limited number of industries. Against this backdrop, our objective in this paper is
to solve for a set of elasticities of substitution that are theoretically consistent with
trade models considering firm heterogeneity.
To accomplish this, we extend the seminal work of Melitz (2003) to a multi-sector,
multi-country model and build on Chaney (2008) to distinguish the intensive and
extensive margins of trade. For our gravity estimations, we use bilateral trade data
at the country level from GTAP Version 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012) which covers
the years 1995-2009. This makes sense, since our ultimate goal is to incorporate these
parameters in a model based on the GTAP data set. In addition, we use the GeoDist
and Gravity databases of CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011) which include bilateral
data on several relevant variables such as distance, language, colonial link among
others determinant of bilateral trade. The resulting dataset covers 113 countries
over 1995-2006. This makes sense, since our ultimate goal is to incorporate these
parameters in a model based on the GTAP data set. In this paper, we focus on
the motor vehicles and parts industry (MVH) of GTAP which, according to Spearot
(2015)s parameters, has one of the highest productivity dispersions across firms among
manufacturing industries. Future research will extend this work to all of the GTAP
sectors and regions.
Our estimation strategy merges the approach adopted by Helpman et al. (2008) with
the extensive margin specification used in Crozet and Koenig (2010). We distinguish
between the intensive and extensive margins of trade which results in two estimating
equations. The first equation estimates the probability of a bilateral trade taking
place, while the second equation estimates the value of bilateral trade conditional
on the choice to export. We refer to the first equation as the export participation
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equation and refer to the second equation as the gravity equation1. Following Crozet
and Koenig (2010) in both equations we focus on the coefficient of distance. In the
export participation equation the distance coefficient is a combination of the distance
and substitution elasticities. On the other hand, in the gravity equation, the distance
coefficient is a combination of the shape parameter and substitution elasticity. This
gives us two equations in three unknowns, whereupon we use the shape parameter
estimates provided in Spearot (2015) to solve for the theoretically consistent estimates
of substitution elasticities.
Our estimation results show that the elasticity estimate consistent with firm
heterogeneity for the motor vehicles and parts industry is considerably lower than
the GTAP Armington elasticity (Hertel et al., 2003). This implies that elasticities
estimated in that traditional way were in fact picking up additional effects accruing from
the supply-side heterogeneity in this framework. In summary, Armington elasticities
are high when employed in the context of a firm heterogeneity model because they
confound demand-side effects with the supply-side effects. This finding underlines
the argument in Dixon et al. (2015) about the observational equivalence between
Armington and Melitz models. In particular, they argue that welfare implications
of trade policies are similar in magnitude between these models if the Armington
and Melitz elasticities are chosen such that trade responses are equal across model
specifications. In such a scenario, Armington-based elasticities are higher than Melitz
elasticities. This implies that using Armington elasticities in a firm heterogeneity
model might lead to overestimated trade volumes and welfare effects.
1In principle, both equations are gravity equations. However, we adopt this convention to distinguish
the new margin of adjustment due to firm entry/exit from the traditional gravity equation that
determines trade flows.
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3.2 Background on Structural Parameters of the Firm Heterogeneity Model
Although Melitz (2003) does not impose any restrictions on productivity, the
common approach in the firm heterogeneity literature is to assume that firms draw
their productivity levels from a Pareto distribution. There are two main reasons
for choosing the Pareto distribution. First, the Pareto distribution is analytically
tractable. As Chaney (2008) argues, an important property of Pareto distribution is
its stability to truncation from below. As a result of this property, exporters, which
are more productive and therefore at the upper tail of the distribution, are also Pareto
distributed. Moreover, the same shape parameter that governs the distribution of
domestic firms also governs that of exporters2.
The second reason for favoring the Pareto distribution over alternatives is empirical.
The Pareto distribution is a power law and provides a good fit for the observed size
distribution of firms3. Empirical support for this distribution is found for US firms
(Axtell, 2001) and French firms (Eaton et al., 2011) among many others4. The Pareto
assumption for firm sales is equivalent to assume that firm productivity is Pareto,
though with a different shape parameter. Furthermore, the Pareto distribution predicts
a linear relationship between the log of rank and the log of firm size (Crozet and
Koenig, 2010). An ever-expanding body of empirical studies uses this property to
consistently estimate shape parameters based on firm sales data. In particular, they
2There are new empirical findings that might challenge this proposition. di Giovanni et al. (2011)
argue that the shape parameter of firm size distribution is systematically different between exporters
and non-exporters. Firm size distribution of exporters is more fat-tailed and has a lower shape
parameter than non-exporters because they are more productive. This in turn implies that the Pareto
shape parameter of productivity distribution is different between exporters and non-exporters given
a constant elasticity of substitution for firm varieties.
3In developed countries, Pareto seems to provide a better fit for the distribution of manufacturing
firms that are medium-sized (Axtell, 2001; Crozet and Koenig, 2010). Moreover, there is a minimum
size threshold for power laws to provide a good fit for the data (Axtell, 2001; Luttmer, 2007).
As a result, di Giovanni et al. (2011) argue that the size distribution of small firms may not be
well-described by a power law.
4Size distribution of firms also follows a power law in the case of Japan (Fujiwara, 2004; Okuyama
et al., 1999). See Gabaix (2008) for a full survey on power laws.
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estimate the Power Law exponent of firm sales given by γ/(σ − 1) to pin down γ and
σ. However, since this expression is a combination of γ and σ, it is not possible to
separately identify the structural parameters in these studies.
A key restriction on these parameter values in this context is the condition γ > σ−1.
This is described in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) as the condition that ensures
the firm size distribution has a finite mean. This is equivalent to saying
γ
σ − 1 > 1
. Therefore, the relative values of γ and σ become critical for quantitative outcomes
such as export sales. The value of the shape parameter determines price differences
across firms in the industry. A small shape parameter implies a large dispersion
of productivity among firms with low-productivity firms capturing a small share of
the market. In this case new entrants charge higher prices compared to the existing
exporters. On the other hand, in an industry with a large shape parameter, there is a
big mass of low-productivity firms that represent a larger share of industry output. In
this case, prices charged by new entrants are similar to the existing exporters. This
supply-side heterogeneity is translated into export sales based on the demand-side
heterogeneity.
A small elasticity of substitution means that consumers are willing to pay a
premium for differentiated varieties which makes low productivity less of a disadvantage.
Therefore, new entrants can capture a larger share of the market. However, a large
elasticity of substitution increases the competition in the market and makes low
productivity a bigger disadvantage. As a result, marginal firms capture a small share
in the market. This discussion suggests that export sales by new entrants are largest
when there is supply-side homogeneity (high γ) and demand-side heterogeneity (low
σ) (Hillberry and Hummels, 2013).
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An opposite case is where γ
σ−1 = 1 which is known as the Zipfs Law. This yields
a fat-tailed distribution of firm size where the infra-marginal firms in the industry
are large and have a disproportionate share of overall sales compared to the small
marginal firms. In that case, the welfare impact of trade is driven by infra-marginal
firms rather than the marginal ones. Therefore, the contribution of the extensive
margin to trade is found to be negligible (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013)5. An
implication of this finding is that quantitative results of trade cost reductions on trade
flows and welfare are very sensitive to the firm size distribution and, by extension,
very sensitive to the structural parameters of firm heterogeneity. This raises the stakes
when it comes to obtaining reliable estimates of the Pareto parameters.
Even though there is a growing body of empirical work aimed at estimating
structural parameters, there is still substantial uncertainty about the appropriate
parameter values to use in the firm heterogeneity model. This is particularly true
because of the challenges associated with the identification of two parameters using
only one estimating equation, as mentioned above. A brief overview of parameter
values used in the firm heterogeneity literature is provided in Table 3.26. There are
three key points that we can draw from this table.
5This can be linked back to the discussion in Dixon et al. (2015) about the offsetting effects of
extensive margin and productivity on welfare in a tariff increase scenario.
6This table is by no means a full review of the literature. The aim of this table is to present only
a sample of the most relevant work to explore the mainstream approach in obtaining parameter






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































First, empirical studies confirm that the value of the Power Law exponent of
firm size distribution is around 1 (Axtell, 2001; di Giovanni et al., 2011) and it
is used in various studies to infer shape parameter values by relying on external
sources for elasticities (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013; Melitz and Redding, 2013).
Second, the shape parameter values that are calibrated using the Power Law exponent
(di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013; Eaton et al., 2011; Melitz and Redding, 2013) or by
other methods (Arkolakis et al., 2008; Zhai, 2008) are higher compared to the directly
estimated values (Crozet and Koenig, 2010; Spearot, 2015). Using calibrated values of
shape parameters would attribute lower productivity dispersion to the industry, while
there could, in fact, be much higher productivity heterogeneity across firms. Therefore,
we prefer to use the information contained in the shape parameter estimates instead
of those from the calibration exercises.
Third, aggregation has a significant effect on parameter values. Estimates based
on higher levels of aggregation are found to be higher than the ones based on lower
levels of aggregation. This is because when we work with aggregated products, we
fail to capture the variation across sectors and we settle on one parameter value to
describe the entire industry. For example, in the two cases where the parameter
values are estimated at a disaggregate level, for more than 30 sectors, the shape
parameter estimates are found to show substantial variation in the range of 1.65-7.31
in Crozet and Koenig (2010) and 1.76-6.29 in Spearot (2015). On the other hand,
estimates/calibrations that are at an aggregate industry level provide few values that
are in the range of 3-7, on average (Arkolakis et al., 2008; Balistreri et al., 2011; Bernard
et al., 2003; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Eaton et al., 2011; Zhai, 2008). Similarly, the
difference in aggregation is important for the elasticity values, as well. Elasticity
estimates in Crozet and Koenig (2010) are in the range of 1.15-6.01, reflecting a wide
range of demand-side heterogeneity compared to the more aggregated studies. In
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order to account for the variation across sectors, we prefer to work at a disaggregated
level of the manufacturing industry, focusing initially on the motor vehicles and parts.
Aggregation is extremely important in analyzing the extensive and intensive margin
effects of trade flows, as well. Hillberry and Hummels (2013) argue that the extensive
margin plays a larger role when one works with aggregated product lines. On the
other hand, the impact of the intensive margin is more pronounced when we work
with disaggregated product lines. Making this distinction is paramount in interpreting
the results of any policy experiment.
3.3 Theoretical Model
We present a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms building on the
theoretical model in Helpman et al. (2008) and Crozet and Koenig (2010). We consider
the world to be composed of R countries, where we index exporters by r = 1, 2, , R
and importers by s = 1, 2, , R. Every country produces and consumes differentiated
as well as homogeneous products. For the homogeneous goods industry, we retain
the traditional assumption of national product differentiation (Armington, 1969) and
the industry is characterized by perfect competition with constant returns to scale
technology. On the other hand, we follow Melitz (2003) and assume that there are
H differentiated industries indexed by h = 1, 2, , H. Each industry is composed of a
continuum of firms where each firm produces a unique variety indexed by ω. Moreover,
firms differ in their productivity levels and operate under monopolistic competition.
3.3.1 Consumers
We adopt a Dixit-Stiglitz treatment in the demand-side. In this setting, consumers
are characterized by love-of-variety where they perceive each variety as a unique product
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and derive utility from that uniqueness. The utility function for the differentiated












where ωhrs indexes the variety of good h imported by country s from the source
country r, Ωhr is the set of all varieties of good h available in country r, qhrs (ωhrs) is
the quantity demanded by a representative consumer in country s of variety ωhrs of
good h imported from country r and σh > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
the varieties of good h.
Let Phs be the price index of good h in country s, i.e. the dual price index of the











where phrs (ωhrs) is the price in country s of variety ωhrs of good h imported from
country r (gross of trade costs). Based on these demand and price aggregates, we







where Yhs is the total expenditure in country s on industry h (equal to income in the
relevant industry in country s)7.
7Please note that
Yhs = PhsUhs =
∫
ωhrs∈Ωhs
phrs (ωhrs) qhrs (ωhrs) dωhrs
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3.3.2 Producers
Producer behavior is based on Melitz (2003). In this setting, there are Nhr varieties
of the differentiated good h produced in the exporting country r. A corollary to this
is that there are Nhr active firms in the monopolistically competitive industry h in
country r. Each firm produces a unique variety, ω, with different productivity, ϕ. In
addition, varieties produced by firms in the exporting country r are distinct from the
varieties produced by firms in the importing country s. Each country exports only a
subset of its unique varieties because only some firms find it profitable to export into
a given market. As a result, exports from country r to s includes only Nhrs < Nhr
varieties being shipped on the r -s trade route. This means that the total number of
varieties of good h available to consumers in country s is Nhs domestic varieties plus∑
r
Nhrs imported varieties.
Firms in industry h incur variable and fixed costs of production and of exporting.
There are two types of fixed costs: sunk-entry costs to produce in the domestic
market and fixed export costs to enter export markets. Fixed export costs are source-
destination specific and are assumed to be identical across firms on the same bilateral
trade route. There are two types of variable costs: marginal cost of production and
transportation costs for export shipments. We adopt the standard assumption of
iceberg transportation costs, in which τhrs > 1 units of good h must be shipped from
country r in order for one unit of good h to arrive in country s.
The only type of cost that is firm-specific in this setting is the marginal cost of
production which equals chr/ϕhr for an active firm in industry h of country r. Here,
chr is the cost of the input bundle that is used for producing one unit of output in
industry h of country r and ϕhr is the productivity of an active firm in industry h
of country r which measures the amount of output produced by one bundle of input.
Given the input bundle cost, let fhrs measure the number of bundles that is used by
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firms in industry h to cover the fixed costs of exporting from country r to country s.
Then, the fixed export costs on this particular bilateral trade route equals chrfhrs.
The profit-maximizing price in a monopolistically competitive industry is a constant
markup over marginal cost. Hence the delivered price in country s of the variety








σh−1 is the markup that decreases with a larger elasticity of demand. If
preferences are more homogeneous (large σh), the industry becomes more competitive
and firms have to charge a lower markup for their respective varieties. Using the profit
maximizing prices in equation (3.4) and utility maximizing level of sales in equation
(3.3), the profit from exporting qhrs (ϕ) units of good h into country s is found to be
πhrs (ϕ) =









Yhs − chrfhrs. (3.5)
Firm export participation is determined by the potential profit to be made in each
bilateral market based on equation (3.5). Firm profit increases with market size in
the destination country (Yhs), lower marginal costs (chr/ϕhr), and lower barriers to
trade (τhrs and fhrs). Productivity level of the firm plays a key role in determining the
potential profit to be made on a particular trade route based on fixed costs associated
with exporting. Particularly, destination-specific fixed export costs limit the number
of exporters from source country r since only the firms with high productivity levels
can cover fixed export costs and make positive profits in the export market. The
cutoff productivity level of exporting is destination-specific and is determined by the
zero profit condition on each bilateral trade route. The revenue made by the marginal
exporting firm is just enough to cover total costs of exporting and determines the
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productivity threshold. Let the productivity threshold for firms in industry h to export












Firms that have a higher productivity level than ϕ∗hrs will successfully export on the
r -s route, while the rest of the firms, which have lower productivity levels than ϕ∗hrs,
will only supply the domestic market. This self-selection mechanism determines the
number of firms in export markets which can differ across destinations. As mentioned
above only a subset Nhrs firms out of the total Nhr firms are able to export into
country s and the mass of firms in this subset depends on the productivity distribution
in the industry.
We assume that firm productivity follows the Pareto distribution with support
[ϕmin,∞) and shape parameter γh that satisfies the condition γh > σh − 1. The
associated density function, g (ϕ), and cumulative distribution function, G (ϕ), are
then as follows:
g (ϕ) = γ
ϕγmin
ϕγ+1
, G (ϕ) = 1− (ϕmin/ϕ)γ (3.7)
where ϕmin ∈ [1,∞) is assumed in this paper.8 Given the productivity distribution,
1 − G (ϕ∗hrs) measures the proportion of firms that have productivity levels higher
than the threshold ϕ∗hrs. Therefore, the fraction of active exporters to all firms in the
industry Nhrs/Nhr equals 1−G (ϕ∗hrs).9
8Helpman et al. (2008) uses a truncated Pareto distribution by imposing upper and lower bounds
to productivity. The reason for these bounds is to construct a model that can explain zero trade
flows in the country level data with firm behavior. But, using a truncated Pareto distribution brings
about nonlinearities into the model which we do not attempt to solve in this paper. For analytical
tractability purposes we choose to impose only a lower bound for productivity. An implication of
this assumption is that because there is a continuum of firms in the industry, there is a positive mass
of exporters for all country pairs as noted in Head and Mayer (2014).





3.3.3 Aggregate Trade Flows
The value of aggregate trade flows is the product of number of firms that sell in
the destination market and the average revenue along the bilateral trade route. Let
Mhrs be the total value of demand in destination country s for good h sourced in




Nhrsphrs (ϕ) qhrs (ϕ)μ (ϕ) dϕ (3.8)
where μ (ϕ) is the productivity distribution of successful firms in equilibrium, i.e.




1−G(ϕ∗) ifϕ ≥ ϕ∗
0otherwise
(3.9)
We simplify (3.8) by using optimal demand and price for good h given by equations



















10Vhrs corresponds to the average productivity in the industry. In Melitz (2003), average productivity









. Based on this definition, we have Vhrs =




σh−1g (ϕ)dϕ, we can
express Mhrs in terms of Nhr instead of the bilateral Nhrs.
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Equation (3.10) can be thought of as a measure of the intensive margin because
it takes export sales of all exporters into account in determining aggregate export
sales on a particular trade route. Equation (3.10) also shows that bilateral trade flows
increase with market size of the importer s (Yhs), the mass of firms in the industry
(Nhr), competition in the importing market (Phs), reductions in barriers to trade (τhrs)
and reductions in factor costs (chr). A quick look at equation (3.10) would suggest that
the elasticity of trade with respect to reduced trade costs is 1− σh. This corresponds
to the trade-cost elasticity in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman monopolistic competition
model. However, this is only part of the story. In fact, 1 − σh only represents the
demand side effects of reduced trade barriers in a firm heterogeneity model. There
are additional effects of trade cost reductions embedded in Vhrs which work through
the supply side. In particular, Vhrs represents how self-selection of firms into export
markets stimulate average productivity and thereby increase trade flows in the case of
lower trade barriers. This mechanism introduces the supply side effects of trade cost
changes into equation (3.10).
The combined effect of demand and supply side effects reveals that the trade-cost
elasticity of trade flows in a firm heterogeneity model is different from that of a model
with homogeneous firms. In fact, Chaney (2008) shows analytically that trade-cost
elasticity11 is equal to the supply side parameter −γh in a multi-country Melitz (2003)
framework. This finding paved the way for subsequent empirical work that changed
the interpretation of parameter estimates in gravity equations in the presence of
heterogeneous firms.





3.3.4 Extensive, Intensive and Compositional Trade Margins
Many empirical studies in the gravity literature distinguish between two margins of
adjustment to trade shocks: intensive and extensive margins. As trade costs fall, not
only does the volume of sales from each exporter increase, i.e. intensive margin, but
the set of exporters changes as well, i.e. extensive margin. As opposed to this two-way
decomposition, Head et al. (2014) offer a three-way decomposition by arguing that an
implicit margin is embedded in the conventional interpretation. Since new entrants
are less productive than the existing exporters, sales of new entrants are lower than
the average shipment prior to trade cost reductions. The margin of adjustment as a
result of this difference in sales is referred to as the compositional margin by Head
et al. (2014). The compositional margin is a part of the extensive margin in Chaney
(2008) and Crozet and Koenig (2010), while it is included in the intensive margin in
Bernard et al. (2007) and Hillberry and Hummels (2008). Needless to say, depending
on how the compositional effects are assigned the relative contribution of the intensive
and extensive margins of trade will vary across otherwise identical studies. Therefore,
it is appealing to break out this compositional effect.
Here we explicitly show the three-way decomposition of trade-cost elasticity. Trade
flows in equation (3.8) can be written as the product of the number of exporters
and average sales per exporter, Mhrs = Nhrsm (ϕ˜hrs) where average sales is defined
as m (ϕ˜hrs) =
∫∞
ϕ∗hrs
m (ϕ)μ (ϕ) dϕ. Using the Leibniz rule, as in Chaney (2008), we























∂ ln [1−G (ϕ∗hrs)]
∂ lnϕ∗hrs
∂ lnϕ∗hrs




The first component in equation (3.12) is the intensive margin which gives the
adjustment in trade-cost elasticity due to changes in sales of the existing exporters.
As mentioned before, the intensive margin effect is the same as in the traditional
Armington model. The second component is the extensive margin, due to changes in
the set of exporters. The third component is the compositional margin due to lower







difference between lower sales of new exporters and the average sales of the incumbents
in the export market.
We follow Head et al. (2014) in simplifying equation (3.12) by applying the Pareto
distribution and using the optimal demand and pricing equations. The resulting
trade-cost elasticity of trade flows is identical to Chaney (2008).
∂ lnMhrs
∂ ln τhrs
= (1− σh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin
+ (−γh )︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
+ (σh − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
compositional margin
= −γh (3.13)
According to equation (3.13) the intensive margin depends only on the demand-
side parameter σh and is equal to the trade-cost elasticity in a Krugman-type model
with homogenous firms. Similarly, the compositional margin also depends on the
demand-side parameter as sales of new entrants are also governed by the substitution
elasticity. An important discussion in Head et al. (2014) is that the intensive and
compositional margins exactly offset each other due to the assumed Pareto distribution.
This is in line with the discussion in Chaney (2008) even though his definition of the
extensive margin includes the compositional part as well. He states that firm-level
trade behaves in the same way as aggregate trade behaves in traditional models. As a
result, the intensive and compositional margins affect the trade elasticity with the
same magnitude, but in opposite direction. On the other hand, the extensive margin
introduces supply-side effects through the shape parameter γh. In the end, what
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determines the final trade-cost elasticity of trade flows is the extensive margin in a
firm heterogeneity model. An interesting point Chaney (2008) makes is that in firm
heterogeneity models, the impact of trade barrier changes on trade flows is larger
than that of the representative firm models. This is due to the required condition
γh > σh − 1 which shows that the quantitative importance of the extensive margin on
trade flows is higher in a firm heterogeneity setting compared to the intensive margin
effect.
In this paper we adopt the convention in Chaney (2008) and include the composi-
tional margin within the extensive margin. Therefore, our definition of the extensive
margin captures the combined effect of export sales per new exporter and the change
in the set of exporters. Therefore, when we refer to the extensive margin in this paper,
we refer to −γh + σh − 1.
3.4 Data
We use two data sources in this paper. Bilateral trade data comes from the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012). This version
includes 57 GTAP commodities and 134 GTAP regions of which 113 country titles
are available. We use the time series bilateral trade data of this version that covers
the period 1995 to 2009 with 2007 as the reference year. (Detailed information about
data sources and variable definitions can be found in Appendix B.)
In this paper, we focus on the motor vehicles and parts sector, coded as MVH
in GTAP. Therefore, we only use the trade data that is related to MVH. This
choice is based on the information about the shape parameter estimates reported in
Spearot (2015). Motor vehicles and parts is one of the most heterogeneous industries
with respect to productivity in Spearot (2015) with a value of 1.79. On the other
hand, the Armington elasticity in GTAP for motor vehicles and parts is 5.6 (Hertel
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et al., 2003). A comparison of these values reveals that the condition for finite size
distribution γ > σ − 1 is not satisfied for MVH if we stick to the Armington elasticity
(1.79 < 5.6− 1).
Trade barriers which are modeled as iceberg trade costs are not explicitly observed
in the data. Therefore, a common approach in the gravity literature is to assume
that iceberg trade cost is a function of many observable variables such as the physical
distance between trading partners, sharing a common language, having a colonial rela-
tionship etc. We adopt the same approach and use the distance (GeoDist) and gravity
(Gravity) databases of Centre d‘Etudes Prospectives et dInfiormations Internationales
(CEPII) to obtain the information about gravity variables. GeoDist is CEPIIs distance
database developed by (Mayer and Zignago, 2005) and it includes country-specific
data for 225 countries and bilateral data for 224 country pairs. Further details about
this database can be found in Mayer and Zignago (2011). In our paper, data on
distance, contiguity, common language, colonial links and landlocked countries are
obtained from GeoDist. In addition, we use CEPIIs Gravity database based on Head
et al. (2010). This database covers an exhaustive set of variables for 224 countries
for the period 1948 to 2006. In our paper, data on common legal origins, common
currency, FTA and GATT/WTO membership are obtained from Gravity.
The time period considered in this paper is from 1995 to 2006 to match the time
series of bilateral trade from GTAP and the gravity variables from CEPII. In particular,
we drop the years 2007-2009 from the GTAP time series data and we drop the years
1948-1994 from the CEPII Gravity data. Our final dataset is obtained by merging
GTAP data with CEPII data for motor vehicles and parts industry, 113 country titles
and it covers the period from 1995 to 2006. The list of countries included in our
dataset is presented in Table B.1.
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Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the final sample of our dataset. We
also tabulate the frequency of zero trade flows in the dataset by year in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics of the Dataset, Motor Vehicles and
Parts, 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006.
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Exports (millions $US) 151,872 48.35 809.4 0 65206
Distance (km) 151,872 7467 4346 131.8 19781
Contiguity 151,872 0.026 0.158 0 1
Common Language 151,872 0.112 0.315 0 1
Common Colony 151,872 0.062 0.241 0 1
Colonial Link 151,872 0.017 0.128 0 1
FTA/RTA 151,872 0.091 0.287 0 1
Common Legal Origins 151,872 0.299 0.458 0 1
Common Curency 151,872 0.010 0.098 0 1
GATT /WTO Membership (both) 151,872 0.714 0.452 0 1
Landlocked 151,872 0.040 0.196 0 1
Table 3.3. Zeros in the Motor Vehicles and Parts Industry, 113 Countries.














Bilateral trade datasets are known to include large numbers of zeros even at the
country level (Helpman et al., 2008). Our dataset is no exception. As reported in
Table 3.3, zero trade flows of motor vehicles and parts account for 77 per cent of the
observations over the period 1995-2006. Large fraction of zeros in the dataset is known
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to cause sample selection bias in coefficient estimates in gravity equations where the
dependent variable is log of trade flows. Since the logarithm of zero is undefined, zero
observations are dropped from the sample in traditional OLS regressions. We follow
the approach adopted in Helpman et al. (2008) to control for sample selection.
Table 3.3 also shows that the fraction of zero trade flows diminished across years.
While zero trade flows account for almost 81 per cent of the observations in 1995, this
fraction reduces to 71 per cent in 2006. This reduction implies that there have been
new bilateral trade routes created over the course of 12 years in motor vehicles and
parts industry. We can interpret this as the reflection of extensive margin effect in the
data resulting from firm entry and exit over the years.
3.5 Empirical Methodology
We follow the common practice of estimating the intensive and extensive margins of
trade using a specification based on the gravity equation. Our empirical strategy draws
on the work of Helpman et al. (2008) and Crozet and Koenig (2010). The empirical
strategy in Helpman et al. (2008) is to develop a two-stage Heckman estimation
procedure where they explicitly account for unobserved firm heterogeneity and sample
selection bias to consistently estimate the gravity equation in a firm heterogeneity
model. Similarly, we consider two equations. The first one is an export participation
equation in which we estimate the effect of distance on the probability that a firm
exports on the r-s route. The second one is a gravity equation in which we estimate
the effect of distance on aggregate trade flows. We diverge from Helpman et al. (2008)
on two fronts. First, we estimate these two equations separately, not simultaneously.
Second, our latent variable definition for the first equation is different and follows
Crozet and Koenig (2010).
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Since we focus only on the motor vehicles and parts industry, we suppress the
h subscript for industries in the rest of the paper. Moreover, we introduce a time
subscript t to the variables that have different values across years.
3.5.1 Export Participation: Probit
The first equation we estimate is the probability of firm participation in export
markets which captures entry/exit of firms, i.e. the extensive margin effect. Firm
activity is not explicit in our dataset because we only observe trade flows at the country
level. Helpman et al. (2008) use a latent variable in order to capture firm behavior
in country level observations. Their latent variable is defined as the ratio of variable
export profits to fixed export costs. According to this specification, positive trade flows
are observed at the country level if and only if the latent variable is greater than one.
However, this specification does not use the information implicit in the productivity
distribution. As a result, the Pareto shape parameter does not appear in the export
selection equation considered in Helpman et al. (2008). In this paper, we want to
show the interaction between the shape parameter (γ) and the substitution elasticity
(σ) which requires use of the productivity distribution. Therefore, we follow the latent
variable definition in Crozet and Koenig (2010) and compare firm productivity with
the productivity threshold in the export market. We now turn to the details of this
approach.
A firm with productivity ϕ exports from country r to s if its productivity level passes
the threshold level, i.e. ϕ > ϕ∗rs. Let Trst be an indicator variable where Trst = 1 if the
country r exports MVH to country s in year t, and zero otherwise. Then, the probability




When we apply the cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution we
obtain






Substituting equation (3.6) and (3.14) and rearranging, we obtain the following
equation for firm selection into export markets:





























We do not have information about the value of variable trade costs and bilateral
fixed export costs in our dataset. Hence we follow the convention of imposing additional
structure on variable and fixed costs. Variable trade costs are assumed to be a function
of distance between countries and several other trade barriers as follows:
τrst = D
δ
rs exp (−kψrst − urst) , (3.16)
where Drs is the distance between country r and s, δ is the distance elasticity of trade
which is strictly positive, ψrst is a vector of trade impeding and trade facilitating
variables and urst ∼ N (0, σ2u) captures unobserved trade costs that are i.i.d.
We follow Balistreri et al. (2011) and Helpman et al. (2008) and model fixed export
costs as a combination of barriers imposed by importers only, by exporters only and
by a county-pair specific bilateral cost. Let frst ≡ exp (θr + θs + κθrs − vrst), where θr
are fixed export costs common across destinations incurred by exporting country r, θs
are the fixed trade barriers imposed by the importing country on all exporters, θrs are
country-pair specific fixed trade barriers, and vrst ∼ N (0, σ2v) captures unmeasured
trade frictions. Helpman et al. (2008) notes that vrst is i.i.d; however, they may be
correlated with the unmeasured variable trade costs, urst.
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Incorporating these definitions of variable and fixed export costs into equation
(3.15) and taking logarithms of both sides we get the following probit equation:
Pr (Trst = 1) = α0 − δγ lnDrs + Er + Es + α4θrs + α5ψrst + ηrst, (3.17)
where α0 = −γ ln σσ−1 , α4 = γκ1−σ , α5 = kγ, Er = γσ1−σ ln cr + γ1−σθr, is an exporter
fixed effect which controls for the marginal cost (cr) and fixed cost (θr) that are




1−σθs is an importer fixed
effect which controls for market size and fixed costs associated with the importer and
urst + vrst = ηrst ∼ N (0, σ2u + σ2v) is i.i.d.12 We also add a year dummy that controls
for the omitted variables which vary across years but common to all trade flows. The
estimating equation, then, becomes
Pr (Trst = 1) = α0 − δγ lnDrs + Er + Es + Et + α4θrs + α5ψrst + ηrst, (3.18)
where Et is a year dummy. In our first step regression, we estimate the Probit equation
in (3.18) for motor vehicles and parts industry. Since fixed export costs, captured by
the variable θrs, only affect the probability of a bilateral trade taking place, we can
use them as exclusion restrictions. We will turn to this again in the results section.
3.5.2 Trade Flows: OLS
The second step in our empirical strategy is to estimate the value of export sales
using the gravity equation. We use the aggregate sales of motor vehicles and parts from
country r to country s that is governed by equation (3.8). Log linearizing equation
12There is an implicit assumption we impose here. For simplicity, we assume that σ2η ≡ σ2u + σ2v = 1.
Helpman et al. (2008) do not impose this restriction which means that all coefficient estimates in
their Probit specification is normalized by ση.
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(3.8) and using variable trade costs defined as (3.16), we obtain the following regression
equation:
lnMrst = λ0 − δ (σ − 1) lnDrs + Er + Es + λ4ψrst + lnVrst + urst, (3.19)
where λ0 = (1− σ) ln σ/(σ − 1), [λ4 = k (σ − 1), Er = (1− σ) ln cr + lnNr is an
exporter fixed effect which controls for the marginal cost (cr) and new varieties (Nr)
that are associated with the exporter, Es = (σ − 1) lnPs + lnYs is an importer fixed
effect which controls for importer size and prices, and urst ∼ N (0, σ2u) is i.i.d.
Consistent estimation of Equation (3.19) requires two corrections as argued in
Helpman et al. (2008). The first correction requires adding a control variable
into (3.19) for the sample selection bias. Omitting country pairs that have zero
trade flows from the dataset might cause a correlation between the unobserved
urst and the explanatory variables. Therefore, we need a consistent estimate for
E [urst|., Trst = 1]. Following Helpman et al. (2008) we define the consistent estimate
as E [urst|., Trst = 1] = corr (urst, ηrst) σuη¯rst where η¯rst = E [ηrst|., Trst = 1]. In order
to be able use this in the gravity equation, we also need a consistent estimate of η¯rst.
As is customary in the Heckman procedure, we obtain this consistent estimate from
the inverse Mills ratioˆ¯ηrst =
φ(ρˆrst)
Φ(ρˆrst)
, where ρˆrst be the predicted probability of trade
between country r and s based on the estimated Probit equation in (3.18).
The second correction requires adding a control variable into (3.19) for the en-
try/exit of firms into export markets which is captured by the variable lnVrst. Since
firm productivity is not observed, we need a consistent estimate for E [lnVrst|., Trst = 1].
Here, we diverge from Helpman et al. (2008) because our export participation is differ-
ent from theirs. Instead, we use the relationship between lnVrst and lnϕ
∗
rst and apply
the cumulative distribution function of firm productivity. The predicted value of our la-
tent variable is ρˆrst = (ϕˆ
∗
rst)
−γ . In log-linear form this is equivalent to ln ϕˆ∗ = 1−γ ln ρˆrst.
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Using this condition and the definition in (3.11), a consistent estimate for lnVrst is
given by the following:
ln Vˆrst = ln
γ
γ − σ + 1 +
γ − σ + 1
γ
ln ρˆrst. (3.20)
We use (3.20) to transform our gravity equation in (3.19) which gives
lnMrst = βo−δ (σ − 1) lnDrs+Er+Es+Et+β4ψrst+β5 ln ρˆrst+β6ηˆrst+εrst, (3.21)
where βo = λ0 + ln
γ
γ−σ+1 , β4 = λ4, β5 =
γ−σ+1
γ
and β6 = corr (urst, ηrst) σu. We note
that the new error term εrst satisfies the condition E [εrst|., Trst = 1] = 0. In our
second step regression, we estimate the gravity equation in (3.21) for motor vehicles
and parts.
Equation (3.17) delivers a combination of the distance elasticity and the shape
parameter, −δγ, while equation (3.19) delivers a combination of the distance and
demand elasticities, −δ (σ − 1). However, estimates of −δγ and −δ (σ − 1) are not
enough to identify three parameters separately.
To circumvent this difficulty Crozet and Koenig (2010) estimate a third equation
that governs the relationship between each firms total factor productivity and its
production by using firm level data. From this equation they obtain an estimate of
−γ+(σ − 1), which facilitates the identification of three parameters in three equations.
With country-level data we cannot determine the relationship between firm sales and
their total factor productivity. Instead, we take the ratio of the two coefficients from
the Probit and OLS equations which gives estimates of γ/(σ − 1). Incidentally, this
fraction is the Power Law exponent of firm size distribution.
In order to solve for the elasticity of substitution in this fraction, we use the shape
parameter estimates provided in Spearot (2015). This method delivers estimates of
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σ, which are conditional on γ, and therefore, consistent with the underlying firm
heterogeneity theory. This estimate of σ is assumed to capture changes in trade flows
coming from substitutability in consumption while γ captures the changes in trade
flows taking into account the variation in productivity across industries and regions.
3.6 Results and Discussion
In this section we present and discuss the estimation results. We also note the
implications of these results as well as the limitations in the discussed empirical
analysis.
3.6.1 Estimation Results
Table 3.4 presents our estimation results. The first two columns give the regression
results for a Probit model that determines the probability of firm export participation.
Column (1) reports marginal effects evaluated at sample means, while estimates
reported in (2) are parameter estimates. Column (3) gives our benchmark model
which is a standard gravity equation estimated using ordinary least squares. Column
(4) reports estimation results for equation (3.21) where we include the variables ln ρˆ
and ηˆ which correct for sample selection as well as firm heterogeneity. All models
in Table 3.4 include country-specific fixed effects as well as year dummies. Standard
errors reported in all models are adjusted for clustering on country-pairs.
Our estimation results are in line with the gravity literature in general. In both (1)
and (3) distance is found to be statistically significant with an estimated coefficient
around -1, which is consistent with the usual coefficient estimates in the gravity
literature. Our results show that the rest of the explanatory variables are positive in
both regressions. In particular, we find that the probability of exporting as well as
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the volume of exports increases between country-pairs when countries: (i) are closer
to each other, (ii) are adjacent, (iii) are colonized by the same country, (iv) are both
Table 3.4. Gravity Estimation Results for Motor Vehicles and Parts
(MVH in GTAP), 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006.
Export Participation (Probit) Export Value (OLS)
Variables Marginal Effects Coefficients Benchmark FH-SS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Distance) -0.093*** -0.941*** -0.914*** -1.121***
(0.003) (0.031) (0.038) (0.056)
Contiguity 0.043*** 0.435*** 0.548*** 0.635***
(0.011) (0.116) (0.105) (0.118)
Common Colony 0.067*** 0.675*** 0.767*** 0.960***
(0.009) (0.087) (0.140) (0.237)
Colonial Link 0.058*** 0.582*** 0.405*** 0.581***
(0.012) (0.121) (0.108) (0.120)
Landlocked 0.015 0.154 0.023 -0.074
(0.01) (0.104) (0.138) (0.188)
Common Legal Origins 0.023*** 0.235*** 0.224*** 0.323***
(0.004) (0.037) (0.047) (0.051)
Common Currency 0.018 0.179 0.374*** 0.166
(0.023) (0.227) (0.113) (0.120)
GATT /WTO Membership (both) 0.025*** 0.256*** 0.383*** 0.532***
(0.004) (0.045) (0.056) (0.066)
FTA/RTA 0.041*** 0.410*** 0.681*** 0.728***
(0.005) (0.050) (0.062) (0.073)
Common Language 0.021*** 0.212*** 0.0565
(0.006) (0.059) (0.077)
Sample Selection (ηˆ) -0.435*
(0.227)
Firm Heterogeneity (lnρˆ) -0.183***
(0.033)
Observations 151,872 34,583 28,355
R2 0.672 0.699 0.721
Notes: Probit reports both the marginal effects at sample means and coefficient estimates,
Benchmark is an OLS specification of a traditional gravity equation without any corrections,
FH-SS is an OLS specification of a gravity equation with both firm heterogeneity (FH) and sample
selection (SS) corrections, SS only corrects for the sample selection bias, and FH only corrects for
the firm heterogeneity bias. Each model includes importer, exporter and year fixed effects.R2
in Probit corresponds to pseudo-R2. Robust standard errors with country-pair clustering are
reported in parantheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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members of GATT/WTO, (v) are both in the same FTA, (vi) share a colonial link, or
(vii) share a common legal system.
Our results show that the landlocked indicator is not significant either for export
participation or for volume of exports. Moreover, the fact that two countries share
the same currency is not significant for export participation, while it increases the
volume of exports. To the contrary, the probability that two countries share a common
language increases the probability of exporting while it is not significant for how much
they trade. We attribute this to the fact that language is akin to a fixed export cost.
Once the firm engages in trade, having a common language ceases to be a significant
factor for trade volumes as the firm has already invested in the new language for
marketing, legal work etc.
As discussed in Helpman et al. (2008) estimating a two-stage model requires using
an exclusion restriction that is correlated with the probability of export participation,
but not correlated with the residuals in the second-stage gravity equation, as once a
decision to export has been made, the exclusion restriction is no longer important for
trade volumes. In our model, common language satisfies these requirements for a valid
exclusion restriction. This is evident from the regression results in (1) and (3). As
mentioned before, common language reduces fixed costs of exporting and thereby it is
a significant factor in export participation, while it does not matter for trade volumes.
The validity of common language as an excluded variable is also argued by Helpman
et al. (2008) who use common language as an alternative exclusion restriction and
obtain similar results to the case where religion is used as an excluded variable.
Comparison of (3) with (4) suggests that the coefficients for almost all explanatory
variables are underestimated in the benchmark model. These findings substantially
differ from Helpman et al. (2008). Their results suggest that the parameters in
benchmark model are overestimated because the extensive margin effect and the
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country pairs that have zero trade flows are excluded in the gravity equation. In
particular, they argue that ignoring sample selection introduces a downward bias,
while ignoring firm heterogeneity introduces an upward bias. However, according
to our results, not only sample selection control, but also firm heterogeneity control
corrects for the downward bias. We attribute the difference in our results to the
latent variable specification used for the Probit model. Basically, the control for firm
heterogeneity captures the movements in productivity thresholds for export markets
as trade barriers change. For example, a higher productivity threshold for exporting
to a particular country forces low-productivity firms to exit the market which reduces
the number of exporters on that bilateral route. Because of having fewer exporters in
the market, aggregate trade flows for MVH declines. This is reflected as a significant
and negative coefficient on the firm heterogeneity control variable reported in column
(4).
While the variable correcting for firm heterogeneity is highly significant, the variable
correcting for sample selection is barely significant in column (4). To further explore
the effect of each correction in explaining aggregate trade flows in MVH, we estimate
two more specifications each focusing on one of the corrections. Results of these
regressions are reported in Table 3.5.
In order to facilitate comparison across models we report the estimation results
of the benchmark model in column (1) and the estimation results including both
corrections in column (2). The results of sample selection correction are given in
column (3), while the results of firm heterogeneity correction are given in column (4).
We note that the coefficient estimate for sample selection is significant and enters
positively contrary to (2). When we look at the firm heterogeneity correction in (4),
we see that the coefficient estimates are slightly lower than (3) and similar to (2).
Hence we see that firm heterogeneity correction dominates in (2) to the extent that
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sample selection changes sign and almost becomes insignificant for trade flows in the
motor vehicles and parts industry. Overall, the coefficient of distance is robust to
Table 3.5. Corrections in the Gravity Equation for Motor Vehicles and
Parts (MVH in GTAP), 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006.
Export Value (OLS)
Variables Benchmark FH-SS SS FH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Distance) -0.914*** -1.121*** -1.267*** -1.126***
(0.038) (0.056) (0.051) (0.056)
Contiguity 0.548*** 0.635*** 0.629*** 0.628***
(0.105) (0.118) (0.109) (0.118)
Common Colony 0.767*** 0.960*** 1.046*** 0.960***
(0.140) (0.237) (0.157) (0.238)
Colonial Link 0.405*** 0.581*** 0.696*** 0.590***
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.120)
Landlocked 0.023 -0.074 0.030 -0.070
(0.138) (0.188) (0.146) (0.188)
Common Legal Origins 0.224*** 0.323*** 0.358*** 0.325***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.045) (0.051)
Common Currency 0.374*** 0.166 0.110 0.150
(0.113) (0.120) (0.123) (0.120)
GATT /WTO Membership (both) 0.383*** 0.532*** 0.504*** 0.536***
(0.056) (0.066) (0.053) (0.066)
FTA/RTA 0.681*** 0.728*** 0.819*** 0.737***
(0.062) (0.073) (0.061) (0.073)
Common Language 0.0565
(0.077)
Sample Selection (ηˆ) -0.435* 1.375***
(0.227) (0.071)
Firm Heterogeneity (lnρˆ) -0.183*** -0.098***
(0.033) (0.028)
Observations 34,583 28,355 34,583 28,355
R2 0.699 0.721 0.729 0.721
Notes: Benchmark is an OLS specification of a traditional gravity equation without any cor-
rections, FH-SS is an OLS specification of a gravity equation with both firm heterogeneity (FH)
and sample selection (SS) corrections, SS only corrects for the sample selection bias, and FH
only corrects for the firm heterogeneity bias. Each model includes importer, exporter and year
fixed effects.R2 in Probit corresponds to pseudo-R2. Robust standard errors with country-pair
clustering are reported in parantheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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different specifications which is reassuring, as this is what will give us the desired
elasticities, to which we now turn13.
3.6.2 Elasticity of Substitution across Varieties
Up to this point, we have largely followed on the heels of existing work. However, the
main interest in this paper lies in obtaining substitution elasticities that are consistent
with the underlying firm heterogeneity theory. Given the coefficient estimates reported
in Table 3.4, we can now solve for the theoretically-consistent elasticities for use in
global trade analysis.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
−δ(σ − 1) −δγ γ/(σ − 1) γ σ ESUBM
Benchmark -0.91 -0.94 1.03 1.79 2.74 5.60
FH-SS -1.12 -0.94 0.84 1.79 3.13 5.60
* From Spearot (2015).
Notes: Probit reports coefficient estimates, Benchmark is an OLS specification of a traditional
gravity equation without any corrections, FH-SS is an OLS specification of a gravity equation
with both firm heterogeneity (FH) and sample selection (SS) corrections.
Table 3.6 reports these elasticities for the motor vehicles and parts industry under
the benchmark and FH-SS specifications. A comparison with the associated GTAP
Armington elasticity dubbed ESUBM (Hertel et al., 2003) - is also presented in
Table 3.6.
13Silva and Tenreyro (2015) argue that the assumption of homoscedastic error terms adopted in
Helpman et al. (2008) causes misspecifications in their gravity model and might lead to biased and
inconsistent estimators. In order to control for the heteroskedasticity in the data Silva and Tenreyro
(2015) suggest using Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML). As a robustness check,
we estimate the gravity equation in (3.19) using PPML. Regression results show that the coefficient
estimate of distance is -0.71 and is significant at 1 per cent level.
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Column (1) reports the coefficient estimate of distance under the benchmark and
FH-SS specifications, while column (2) reports the distance coefficient in Probit. The
ratio of column (2) to column (1) gives a similar coefficient as the Power Law exponent
of firm sizes. Values of this ratio under two specifications are reported in column (3)
and found to be around 1. In particular, the ratio is 1.03 for the benchmark model
and 0.84 for the FH-SS corrected model. These values are quite close to the Power
Law exponent estimates found in the literature summarized in Table 3.2 (Axtell,
2001; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013; di Giovanni et al., 2011; Melitz and Redding,
2013). This suggests that empirical evidence about Power Law exponents for firm
size is quite robust to the type of data used for estimation, as the value we obtain
with country-level data is consistent with that obtained from the firm-level empirical
studies.
Armed with empirically supported Power Law exponents, we move on to solve for
the theoretically-consistent elasticities of substitution. The shape parameter estimate
for motor vehicles and parts industry found in Spearot (2015) is reported in column
(4) of Table 3.2. We use this information in the Power Law exponent to solve for
our “Melitz substitution elasticities which are reported in column (5). Elasticity
values are found to be quite close across our specifications, 2.74 for the benchmark
model and 3.13 for the corrected model. Both are substantially lower than the GTAP
Armington elasticity of 5.60 and both satisfy the key parameter restriction of the
model (γ > σ − 1).
It is important to note that even when the firm heterogeneity and sample selection
corrections are not applied, the elasticity implied by the theory is lower than the
Armington elasticity used in the GTAP model. This finding is consistent with our
arguments and deserves further discussion. Even though the benchmark model does
not take sample selection and firm heterogeneity into account, it still gives us a “Melitz
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elasticity in this framework. This is because we are complementing the estimates
found in the benchmark model with the estimates found in the Probit model to infer
those elasticities. Although we do not use the Probit predictions in the trade-flow
equation, we still use the information about export participation through the Power
Law exponent. On the other hand, GTAP Armington elasticities are estimated based
only on the trade-flow equation with an Armington structure; thereby, they do not
contain any information about firm entry/exit behavior. As a result, we can say that
when used with the Probit model, even the benchmark elasticity removes the supply-
side effect captured in the GTAP Armington elasticity. In fact, when we compare
it with the corrected model, we see that the benchmark case gives a lower elasticity
estimate which implies that it removes more than the supply-side effects. That is to
say the appropriate elasticity for the firm heterogeneity model lies somewhere between
the benchmark elasticity and the GTAP Armington elasticity.
3.6.3 Implications and Limitations
So, what is the economic significance of finding a lower elasticity of substation
between varieties for use in global economic analyses? To answer this question we
should recall the effect of parameter choice on the extensive margin. Based on the
definition in Chaney (2008) the extensive margin captures the contributions to trade
flows of both the change in the number of exporters and their respective export
volumes. As you may recall this corresponds to the familiar form γ − (σ − 1). This is
where the choice of structural parameters becomes the key to policy implications. The
extensive margin is less responsive to trade barriers when the elasticity is high, while
the intensive margin is more responsive. Therefore, the choice of structural parameters
will determine the trade response as well as the welfare response to policy changes
through micro and macro mechanisms in the model. The most relevant mechanisms
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in this context are changes in average productivity through the self-selection of firms
into export markets and changes in consumer utility through the availability of new
varieties. Both of these mechanisms primarily depend on the parameter choice.
Finding a lower elasticity means that the demand-side is more heterogeneous in
the firm heterogeneity model for motor vehicles and parts than we thought it was
based on the Armington elasticity. Since consumer preferences are more heterogeneous
there is more room for new exporters in the MVH market to invest in differentiat-
ing their varieties. Therefore, marginal firms can markup their prices against large
infra-marginal firms in the market. It should be noted that there is also significant
supply-side heterogeneity in the MVH market. Spearots shape estimate is 1.79 for
MVH is one of the lowest shape parameter values within the aggregate manufacturing
industry (Spearot, 2015). This implies that infra-marginal firms have a dispropor-
tionate share of the overall activity in this market and marginal firms are much less
productive compared to the incumbents. As noted in previous discussions, having a
low productivity is less of a disadvantage when preferences are more heterogeneous
(low elasticity). Even though marginal firms charge slightly higher prices than the
incumbents, consumers are willing to pay a premium for new varieties. However, with
a higher elasticity, marginal firms would have lost their market power and would be
subsumed by the large and productive infra-marginal firms. So moving from the higher
substitution elasticities used previously in GTAP-based studies of firm heterogeneity
to the lower values suggested by this study represents an important change.
The take-away from this discussion is that the relative value of the shape parameter
and the elasticity of substitution have important consequences for trade and welfare
responses in a firm heterogeneity model. In a sense, quantitative outcomes are driven
by the Power Law exponent of firm size. For example, as mentioned before, di Giovanni
and Levchenko (2013) show that welfare impact of the extensive margin of trade is
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negligible when the Power Law exponent is 1, i.e. when the firm size distribution
converges to Zipfs Law. In fact, they compare welfare gains from reductions in fixed
and variable costs when the Power Law exponent is 1 to the case when it equals 2.
They show that when the Power Law exponent equals 1, welfare gains from reductions
in fixed costs are an order of magnitude lower and welfare gains from reductions in
variable costs are an order of magnitude higher compared to the case when the Power
Law exponent is 2. Quantitative outcomes are not the only policy implications we are
interested in. Parameter choice also matters for analyzing the dominant mechanisms
in bringing about the changes in trade flows and welfare.
The objective in this paper is to highlight the need for parameterization of the
firm heterogeneity module of GTAP for practical policy analysis. We illustrate the
need for using theoretically-consistent parameters with empirical examples in order to
have a more informed discussion about the issue. However the work presented here
has some limitations. First of all, the use of untruncated Pareto distribution in our
theoretical model imposes some restrictions on the theory to explain zero trade flows
between countries. The explanatory power of the model can be improved by putting
bounds on the productivity distribution similar to Helpman et al. (2008). Secondly,
elasticity values presented in this study are conditional on the choice of the shape
parameter value as well as the underlying model specification. In particular, some
of the variation in our firm heterogeneity elasticities is the result of using Spearot
(2015) shape estimates, which are lower than the inferred shape parameters in the
mainstream literature. In our view, this issue is an econometric one that requires
firm-level data to estimate both parameters simultaneously. Future work should focus
on separate identification of key firm heterogeneity parameters and provide confidence
intervals to those estimates for systematic sensitivity analysis. While our objective in
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this paper is to define the problem, the outstanding issue of parameter identification
remains to be open for future work.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this study we discuss a theoretically-consistent way to parameterize the firm
heterogeneity model with a focus on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The
current CGE literature relies on Armington elasticities and infers shape parameters
based on these elasticities. However, Armington elasticities are not appropriate
in a firm heterogeneity model. In fact, their interpretation and the underlying
econometric specification for their estimation are different in a Melitz (2003) framework.
Particularly, the traditional gravity equation that delivers Armington elasticities do
not control for the impact of firm self-selection into export markets which is the
main micro mechanism for productivity and variety induced gains from trade. In the
absence of firm behavior the resulting coefficient estimates confound the demand-side
effects with the supply-side effects. This indicates overestimated elasticities which
pick up part of the supply-side heterogeneity governed by the shape parameter. The
resulting parameter set used in the current CGE literature is, then, an overestimated
Armington elasticity with an inferred shape parameter that does not capture the
substantial variation across industries.
In this study we distinguish between the intensive and extensive margins of trade
flows to obtain theoretically-consistent elasticities. In particular, we estimate two
equations: an export participation equation and a gravity equation that governs
bilateral trade flows. Since we use country level data, we impose further information
in order to identify the elasticities. Specifically, we use the shape parameter estimates
provided in Spearot (2015) which shows the variation of heterogeneity across industries
and regions. Our results show that GTAP Armington elasticities are significantly
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higher than the elasticity estimates that are theoretically consistent with the Melitz
(2003) model.
This study provides an informed discussion about the theoretically-consistent
parameterization of firm heterogeneity models in a CGE setting. Since we work with
country-level data, separate identification of parameters is not feasible. Therefore, we
rely on external shape parameter estimates. Our future research agenda is to identify
elasticities and shape parameters separately by utilizing firm-level data. We, then, will
be able to test the observational equivalence between an Armington-based model with
a Melitz (2003) model in a CGE setting. We believe that combining theory-consistent
econometric evidence with the firm heterogeneity model in a CGE framework will
lead the way for mainstream application of firm heterogeneity models in the GTAP
community.
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CHAPTER 4. FIRM HETEROGENEITY, FIXED COSTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF US-EU BEEF TRADE
4.1 Introduction
Regulatory measures and non-tariff barriers are among the key issues discussed in
recent trade agreement negotiations between the United States (US) and the European
Union (EU). Lowering of protection on several agricultural products has been on the
agenda of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement
where beef trade stands out among many others as it is heavily protected in the EU
market. Non-tariff barriers in the EU beef market include sanitary and phystosanitary
(SPS) measures such as the hormone ban on beef (Arita et al., 2014). In particular,
the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production was banned in the EU in
1989 which has put a significant restriction on US beef exports into the EU market
(FAS, 2014). These measures have been subject to scrutiny by US beef exporters as
well as industry stakeholders and are being discussed in recent TTIP negotiations.
In order to ensure that beef exports meet the EU standards, the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has been offering the Non-Hormone Treated Cattle (NHTC) Program (FSIS, 2014).
Signing up for this program brings additional costs to the firms as it requires them to
pay for on-site visits by AMS, prepare the associated documents, adapt the production
and packing processes to comply with the hormone-free beef production etc (Arita
et al., 2014). These are significant fixed costs which may prevent US beef producers to
export into the EU market. Removal of these barriers could yield significant economic
100
gains by reducing fixed costs in export markets and by US improving market access
to the EU.
There are a few CGE-based studies of the TTIP that quantify the economic
implications of removing NTMs in general (ECOYRS, 2009; CEPR, 2013; EP, 2014)
and the beef hormone ban in particular (Arita et al., 2015; Beckman and Arita, 2015).
The established approach in this literature is to model trade based on the Armington
assumption of national product differentiation. Even though computational policy
analysis with Armington-based models shed some light on the implications of NTM
removal, it fails to capture (i) important demand-side mechanisms based on product
differentiation and (ii) important supply-side mechanisms based on productivity
dispersion across firms.
Beef industry is assumed to have a perfectly competitive market structure in these
studies (Arita et al., 2015; Beckman and Arita, 2015). However, a more appropriate
treatment is to allow for monopolistic competition in the beef industry. Consumers
in the EU market differentiate between hormone-free and hormone-treated beef such
that they have a higher preference for the hormone-free varieties (Lusk et al., 2003).
In fact, studies show that European consumers, on average, indicate a willingness
to pay a premium for steaks with a USDA Choice No Hormones or GMOs stamp
(Tonsor and Shroeder, 2003). A monopolistically competitive industry structure fits
better in this case as it captures the effect of availability of different varieties from
different source regions.
On the supply-side, the interaction of fixed costs and productivity dispersion across
firms provides significant insights into which exporters will sign up for the NHTC
program and which will be given the license to export. One of the stylized facts in
the empirical literature is that firms substantially vary in their efficiency levels and
only the relatively productive ones are able to export (Bernard and Jensen, 1999;
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Bernard et al., 2003). This applies to the beef industry as well which implies that
the same fixed costs imposed by the NHTC program do not affect each firm in the
same way. Productivity dispersion in the beef market dictates which firms will export
and which firms will supply the domestic market. Therefore, the costly compliance
procedures may prevent inefficient US firms to export beef into the EU market. These
mechanisms have significant welfare implications.
In this paper we address these gaps by using the firm heterogeneity module of
GTAP developed in Chapter 2 where we explicitly model monopolistic competition
with firm-level heterogeneity based on the seminal work of Melitz (2003). A unique
aspect of this model is its ability to capture the trade creation and diversion effects at
the extensive margin and to tease out productivity changes due to within-industry
factor movements. These new mechanisms available in the firm heterogeneity module
of GTAP will help better understand the welfare implications of NTMs in general and
hormone ban in particular. In addition, we provide values for key parameters of the
firm heterogeneity model consistent with the underlying theory based on the insights
discussed in Chapter 3.
In this paper we explore the implications of reducing the hormone ban imposed by
the EU on US beef imports by using two specific policy instruments: (i) reduction in
fixed export costs, (ii) reduction in tariff rates. There are three forms of modeling
NTMs in the mainstream CGE literature. These are summarized by Andriamananjara
et al. (2003) as tariff-equivalent, export tax equivalent and as efficiency losses. Our
treatment for (i) falls broadly under the efficiency loss category, while that of (ii) falls
under the tariff-equivalent category.
In the GTAP model NTMs are modeled as efficiency losses by considering their
implications on the effective price and demand for imports from a particular exporter
(Hertel et al., 2001). This is a demand-side treatment of NTMs which does not trace
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out the direct effect of fixed costs on firms. However, the fixed costs associated with
beef hormone ban accrue directly to producers and exporters before they are reflected
in consumer prices. Therefore, we lose important information about firm behavior
when NTMs are modeled on the demand-side only. A novelty in our paper is to model
NTMs on the supply-side. In particular, we map NTMs to country pair-specific fixed
export cost shifters that capture efficiency losses on the use of inputs that cover fixed
costs. These shifters are additional policy leverages introduced to the GTAP model in
the context of firm heterogeneity.
Finally, we explore the welfare implications of reducing the fixed export costs
associated with beef hormone ban. We compare welfare predictions under the firm
heterogeneity model to the mainstream models, in this case the standard GTAP model
with Armington assumption and perfect competition.
4.2 Data and Empirical Background
Our model is calibrated to GTAP Version 9 Pre-release 1 data base with 2011
as the base year. We aggregate the data base to include eight regions, six tradeable
products and three primary factors of production as listed in Table 4.1.
The choice of our regional aggregation is based on major trade partners of US
and major beef exporters to the EU. South American countries constitute the biggest
Table 4.1. Data Aggregation: GTAP Version 9.1 Pre-release.
Regions Sectors Endowments
European Union (EU) Canada Primary Food Land
United States (USA) Mexico Extraction Labor
Brazil China Beef Capital
Argentina India Processed Food
Uruguay Rest of the World (ROW) Manufactures
Australia Services
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share in beef import of the EU. In particular, Brazil (40%), Argentina (21%) and
Uruguay (17%) account for 78 percent of beef imports in the EU between 2009 and
2013 (Arita et al., 2014) followed by the US as the fourth largest source.
Our sectoral aggregation consists of primary food, extraction products, beef, pro-
cessed food, manufactures and services. The details of this aggregation are summarized
in Appendix C. In the GTAP sectoral definition beef includes bovine meat products.
Therefore, the beef industry in this study is composed of firms that produce and sell
bovine meat products. The rest of the firms which produced other processed food are
included in the processed food industry.
We assume a monopolistically competitive market structure in the beef industry
with firm-level productivity heterogeneity. The motivation for this treatment is based
on consumer preferences. Beef is not just one homogeneous product. There are many
varieties within the industry. The most important distinction is between hormone-free
and hormone-treated beef. Consumers in the EU have a higher preference for the
hormone-free varieties of beef (Lusk et al., 2003) which are sold as premium products.
There is also variation across the varieties of different regions. For example, US
beef imports in the EU are grain-fed and are considered as higher value products. In
contrast, South American beef is categorized as prepared products such as corned beef
and manufacturing-grade product used in ground beef production (Arita et al., 2014).
Similar to beef, we treat processed food and manufacturing industries as monop-
olistically competitive with heterogeneous firms. The other sectors (Primary Food,
Extraction and Services) are assumed as perfectly competitive.
Key to our analysis is how we calibrate the parameters of our aggregation in
the firm heterogeneity model. There are two parameters of particular importance in
the firm heterogeneity model: (i) the elasticity of substitution across varieties which
governs the demand-side heterogeneity and (ii) the shape parameter of productivity
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distribution (Pareto) which governs the supply-side heterogeneity. As discussed in
Chapter 3, parametric assumptions are paramount to computational policy analysis.
Interpretation and estimation/calibration of key parameters of the model have to be
tailored to the model specification.
These arguments have been addressed in Chapter 3 and we find that the elasticity
of substitution is different between the firm heterogeneity model and the Armington-
based perfect competition models. As a result, we cannot simply use the Armington
elasticities in the GTAP data base in this study. Instead, we use the method proposed in
Chapter 3 and obtain the theoretically-consistent elasticities for the firm heterogeneity
model conditional on shape parameter estimates of Spearot (2015). We, then, aggregate
the new elasticities based on each product’s respective share in world trade, while
we aggregate the shape parameters based on each industry’s respective share in total
costs of production. The calculated parameter values are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Key Parameters of the Model.
Aggregate Market Shape Parameter Melitz Elasticity GTAP Armington Elasticity
Sectors Structure γ σ ESUBM
Primary Food PC - - 4.97
Extraction PC - - 10.65
Beef FH 3.78 4.21 7.70
Processed Food FH 2.71 2.95 4.90
Manufactures FH 2.59 3.55 7.16
Services PC - - 3.85
Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition (Armington).
Parameters in perfectly competitive industries are calibrated via the usual tech-
niques where GTAP Armington elasticities are used for primary food, extraction and
services products. For the monopolistically competitive industries with heterogeneous
firms, we find that ’Melitz’ elasticities are lower than the GTAP Armington elasticities.
The ’Melitz’ elasticity for the beef industry is found to be 4.21, while the elasticity is
7.70 if the industry was treated as perfectly competitive. This big difference indicates
that the choice of market structure would have important welfare implications.
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4.3 Policy Application
In this section we present our policy applications in the firm heterogeneity module
of GTAP developed in Chapter 2. Specifically, we examine the implications of reducing
EU’s hormone ban imposed on US beef imports by using two specific policy instruments:
(i) reduction in fixed export costs, (ii) reduction in tariff rates. We, then, compare
the effects of each policy under the firm heterogeneity model with that of the perfect
competition model.
4.3.1 Treatment of Non-Tariff Measures
Treatment of NTMs in the firm heterogeneity model is quite different than the
mainstream approach adopted in the standard GTAP model. To highligt the differences
we briefly summarize each approach before detailing the specifics of the shocks.
NTMs are modeled as efficiency losses in the standard GTAP model. They enter as
technical coefficients, AMS(i,r,s), and work through the demand-side (Hertel et al.,
2001). AMS(i,r,s) is defined as the import augmenting technical change of product
i from source region r to destination s. Changes in the value of AMS(i,r,s) are
reflected in the price of imports from a particular exporter as well as the demand
for imports from that exporter. Thus, non-tariff measures work its way through the
prices. Moreover, since there are no NTM costs in the initial data base, the model
needs to be calibrated to add those costs into the data.
Unlike the standard GTAP model, the impact of NTMs work through the supply-
side in the firm heterogeneity model. In particular, we map NTMs to country
pair-specific fixed export cost shifters that capture efficiency losses on the use of inputs
that cover fixed costs. For this purpose, a new policy instrument AVAFX(i,r,s) is
defined as the technical change in the fixed cost of exporting product i from source
region r to destination s. An increase in AVAFX(i,r,s) ensures a fall in the effective
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quantity of value-added used in covering the fixed export costs in that particular
market. In other words, each firm faces lower fixed export costs conditional on
exporting. This has repercussions for the effective price of value-added as well. In
this model, we assume that firms’ price of value-added is the same for fixed and
variable portions of value-added in order to ensure market clearing for endowments.
Therefore, an improvement in the efficiency of fixed costs reduces the effective price of
all value-added independent of whether it is employed in the variable cost coverage or
fixed cost coverage.
Initial fixed costs in the model are calibrated based on a gravity equation of trade
flows. Chapter 2 explains this in more detail. Here, we modify the calibration slightly
to match the share of revenues spent on fixed costs in the export market to that
of fixed costs in the domestic market. Our simplifying assumption is that domestic
suppliers face similar plant modification costs to segregate the production line for
hormone-free and hormone-treated beef. Based on our parameter settings, we find
that the average firm in the beef industry devotes 3.6 % of its net revenues from sales
in a particular market on the fixed costs to operate in that market.
4.3.2 Shocks on Policy Instruments
The shocks we impose on our policy instruments are based on the gravity esti-
mations obtained in Arita et al. (2015). They use estimates of NTM costs as data
in the standard GTAP model as well as in a supply-chain module of GTAP where
detailed land-use competition among livestock markets are modeled. The removal of
NTM costs is, then, broken out into changes in import taxes (tms(i,r,s)), changes
in export taxes (txs(i,r,s)) and changes in efficiency (ams(i,r,s)). They find that
if the removal of NTM costs is allocated entirely to the efficiency variable, US beef
exports to the EU increases by 274%. If it is allocated entirely to import taxes, US
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beef exports to the EU increases by 274%, as well. If on the other hand, the removal of
NTM costs are broken into three policy variables under a supply-chain model explored
by Arita et al. (2015), US beef exports to the EU increases by 306%. These simulation
results are in line with the gravity model predictions presented in Arita et al. (2015).
According to their gravity model, if the hormone ban were removed, the estimated
amount of US beef exports ranges between 210% - 314% across different specifications.
We calibrate the shocks used in our policy scenarios based on the trade volume
changes obtained in Arita et al. (2015). We use the percentage change in exports
found by using the tariff and efficiency variables only (274%) as opposed to the one
found in the supply-chain case (306%). There are two reasons for this preference.
First, in the firm heterogeneity model we do not allow for land-use competition among
livestock markets as in the supply-chain module in Arita et al. (2015). Second, we
explore the effects of policy instruments separately; therefore, isolating the shocks is
more appropriate for our purposes.
We fix the percentage change in export sales of beef from the US to EU as 274% in
our model and calibrate how much efficiency increase in fixed export costs is required
to obtain this trade volume increase. This gives us the shock on our fixed export
cost shifter, avafx(i,r,s). We repeat the same procedure for the tariff rate with
the same trade volume increase. This gives us the shock on our power of the tariff,
tms(i,r,s). These shocks are presented in Table 4.3
We follow the same procedure in calibrating the shocks for the perfect competition
model. Note that we use the standard GTAP model as the perfectly competitive model.
There are several differences in our policy application under the perfect competition
model. First, to calibrate the shock for fixed cost reduction we use the efficiency
variable ams(i,r,s) as opposed to avafx(i,r,s). Second, in order to be able to
compare welfare results in firm heterogeneity with perfect competition we distinguish
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between Melitz and Armington elasticities in respective model specifications. This is
in line with the discussion in Arkolakis et al. (2008) and Dixon et al. (2015). They
argue that a meaningful comparison across Melitz and Armington models can be
done if the observed trade patterns are equivalent and model-consistent elasticities are
used across model specifications. Both of these conditions are satisfied in our policy
scenarios. The resulting shocks are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Shocks Imposed on US Beef Imports in the EU un-
der Firm Heterogeneity and Perfect Competition Models where j













Tariff Equivalent FH tms(i,r,s) −13.42% 65.28% 43.10%
PC tms(i,r,s) −16.05% 65.28% 38.75%
Fixed Costs
FH avafx(i,r,s) 207.54% − −
PC ams(i,r,s) 22.01% − −
Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition (Armington). tms(i,r,s) is
the source-specific change in the power of the tax on imports of product i from source
r into destination s, avafx(i,r,s) is the technical change in the fixed cost of export-
ing product i from source r into destination s, ams(i,r,s) is the import augmenting
technical change of product i from source r into destination s.
A comparison of tariff shocks across model specifications show that a higher tariff
reduction is required in the perfect competition model (-16.05%) compared to the
firm heterogeneity model (-13.42%) to generate the same increase in US beef exports
to the EU. Initial ad-volarem tariff rate imposed on beef exports from the US to EU
is 65.28 per cent. A -13.42 per cent reduction in the power of tariff brings about an
ad-volarem tariff rate of 43.10 per cent. Therefore, it is not a complete removal of
tariff, rather a reduction to facilitate imports from the US.
A positive value for the fixed export cost shifter means that, fixed export costs per
active firms will be reduced. As per firm fixed export costs are now lower, profitability
in the export market increases which attracts new firms into the market. Therefore,
the mass of exporters in the US-EU beef market expands. As a result of this firm
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entry, total fixed costs incurred in the post-shock economy is actually higher than
initial fixed costs. This is purely an extensive margin effect. We should note that the
fixed export cost shock of 207.54% does not eliminate all fixed costs. It is merely a
reduction in fixed costs per firm conditional on observed trade patterns.
We analyze four scenarios that reduce NTMs on US beef imports in the EU:
* Fixed cost reduction of 207.54% under the firm heterogeneity model;
* Tariff reduction of 13.42% under the firm heterogeneity model;
* Fixed cost reduction of 22.01% under the perfect competition (Armington)
model;
* Tariff reduction of 16.05% under the perfect competition (Armington) model;
4.3.3 Results under the Firm Heterogeneity Model
One of the major mechanisms captured by the Melitz (2003) model is the self-
selection of firms into domestic and export markets. In this theory, firm participation
in industries or in export markets is governed by the productivity threshold to enter
that market. The productivity threshold is defined as the lowest productivity level
for a firm to produce or export in that market. We first focus on the effect of fixed
export cost reduction on these key firm heterogeneity mechanisms. Then we compare
the results with that of the tariff cut scenario.
Table 4.4 presents the changes in the productivity threshold to enter the EU beef
market as well as the changes in the number of exporters that supply this market
under the fixed cost reduction scenario. Results show that while export productivity
threshold decreases for the US firms, it increases for all other regions. The direct effect
of lower fixed export costs per firm is a fall in the demand for value-added inputs
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used by existing US beef exporters to fulfill the AMS export requirements. As fixed
export cost per sale decreases, it becomes more profitable for existing US exporters
to supply the EU market. This is especially good news for the marginal exporters of
US beef who previously made zero profits in the pre-shock economy. As they start to
make positive profits, the cutoff productivity level to export into the EU beef market
decreases by 79%.
Table 4.4. Fixed Cost Reduction: Changes in the Export Threshold






European Union 0.000 −1.506









Rest of the World 0.013 −0.021
The profitability in the European beef market attracts new exporters which
previously could not afford to sign up for the AMS program due to their lower
productivity levels relative to the existing exporters. Consequently, the number of US
exporters that supply the EU market increases by 276%. This rather large increase is
partly because of the rate of productivity dispersion in the beef industry. There is a
large pool of low-productivity producers in the beef industry around the margin that
can profitably export in the post-shock economy.
While this cost reduction benefits US firms, it diverts trade from other beef
exporters. US firms meet almost all the demand in the EU beef market such that
they replace sales from all other regions. As potential sales to the EU market
drop significantly for the rest of the regions, exporters no longer benefit from scale
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economies. Therefore, their export productivity thresholds increase as shown in
Table 4.4. Marginal exporters lose their market sales and start making negative profits
which force them out of the EU market. As a result, the number of exporters to the
EU beef market diminish in all regions except for the US.
Table 4.5 presents the results in the tariff cut scenario on productivity threshold
and number of exporters into the EU beef market. The tariff cut scenario predicts
smaller changes for the threshold and mass of exporters. Reduction in fixed export
cost per sale increases the profitability of exporting more than cutting tariffs.
Table 4.5. Tariff Reduction: Changes in the Export Threshold and






European Union 0.000 −1.228









Rest of the World 0.011 −0.015
It is important to note the difference in the nature of tariffs and fixed costs as
policy instruments. By using tariffs as a policy instrument we are allowing for money
transfers between exporters and importers. On the other hand by using fixed costs,
we are actually improving the efficiency of value-added devoted to cover fixed costs
and reduce the factor demand of firms for entering a new market. As a result, the
underlying general equilibrium mechanisms are markedly different in each scenario.
Table 4.6 presents the changes in the number of exporters, producers and potential
firms in the beef industry of each region under both scenarios. We see that beef
exporters increase in all regions except for the EU and Argentina. Beef production in
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the EU falls as the domestic demand is met by the US imports. As a result, factors of
production released from the beef industry are devoted to production in the processed
food and manufactures industries in the EU.
Table 4.6. Changes in Varieties in the Beef Market under Fixed Cost
Reduction and Tariff Cut Scenarios (%).
Regions













European Union −0.071 −0.057 −1.506 −1.228 −1.506 −1.228
United States 0.528 0.182 0.289 −0.170 0.537 0.401
Brazil 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Argentina −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000
Uruguay 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.009
Australia 0.021 0.027 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.020
Canada 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.020 0.007 0.020
Mexico 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011
China 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011
India 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Rest of the World 0.001 0.001 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.025
We see that the number of all producers increases in most of the regions including
the US under the fixed cost reduction scenario (0.289%). The US experience is
noteworthy because the domestic productivity threshold increases much more in the
US compared to other regions. Interestingly, there is firm entry into the beef industry
even though the domestic threshold increases. This can be explained by the effect of
trade policies on potential firms.
The pool of potential firms is determined endogenously by the zero profits condition
in the model. A potential firm decides to enter the industry if the potential profits
from all sales are high enough to cover both domestic and export fixed costs. The
US beef industry becomes highly profitable following the fixed export cut as a result
of increased sales to the EU market. This attracts many potential firms to make
the productivity draw and survive in the beef industry. The increase in the mass of
potential firms (0.537%) more than offset the rise in domestic productivity threshold
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(0.065%) which eventually leads to an increase in the mass of active firms in the US
beef industry (0.289%). The number of potential and total firms are the same in other
regions as there is not much of a change in their respective domestic thresholds (only
after three decimal places).
The compositional change in domestic and export markets have significant im-
plications for the industry productivity. Table 4.7 presents the changes of average
productivity of domestic suppliers, exporters and the whole industry under the two
trade policy simulations.
Table 4.7. Productivity Growth in the Beef Industry: Domestic,
Export and Industry-Wide Averages under Fixed Cost Reduction and
Tariff Cut Scenarios (%).
Regions













European Union 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
United States 0.065 0.151 −0.066 −0.057 −0.084 0.044
Brazil 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Argentina 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Uruguay 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
Australia 0.000 0.000 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005
Canada 0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003
Mexico 0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
China 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
India 0.000 0.000 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
Rest of the World 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Domestic suppliers report the average productivity growth of firms that only sell in the domestic
market. Exporters report the productivity growth of exporters in all export markets weighted by the
respective share of each export market in total sales of beef. All producers report the average productivity
growth in the industry weighted by the respective share of each market in total sales of beef.
For most regions, average productivity in the domestic market is affected only
modestly by these policies. Comparatively, the US experiences a more sizeable change.
Average productivity of domestic suppliers increases by 0.065% under the fixed cost
reduction scenario while it increases by 0.151% under the tariff cut scenario.
Average productivity of exporters decreases in most of the regions as a result of
the expansion of low-productivity firms into export markets. Even though most of
the regions suffer from a productivity threshold increase for the EU market, there is
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a decline in the productivity threshold for other export markets. As a result, they
divert their beef sales to regions other than the EU. This allows for low-productivity
exporters in the beef market to expand their market shares. Since new exporters
are less efficient than the incumbents, their entry into the export markets lowers the
overall efficiency in export markets on average.
Industry-wide average productivity is affected by the compositional changes in
domestic and export markets. As less efficient firms expand into the beef export
market, the industry-wide productivity decreases on average in all regions under both
scenarios. The only exception is the US under the tariff cut scenario. In that particular
case, domestic market productivity increases more than in the fixed cost scenario
because less efficient firms drop out of the industry. The domestic average (0.151%)
more than compensates for the reduced export market average (-0.057%). Therefore,
tariff cut reallocates market share by shifting resources towards more productive firms
improving the aggregate productivity in the US (0.044%).
So far, we have focused on the beef industry. To complete the picture, we briefly
turn to other industries. Table 4.8 presents changes in the output of each industry
in the EU and US under the two policy scenarios. As expected, production in the
primary food industry expands as well as beef in the US. This is not surprising as
primary food is the major input used in beef production.
Unlike primary food, production in other industries drops. As beef becomes more
profitable, firms in other industries switch to beef production especially the ones in
the processed food industry. On the other hand, the EU experiences the opposite
such that there is a substantial contraction in the beef industry and a more modest
expansion in the manufacturing industry.
Finally, we consider the effects of fixed cost reduction and tariff cut on prices.
Table 4.9 presents the supplier prices in each industry for the US and EU across the
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two scenarios. An interesting finding is that price of beef in the US increases under
the fixed cost scenario while it decreases under the tariff scenario. In both cases the
expansion in the beef industry bids up factor prices. Although input prices are higher
at the industry level, the average efficiency of firms within the industry differs across
scenarios.
Table 4.8. Change in the Production of Each Sector under Fixed Cost






EU US EU US
Primary Food −0.063 0.052 −0.051 0.051
Extraction 0.039 −0.026 0.033 −0.025
Beef −1.497 0.476 −1.221 0.598
Processed Food −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
Manufactures 0.007 −0.010 0.007 −0.009
Services 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
Table 4.9. Change in the Supplier Prices of Each Sector under Fixed






EU US EU US
Primary Food −0.014 0.013 −0.012 0.013
Extraction −0.011 0.007 −0.009 0.007
Beef −0.007 0.090 −0.006 −0.037
Processed Food −0.003 0.003 −0.003 0.004
Manufactures −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.001
Services −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.002
As mentioned before in the tariff cut scenario, the domestic threshold in the beef
industry increases and pushes the less efficient firms out of the industry which improves
the overall efficiency in the industry. As high-productivity firms constitute a larger
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share of the industry, the average productivity in the industry falls despite the increase
in factor prices. Hence the decline in supplier prices under the tariff-cut scenario.
The opposite occurs in the fixed cost scenario due to the rise in domestic average
productivity.
4.3.4 Welfare Implications across Model Specifications
Implications of these TTIP scenarios can be better understood by exploring the
resulting welfare effects in each region. In this section we provide a detailed analysis on
the components of welfare change in firm heterogeneity. There are three new sources
of economic gains from trade that can be captured in firm heterogeneity models. We
can summarize them as: (i) productivity effect, (ii) love-of-variety effect, and (iii)
scale effect (Melitz and Trefler, 2012; Zhai, 2008). These components are additional to
the allocative efficiency and terms of trade effects which are the traditional channels
of gains from trade in perfect competition models with Armington assumption.
Productivity effect is the result of within-industry compositional change of firms
in favor of the high-productivity firms. As factors of production are reallocated
towards more productive firms, overall efficiency in the industry rises which has a
positive contribution to overall welfare. The productivity channel is unique to the firm
heterogeneity model. The second channel is the Dixit-Stiglitz love-of-variety effect
which results from the ability of the firm heterogeneity model to capture trade growth
along the extensive margin. Trade contributes to overall welfare by allowing new
varieties to become available to consumers who gain utility from the uniqueness of
products. The third channel is the scale effect which is the result of increasing returns
to scale technology available in the monopolistically competitive industries. As trade
expands, there are fewer firms left in the market which face lower average costs and
operate at a higher scale generating additional gains from trade.
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Aggregate welfare effects of the unilateral fixed export cost reduction and tariff
cut in the firm heterogeneity model are presented in Table 4.10. The provide addi-
tional insights about the contribution of firm heterogeneity mechanisms, we compare
the outcomes of this model to that of the standard GTAP model with Armington




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The firm heterogeneity model predicts a global welfare gain of $403 million from
the fixed export cost reduction. This is much higher than what the tariff reduction
scenario predicts which is about a $195 million global welfare gain. Here we should
note that the higher welfare gains predicted by the fixed cost scenario is not simply
the result of the bigger shock we imposed on fixed costs. In fact, since trade responses
are equalized between the two scenarios, welfare differences are attributed to the
differential effects of each policy instrument on the responses of productivity and
extensive margin.
Welfare decomposition can provide more insights into these findings. Looking at
the experience of each country in the firm heterogeneity model reveals that welfare
of the EU increases under both scenarios, $460 million with fixed cost reduction and
$261 million with tariff cut. The main driving force of these economic gains is due to
the traditional allocative efficiency effect. As the EU welcomes increasing levels of
beef imports from the US, a considerable amount of tariff rents are collected which
contributes positively to the welfare of EU ($456 million). Even in the case of tariff
reduction, the EU benefits from rents ($371 million) because tariffs are not completely
eliminated and beef imports from the US increases by the same rate as in the fixed
cost scenario. As expected, terms of trade contribution is negative (-$45 million under
both scenarios) due to terms of trade deterioration in the EU (-0,002%).
The new channels in firm heterogeneity paint a more detailed picture of the welfare
change. We see that the loss in average productivity in the beef industry as well as in
other heterogeneous industries reduces welfare by $42 million in the case of fixed cost
reduction and $43 million in the case of tariff cut. The loss caused by productivity
and terms of trade effects are offset by the variety effects ($87 million) under fixed
cost reduction. Increased domestic varieties of manufacturing products more than
compensates for the loss in domestic beef varieties ultimately contributing to the
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welfare gain. The opposite happens in the tariff cut scenario where the private sector
suffers from the loss in domestic beef varieties which eventually reduces welfare by
$25 million.
The firm heterogeneity model predicts a welfare loss in the US (-$9 million and
-$23 million under the respective scenarios). This is contrary to the predictions of the
Armington-based model reported in Table 4.11 which estimates a $40 million welfare
gain under the tariff cut scenario and a more modest $8 million gain under the fixed
cost reduction scenario. The divergent findings across model specifications result from
the additional channels of economic gains in the firm heterogeneity model. In the fixed
cost reduction scenario, we see that the negative welfare in the US is driven by the loss
in average productivity (-$71 million). This is due to within-industry compositional
change in favor of the low-productivity firms. In this context, trade growth causes
welfare loss by allowing inefficient marginal firms to survive in domestic and export
markets. This can be thought of as trade diversion in the sense that lower fixed costs
makes production and exporting profitable for inefficient firms. Therefore, part of the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































On the other hand, welfare loss under the tariff cut scenario is driven by the
negative variety effect (-$143 million). US consumers suffer from the loss of domestic
varieties in the beef industry as well as the manufacturing industry. In particular, the
impact of domestic variety loss of beef is most severe on private households, while
the impact of domestic variety loss of manufactures is most severe on firms that use
manufacturing products as inputs. Even though the imported varieties of beef and
manufactures increases in the US, it is no match for the loss of domestic varieties when
we account for the preference bias of home goods. Overall, we see that the choice of
policy instruments matters for the responses of each welfare mechanism.
Comparison of results between firm heterogeneity and perfect competition indicates
that the US benefits from lower fixed costs if the productivity and variety channels are
not taken into account. In particular, without the trade diverting effect of lower average
productivity in the case of fixed costs and the utility reducing effect of variety loss in
the case of tariffs, welfare in the US increases due to positive terms of trade effects.
However, this leaves out important economic information which can be paramount for
policy recommendation.
Overall, the firm heterogeneity model predicts larger welfare gains for the world
compared to the perfect competition model. Including firm-level heterogeneity in the
model allows for tracing out the welfare implications of NTM reduction due to new
channels which are unexplored in Armington-based perfect competition models. By
ignoring the significant variation across firms, NTM removal scenarios miss the effect
of productivity change and the extensive margin on global welfare.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Limitations
The policy analysis in this chapter relies on the assumptions we make in model
calibration and parameterization to determine the values of substitution elasticities
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between varieties, shape parameters and the associated fixed costs in the domestic
and export markets. In this section, we check the sensitivity of the model results to
alternative assumptions about the model parameters. The key issue in this sensitivity
analysis is to use parameter values that will satisfy the parametric restriction in the
model, γ > σ − 1. This parametric restriction is important in the calibration of fixed
costs and variable costs in value-added which we turn to now.
4.4.1 Calibration of Fixed Costs and Parametric Restrictions
In this study we assume that fixed costs for the domestic and export markets
are composed of value-added only. For the initial value of fixed costs we follow Zhai
(2008) in calibrating fixed costs to the base year bilateral sales data because the GTAP
data base does not have information about fixed costs. This method imposes certain
restrictions on the parametric space that allows the model to run. In this section we
discuss these restrictions and present the set of parameters for the beef industry that
satisfy these restrictions. We start with briefly summarizing the main aspects of the
calibration.
Using the optimal demand and price for the differentiated variety, we find fixed
costs to be proportional to sales where the proportionality constant depends on our
parametric choice. The calibration for fixed costs in both domestic and export markets




γi − σi + 1
σiγi
, (4.1)
where Pirs is the price of product i produced in region r and sold in region s, Qirs is
the quantity of product i produced in r sold in s, Nirs is the number of exporters of
i that sell on the r − s trade route, Wir is the cost of one value-added bundle that
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is used by firms in region r that sell product i to cover fixed costs and Firs is the
number of value-added bundles required to cover fixed costs of sales of i from region r
to region s.
The left-hand side in equation (4.1), NirsWirFirs, gives the fixed cost of selling
product i from source r to destination s aggregated over all firms that are active
in that market. The right hand side has two components. The first one, PirsQirs
Tirs
,
gives the total revenue of selling product i from r to s which equals total cost of
exporting that particular good to market s. The second component, γi−σi+1
σiγi
, is a
proportionality constant that depends on preferences and the heterogeneity of the
industry. As preferences become more homogeneous, i.e. higher σi, firms have little
incentive to invest in differentiating their varieties because the markup gets smaller.
As a result, in this model fixed export costs decrease with the elasticity of substitution.
Similarly, a higher shape parameter, i.e. less heterogeneity across firms, reduces fixed
costs of exporting.
The rest of the value-added costs are attributed to the variable portion of production.
Then, variable value-added costs are calculated as residuals from fixed costs. Based
on the parametric choice, initial fixed and variable cost calibration could give negative
values. In order to avoid negative values, we need to restrict the parametric space to
a particular region where the parameter combinations give positive values for fixed
costs as well as for variable costs in the initial data base. The parametric restriction
for the beef industry is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 plots the combinations of the substitution elasticity and Pareto shape
parameter for the beef industry. The range of parameters considered is [1, 13]. The
lower bound is selected based on the model assumptions, i.e. σ > 1 and γ > 1. We
limit the upper bound for both parameters at 13 for representative purposes. For the
shape parameter, the value of the upper bound is in line with empirical studies where

126
(2015) within the bounds of the model. The parameter combination for the beef
industry that we used in our policy analysis is reported as the ‘reference value’ in
Figure 4.1, where γ = 3.78 and σ = 4.21. The shape parameter estimate is from
Spearot (2015) which is the mean value for 59 countries. The elasticity value that
corresponds to this shape parameter is found by following the empirical study in
Chapter 3.
Spearot (2015) provides shape parameter estimates for the beef industry by country.
This gives us a range of shape parameter estimates that vary across 59 countries.
However, he does not provide corresponding elasticity values. Therefore, we rely on
empirical studies in order to find a way to disentangle elasticity values that correspond
to the Pareto shape estimates in Spearot (2015). The first candidate is the firm-level
study conducted by Arita et al. (2015) for the beef industry in Europe. Arita et al.
(2015) estimates the dispersion of firm-level export sales by following the approach
in Helpman et al. (2004) which gives an estimate of a combination of the Pareto
shape parameter and the elasticity of substitution. The resulting coefficient estimate
is γ − σ + 1 = 0.62. We fit the elasticities to this empirical relationship using the
shape parameter values in Spearot (2015). The resulting parameter combinations are
plotted in Figure 4.1 and referred to as Arita et al. (2015). As is shown on the figure,
several parameter combinations do not satisfy the parametric restriction and are in
the invalid region.
In order to compare the parameter combinations with an alternative fit for elas-
ticities, we also consider the empirical work of di Giovanni et al. (2011) where the
Power Law exponent of firm sales are estimated by regressing log of rank on log of
sales by based on French firm-level data. The resulting coefficient estimate is the
Power Law exponent which gives a value of γ
σ−1 = 1.06. This is for an average of 25
tradeable industries. The resulting parameter combinations are plotted in Figure 4.1
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and referred to as di Giovanni et al. (2011). The parameter values on this fit are
very close to the fit with Arita’s (2015) estimate. However, in this case all parameter
combinations are within the valid region.
Table 4.12 reports the parameter values used in our sensitivity analysis. The
reference values presented in the table are the parameter values we use in the original
policy analysis in Section 4.3.3. The low and high values for Arita et al. (2015) and
di Giovanni et al. (2011) are selected such that the parameter values are within the
valid region. The lower and higher values for the shape parameter are selected to be
the same in Arita et al. (2015) and di Giovanni et al. (2011) in order to be able to
compare the effect of a different elasticity fit on simulation results.
Table 4.12. Parameter Values for the Beef Industry used in the Sensitivity Analysis.
Arita (2015) di Giovanni et al. (2011)
Parameters Reference Value Low Value High Value Low Value High Value
Shape parameter, γ 3.78 2.17 11.60 2.17 11.60
Elasticity of substitution, σ 4.21 2.55 11.98 3.05 11.94
Notes: Reference Value reports the parameter values used in this dissertation for policy analysis, Arita
(2015) reports the parameter combinations that fits elasticities to the estimates found in Arita (2015)
and shape parameters in Spearot (2015), di Giovanni et al. (2011) reports the parameter combinations
that fits elasticities to the estimates found in Arita (2015) and shape parameters in Spearot (2015).
Since the Pareto shape parameter and the elasticity of substitution move in tandem
based on the parametric restriction of the model and fit, low values correspond to
lower values for both parameters. In other words, if the Pareto shape parameter is
low, then the associated elasticity is also low. Similarly, high values correspond to
higher values for both parameters.
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4.4.2 Simulation Results with Alternative Parameter Values
Table 4.13 presents the welfare effects of the two policy scenarios analyzed in
Section 4.3.3 under alternative parameter values. Low and high values correspond to
the parameter combinations in Table 4.12 under Arita (2015).
Results in Table 4.13 show that welfare changes under the fixed cost scenario are
not very sensitive to parameter values. For the EU, welfare gains are slightly higher
under higher parameter values. The US experiences welfare loss under all parameter
values considered; however, there is no clear relationship as to how the parameter
values affect the magnitude of the change. Compared to the reference value, the
US experiences a larger welfare loss both under lower parameter values and higher
parameter values.
Table 4.13. Welfare Effects under Alternative Parameter Values (Elas-
ticities are fitted to Arita et al. (2015)): Equivalent Variation in
millions of US$.
Region Fixed Cost Scenario Tariff Scenario
Low Value Reference Value High Value Low Value Reference Value High Value
EU 450 460 464 165 261 386
USA -17 -9 -11 -29 -23 -18
Brazil -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Canada -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1
Mexico -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3
China -6 -6 -6 -7 -6 -6
India 1 1 1 1 1 1
ROW -35 -38 -40 -27 -33 -40
Total 388 403 403 99 195 317
Sensitivity analysis for the tariff cut scenario presents a clearer comparison. For
the EU, welfare gains are much higher as parameter values are increased. On the other
hand, the US experiences a smaller welfare loss as parameter values are increased. We
see that the impact of parameter values on the effects of tariff cut is more pronounced.
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Welfare effects are much more sensitive to parameter values under the tariff cut
scenario compared to the fixed cost scenario.
Table 4.14 presents the effects of using alternative parameter values on changes in
export values for beef under the two policy scenarios. The results show that export
values are not very sensitive to parameter values under either scenario. The EU
experiences a loss in beef exports which is lower under higher parameter values. On
the other hand, there is a considerable increase in US beef exports, the magnitude of
which gets lower as parameter values are increased.
Table 4.14. Changes in the Value of Beef Exports under Alternative
Parameter Values (Elasticities are fitted to Arita et al. (2015)), $US
millions.
Region Fixed Cost Scenario Tariff Scenario
Low Value Reference Value High Value Low Value Reference Value High Value
EU -46 -46 -43 -34 -37 -39
USA 585 583 579 579 574 561
Brazil 1 1 0 1 1 1
Argentina 0 0 -1 0 0 -1
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia 7 5 5 7 7 7
Canada 3 2 2 4 4 5
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1
China 0 0 0 0 0 0
India 2 1 1 1 1 1
ROW 4 3 2 4 4 5
Total 557 550 545 565 555 541
Table 4.15 presents the effects of using alternative parameter values on the percent-
age change of average productivity in the beef industry under the two policy scenarios.
The sensitivity analysis on welfare results may depend on how we fit the elasticity
values. An alternative fit for elasticities may paint a different picture for the welfare
results. Table 4.16 presents the welfare effects of the two policy scenarios under an
alternative elasticity fit using the estimates in di Giovanni et al. (2011).
The welfare gains under alternative parameter values are similar for the EU in
the fixed cost scenario. On the other hand, there is a huge difference in the welfare
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Table 4.15. Changes in Average Productivity in the Beef Industry
under Alternative Parameter Values (Elasticities are fitted to Arita
et al. (2015)), % Change.
Region Fixed Cost Scenario Tariff Scenario
Low Value Reference Value High Value Low Value Reference Value High Value
EU -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
USA -0.178 -0.084 -0.025 -0.059 0.044 0.097
Brazil -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Argentina 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Uruguay -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.000
Australia -0.010 -0.004 -0.001 -0.010 -0.005 -0.002
Canada -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001
Mexico -0.005 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 0.000
China 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
India -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001
ROW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total -0.210 -0.096 -0.027 -0.091 0.029 0.093
Table 4.16. Welfare Effects under Alternative Parameter Values (Elas-
ticities are fitted to di Giovanni et al. (2011)): Equivalent Variation in
millions of US$.
Region Fixed Cost Scenario Tariff Scenario
Low Value Reference Value High Value Low Value Reference Value High Value
EU 455 460 464 174 261 386
USA 4 -9 -11 -25 -23 -18
Brazil -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0
Australia -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Canada -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1
Mexico -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
China -6 -6 -6 -7 -6 -6
India 1 1 1 1 1 1
ROW -37 -38 -40 -30 -33 -40
Total 412 403 403 109 195 317
response of the US to changes in parameter values. The US experiences a welfare gain
under low parameter values, while it experiences a welfare loss under high parameter
values. The sensitivity of welfare changes to parameter values can be traced back to
the sensitivity of the variety effects to parameter values. As parameter values get
higher, the variety effect turns from positive to negative.
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The different results under alternative fits to elasticities highlight the importance
of proper parameterization of the firm heterogeneity model. A better parameterization
of the model is paramount for improving the performance of the model.
4.4.3 Limitations
An outstanding issue in this study is the parametric restrictions imposed by the
theory and the calibration of fixed costs. As initial values for fixed costs and variable
value-added depend on the parametric choice, we are restricted to the parameter
combinations which provide positive values for fixed and variable value-added costs.
In order to improve the model, alternative methods of parameterization should be
considered. Expansion of the parametric space can relax the dependency of the model
on parameters which requires an alternative method to calibrate or estimate initial
fixed costs. Estimation of fixed costs is difficult as their identification depends on
their nonlinear effects on market participation patterns. Das et al. (2007) develops a
structurally dynamic framework which allows for the estimation of fixed export costs
based on plant-level data. In particular, Das et al. (2007) identify fixed costs by using
the differences in the exporting frequency of plants with similar profit streams but
different export participation history. We do not attempt to solve this issue in this
study. However, using empirical information for initial fixed costs may improve the
flexibility of the model for alternative parameters.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Reducing NTMs as a means to increase market access and harmonizing the
standards in trade between the US and the EU has been the main target of recent
TTIP negotiations. EU’s hormone ban on US beef is one of the frequently discussed
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issues in these negotiations. Removal of the fixed costs associated with US beef
imports into the EU is expected to generate significant economic gains.
This study focuses on the implications of reducing beef hormone ban imposed on
US imports. We contribute to this line of literature by taking firm-level heterogeneity
and extensive margin effects prevalent in the monopolistically competitive beef market
into account. For this purpose we use the newly developed firm heterogeneity module
of GTAP which (i) accounts for fixed costs in domestic and export markets; (ii) traces
out self-selection of firms into export markets based on productivity differences and
(iii) captures trade growth along the extensive margin. We compare the effects of
using different policy instruments to capture NTM reductions. Moreover, we provide
insights into welfare implications of firm heterogeneity model and compare them with
that of the perfect competition model.
Our findings show that the mass of US exporters into the EU beef market increases
significantly under both scenarios. The compositional change in US beef export market
is such that low-productivity firms expand their market shares as a result of lower
productivity thresholds. We find that reducing fixed export costs cause aggregate
productivity in the US beef industry to fall since it allows less efficient marginal
firms to survive in the industry and expand into export markets. This has significant
welfare implications. Reduced average productivity in the beef industry causes an
overall welfare loss in the US. We find that the choice of policy instrument alters the
underlying mechanisms at play that cause the welfare loss. When NTMs are captured
as tariff equivalents in the firm heterogeneity model, we see that the US experiences a
higher welfare loss despite the rising average productivity in the beef market. The
tariff cut causes a significant loss of domestic varieties in the beef and manufacturing
industries which more than offset the welfare gain of improved productivity.
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Overall, we find important productivity and variety impacts of NTM reductions
consistent with much of the firm heterogeneity literature on trade integration. The
comparison with Armington-based GTAP model highlights the importance of pro-
ductivity and variety impacts captured by the theory of firm heterogeneity. While
the Armington-based GTAP model predicts positive welfare gains in the US under
both policy scenarios, the firm heterogeneity specification predicts negative welfare
gains. The different welfare predictions across model specifications is due to the
productivity and variety effects captured by the theory of firm heterogeneity. Since
Armington-based CGE models fail to account for these effects, their welfare predictions
are not sufficiently informative.
In this study we focus only on the impact of reducing beef hormone ban. However,
there are other trade barriers prevalent in the beef industry such as non-technical
NTMs known as tariff rate quotas (TRQ). In fact, the EU has a restrictive TRQ policy
on US beef imports which further impedes US exports. There can be interactive effects
between the TRQ policy and the hormone ban which deserves further analysis. In fact,
the potential interplay between the hormone ban and TRQs on US beef imports is
explored in Beckman and Arita (2015). They find that the binding TRQ is the limiting
constraint which has significant implications for trade flows. This is a promising venue
for an extension of this study.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY
This thesis contributes to the international trade literature by extending the
tools available to analyze trade policies with a mainstream policy model introducing
the theory of firm heterogeneity. These extensions encompass the development and
inclusion of the related theory, calibration, estimation and simulation. These tools will
become available to the entire community of GTAP users. The broader availability of
these tools provide the basis for a more thorough policy analysis and strengthen the
link between CGE analysis and broader trade literature.
Chapter 2 presents the implementation of firm heterogeneity theory in the GTAP
model and illustrates the behavioral characteristics of the new model in a stylized tariff
removal scenario whereby Japanese tariffs on US manufactures are eliminated. Results
are compared across different model specifications such as monopolistic competition
based on Krugman (1980) and perfect competition based on the Armington (1969)
assumption of national product differentiation. Significant productivity, variety and
scale effects are observed under the firm heterogeneity model which lead to more
pronounced welfare responses compared to the monopolistic and perfect competition
models. Exit of less efficient firms from the industry due to higher competition is
found to be the main source of overall productivity increase in the manufacturing
industry of the US. This contributes positively to the welfare change. The loss in
domestic varieties due to the exit of firms results in negative variety effects which
reduces welfare.
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Chapter 3 proposes a theoretically-consistent way to parameterize the firm hetero-
geneity model with a focus on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Intensive
and extensive margins of trade are distinguished in a multi-sector, multi-country
firm heterogeneity model resulting in two estimating equations. Elasticity of sub-
stitution consistent with firm heterogeneity theory is obtained conditional on the
shape parameter estimates of Spearot (2015). Results show that the elasticity values
that are consistent with the firm heterogeneity theory are considerably lower than
Armington elasticities used in the standard GTAP model. This implies that current
implementations of Melitz-type models which use elasticities of substitution estimated
in the absence of firm heterogeneity will give overly large trade volume responses to
policy reforms.
Chapter 4 investigates the implications of reducing non-tariff measures on US-EU
beef trade associated with the beef hormone ban imposed on US imports. Two
alternative policy instruments are used: fixed export costs and tariff equivalents of the
hormone ban. Results show that while the EU benefits from these scenarios, the US
experiences a welfare loss. The choice of policy instrument is found to have important
welfare implications. Welfare loss in the US is found to be driven by the decline in
aggregate productivity under fixed cost reduction, while it is found to be driven by
the loss in domestic varieties under the tariff cut. Results are also compared across
model specifications. Findings indicate that welfare change in the US is reversed
under perfect competition. Since the perfectly competitive model does not account for
productivity and variety effects, terms of trade improvement dominates the welfare
response. As a result, welfare increases in the US. The different welfare implications
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This section provides the derivation of the zero profit condition in the monop-
olistically competitive industry with heterogeneous firms. In the monopolistically
competitive industry, total cost (TC) is composed of variable (VC) and fixed (FC)
costs. In order to obtain the average total cost (ATC) and hence the output price
(P), we normalize both the right-hand side and left-hand side variables by the level of
output (Y) as follows:
TC (w, p, Y ) = V C (w, p, Y ) + FC(w, p, ) (A.1)
TC
Y
(w, p, Y ) =
V C
Y








Using GTAP notation, (A.1) corresponds to,
PS(j, r) = AV C (j, r) +
V AF (j, r)
QO(j, r)
,
= AV C (j, r) +
PV AF (j, r) QV AF (j, r)
QO(j, r)
, (A.4)
where j ∈ MCOMP COMM for monopolistically competitive industries and r ∈
REG for regions. Total differentiation of (A.4) yields:
dPS (j, r) = dAV C (j, r) +
QV AF (j, r)
QO (j, r)
dPV AF (j, r) (A.5)
+
PV AF (j, r)
QO (j, r)
dQV AF (j, r)






We divide and multiply both sides of the equation by price and quantity variables to




= AV C (j, r)
dAV C (j, r)
AV C (j, r)
(A.6)
+
PV AF (j, r)QV AF (j, r)
QO (j, r)
dPV AF (j, r)
PV AF (j, r)
+
PV AF (j, r)QV AF (j, r)
QO (j, r)
dQV AF (j, r)
QV AF (j, r)





If we rearrange and use lowercase letters to denote percentage changes in the corre-
sponding uppercase variables, we obtain
V OA (j, r) ps(j, r) = V C (j, r) avc (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r) (A.7)
+ V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)− V AF (j, r) qo(j, r).
Recall that average variable cost is determined by the following equation:
V C (j, r) avc (j, r) =
∑
i=TRAD COMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.8)
+ V AV (j, r) [pvav (j, r)− avav (j, r)]− V C (j, r) ao(j, r).
Substituting (A.8) into (A.7) we obtain:
V OA (j, r) ps(j, r) =
∑
i=TRAD COMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.9)
+ V AV (j, r) [pvav (j, r)− avav (j, r)]− V C (j, r) ao(j, r)
+ V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r) + V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)
− V AF (j, r) qo(j, r).
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Note that total fixed cost, V AF (j, r) is composed of fixed domestic costs and fixed
export costs:
V AF (j, r) = V AFD (j, r) +
∑
s=REG
V AFX(j, r, s). (A.10)
Substituting (A.10) into (A.9) yields:
V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =
∑
i=TRADCOMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.11)
+ [V AV (j, r) pvav (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r)]
− V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r) + V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)
− [V AFD (j, r) +
∑
s=REG
V AFX(j, r, s)]qo(j, r)].
Recall that the demand price of value-added composite is a share-weighted summation
of prices of fixed and variable value-added composites. This is given as follows:
∑
i=ENDW COMM
V FA(i, j, r)pva (j, r) = V AV (j, r) pvav (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf(j, r)
V A(j, r)pva (j, r) = V AV (j, r) pvav (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf(j, r).
(A.12)
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Substituting (A.12) into (A.11) we obtain:
V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =
∑
i=TRADCOMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.13)
+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r)− V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r) + V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)
− V AFD (j, r) qo (j, r)−
∑
s=REG
V AFX(j, r, s)qo(j, r).
Note that demand for fixed value-added is composed of demand for domestic and
export markets as follows:




V AFX (j, r, s) qvafx(j, r, s).
Substituting (A.14) into (A.13) yields:
V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =
∑
i=TRADCOMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.15)
+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r)− V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)




V AFX (j, r, s) qvafx(j, r, s)
− V AFD (j, r) qo (j, r)−
∑
s=REG
V AFX(j, r, s)qo(j, r).
Note that demand for value-added is further determined by the following equations:
qvafd (j, r) = n (j, r)− avafd(j, r), (A.16)
qvafx (j, r, s) = nx (j, r, s)− avafx(j, r, s). (A.17)
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Substituting (A.16) into (A.15) we obtain:
V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =
∑
i=TRADCOMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.18)
+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r)− V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r)




V AFX (j, r, s) [nx (j, r, s)− avafx (j, r, s)]




V AFX(j, r, s)qo(j, r).
Output per firm and output per exporter are determined by the following equations:
qo (j, r) = qof (j, r) + n (j, r) (A.19)
qox (j, r, s) = qo (j, r)− nx (j, r, s) (A.20)
(A.21)
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Substituting (A.19) into (A.18) yields:
V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =
∑
i=TRADCOMM
V FA (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.22)
+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r)− V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r)




V AFX (j, r, s) [nx (j, r, s)− avafx (j, r, s)]




V AFX (j, r, s) [qox (j, r, s) + nx (j, r, s)]
After simplification (A.22) becomes:
ps (j, r) =
∑
i=TRADCOMM
V FA (i, j, r)
V OA (j, r)
[pf (i, j, r)− af (i, j, r)] (A.23)
+
V A (j, r)
V OA (j, r)
pva (j, r)− V AV (j, r)
V OA (j, r)
avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r)
V OA (j, r)
ao (j, r)
− V AFD (j, r)
V OA (j, r)




V AFX (j, r, s)
V OA (j, r)
[qox (j, r, s) + avafx (j, r, s)]
A.2 Data Description and Transformation
In the monopolistic competition model imports are sourced by agent as mentioned in
the previous sections. The structure of the standard GTAP database is not compatible
with sourced imports. Therefore, we transform the standard GTAP database following
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Swaminathan and Hertel (1996). This section outlines the steps in making this
transformation.
There are three steps to generate the monopolistically competitive data base:
• Sourcing agent demand at market prices
• Sourcing agent demand at agents prices
• Trade data
We summarize each step in this section for completeness purposes. For more details,
we refer the reader to Swaminathan and Hertel (1996).
A.2.1 Sourced Imports at Market Prices
In the standard GTAP database, consumption expenditure on domestic and im-
ported goods are given separately. For instance, the private household consumption
expenditure is VDPM(i,s) (for domestic goods) and VIPM(i,s) (for imported goods).
The first step is to transform agents domestic and import demands into sourced
demands valued at market prices. Share of imports from a particular source country
in all imports of the destination country is applied to value of agent purchases. Let
MSHRS(i, r, s) be the market share of source r in total imports of i by region s
which is calculated as follows:
MSHRS(i, r, s) =
V IMS(i, r, s)∑
k V IMS(i, k, s)
, (A.24)
where V IMS(i, r, s) is the value of imports of i by source r to destination s. Applying
this share to agent purchases yields the consumption of imports of i from source r to
destination s by agent. For instance, for the private household, we use VIPM(i,s) and
the import share MSHRS(i,r,s) to generate VPMS(i,r,s). If the source region, r, is
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the same as the destination region, s, agents purchases of domestically produced i are
also taken into account. An example for private household is given as follows:
V PMS(i, r, s) = MSHRS(i, r, s) ∗ V IPM(i, s) for r = s, (A.25)
V PMS(i, r, s) = MSHRS(i, r, s) ∗ V IPM(i, s) + V DPM(i, r, s) for r = s. (A.26)
As a result, agents domestic and import demands, i.e. VDPM(i,s) and VIPM(i,s),
are replaced by sourced demands, VPMS(i,r,s). The change in GTAP notation is
outlined in Figure A.1, Panel A.
A.2.2 Sourced Imports at Agent’s Prices
The second step is to generate the sourced import demands valued at agents prices.
Sourced imports at market prices have already been obtained in step one. Value flows
at market prices will be used to generate sourced imports at agents prices by using the
power of average (ad volarem) tax on total demand by an agent (TP (i, s), TG(i, s),
and TF (i, j, s)). The formula to calculate the power of the tax for private household
is as follows:
TP (i, s) =
V IPA(i, s) + V DPA(i, s)
V IPM(i, s) + V DPM(i, s)
. (A.27)
The same method is used for private households, government and firm intermediate
input demands. To obtain the sourced purchases at agents prices, TP (i, s) is applied
to V PMS(i, r, s) as follows:
V PAS(i, r, s) = TP (i, s) ∗ V PMS(i, r, s) (A.28)
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As a result, agents domestic and import demands, i.e. VDPA(i,s) and VIPA(i,s),
are replaced by sourced demands, VPAS(i,r,s). The data transformation in this step
is summarized in Figure A.1, Panel B.
A.2.3 Trade Data
The third step is to generate the trade data. Trade data does not go through sourcing
since it is already sourced. There are just two changes: (a) notation (exports and
imports are renamed as sales and demands respectively), and (b) inclusion of domestic
sales to ensure market equilibrium (for r = s, aggregate domestic sales are also taken
into account). The following formulas are used for exports:
V SMD(i, r, s) = V XMD(i, r, s) for r = s, (A.29)
V SMD(i, r, s) = V XMD(i, r, s) + V DM(i, r) for r = s. (A.30)
where V DM(i, r) is the value of aggregate domestic sales of i in r at market prices:
V DM(i, r) = V DPM(i, r) + V DGM(i, r) +
∑
j
V DFM(i, j, r). (A.31)
The following formulas are used for imports:
V DMS(i, s, r) = V IMS(i, r, r) for r = s, (A.32)
V DMS(i, s, r) = V IMS(i, s, r) + V DM(i, r) for r = s. (A.33)
Swaminathan and Hertel (1996) note that there are hardly any consumption tax on
domestic demand which allows the addition of domestic sales into value flows for
exports and imports when r = s. However, they highlight the fact that if domestic
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Appendix B: Data Appendix to Chapter 3
This section defines the variables used in the empirical analysis and describes the
data sources. We used two sources to obtain the data. The bilateral trade flows are
from the GTAP Data Base Version 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012). This version includes
57 GTAP commodities and 134 GTAP regions of which 113 country titles are available.
We use the time series bilateral trade data of this version that covers the period 1995
to 2009 with 2007 as the reference year.
The gravity data have been obtained from the CEPII distance and gravity databases
(http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp). GeoDist is CEPIIs distance
database developed by Mayer and Zignago (2005). In our paper, data on distance,
contiguity, common language, colonial links and landlocked countries are obtained
from GeoDist. There are two files available in this database: a country-specific dataset
geo cepii.xls (geo cepii.dta) which includes geographical variables for 225 countries
and a dyadic dataset dist cepii.xls (dist cepii.dta) which includes different measures
of bilateral distances between 224 countries. The content of these files and details
about the variables included in these files are explained in Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Gravity is CEPIIs gravity database gravity cepii (gravdata cepii.dta) based on Head
et al. (2010). This database covers an exhaustive set of variables for 224 countries for
the period 1948 to 2006. Details about the sources used in creating this database are
explained in Head et al. (2010). In our paper, data on common legal origins, common
currency, FTA and GATT/WTO membership are obtained from Gravity.
The time period considered in this paper is from 1995 to 2006 to match the time
series of bilateral trade from GTAP and the gravity variables from CEPII. In particular,
we drop the years 2007-2009 from the GTAP time series data and we drop the years
1948-1994 from the CEPII Gravity data. Our final dataset is obtained by merging
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GTAP data with CEPII data for motor vehicles and parts industry, 113 country titles
and it covers the period from 1995 to 2006.
Table B.1. List of Countries.
List of Countries
Albania Cte d’Ivoire Iran Namibia South Africa
Argentina Croatia Ireland Nepal Spain
Armenia Cyprus Israel Netherlands Sri Lanka
Australia Czech Republic Italy New Zealand Sweden
Austria Denmark Japan Nicaragua Switzerland
Azerbaijan Ecuador Kazakstan Nigeria Taiwan
Bahrain Egypt Kenya Norway Thailand
Bangladesh El Salvador Korea Oman Togo
Belarus Estonia Kuwait Pakistan Tunisia
Belgium - Lux. Ethiopia Kyrgyzstan Panama Turkey
Benin Finland Laos Paraguay Uganda
Bolivia France Latvia Peru Ukraine
Botswana Georgia Lithuania Philippines United Arab Emirates
Brazil Germany Luxembourg Poland United Kingdom
Bulgaria Ghana Madagascar Portugal United Rep. of Tanzania
Burkina Faso Greece Malawi Qatar United States of America
Cambodia Guatemala Malaysia Russian Federation Uruguay
Cameroon Guinea Malta Rwanda Venezuela
Canada Honduras Mauritius Saudi Arabia Viet Nam
Chile Hong Kong Mexico Senegal Zambia
China Hungary Mongolia Singapore Zimbabwe
Colombia India Morocco Slovakia
Costa Rica Indonesia Mozambique Slovenia
All of the variables used in our empirical work are summarized below with details
about the respective data sources resorted to obtain them. To facilitate comparison
with the gravity literature we adopt the convention in Helpman et al. (2008) for several
of the variable definitions.
Bilateral Trade: is the bilateral trade between exporter r and importer s in
millions of US dollars. We use GTAP database for information about bilateral trade
flows. In particular, we use value of export sales evaluated at world (FOB) prices
which corresponds to ‘VXWD in GTAP. The dependent variable in our empirical work
is value of export sales in logs.
Distance: the population-weighted bilateral distance between the biggest cities
of exporter r and importer s in kilometers. For distance, we use the dist cepii file of
the CEPII GeoDist database. This uses city level data to evaluate the geographic
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distribution of population inside each country. There are two population-weighted
distance measures reported in this database. We use the one named as ‘distw which is
calculated by setting the sensitivity of trade flows to bilateral distance as 1. We use
log(distance) in the regression equations.
Contiguity: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and importer s are
adjacent countries, i.e. are contiguous, and zero otherwise. For contiguity, we use
the dist cepii file of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the variable in the
database is ‘contig.
Common Colony: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and importer
s have had a common colonizer after 1945. For common colony, we use the dist cepii
file of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the variable in the database is
‘comcol.
Colonial Link: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and importer
s have ever had a colonial link, and zero otherwise. For colonial link, we use the
dist cepii file of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the variable in the database
is ‘colony.
Common Language: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and
importer s share a common official language, and zero otherwise. For common
language, we use the dist cepii file of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the
variable in the database is ‘comlang.off.
Landlocked: a dummy variable that equals one if both exporter r and importer
s are landlocked countries, i.e. no direct access to sea, and zero otherwise. For
landlocked countries, we use the geo cepii file of the CEPII GeoDist database. The
name of the variable in the database is ‘landlocked. This database is country specific;
therefore, landlocked is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if the particular
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country is landlocked. We define a new dummy variable for our purposes using the
country-specific information available in geo cepii.
Common Legal Origins: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and
importer s share a common legal origin, and zero otherwise. For common legal origins,
we use the gravity cepii file of the CEPII Gravity database. The name of the variable
in the database is ‘comleg.
Common Currency: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and
importer s use the same currency, and zero otherwise. The data on currency unions
come from the gravity cepii file of the CEPII Gravity database. The name of the
variable in the database is ‘comcur.
GATT/WTO Membership: a dummy variable that equals one if both exporter
r and importer s are GATT/WTO members, and zero otherwise. The data on
GATT/WTO membership comes from the gravity cepii file of the CEPII Gravity
database. This database has separate information about the GATT/WTO membership
of exporter r (gatt o) and importer s (gatt d). Therefore, we define a new dummy
variable to incorporate the membership information on both countries which matches
our definition above.
FTA/RTA: a dummy variable that equals one if both exporter r and importer s
belong to the same regional trade agreement, and zero otherwise. FTA data comes
from the gravity cepii file of the CEPII Gravity database. The name of the variable
in the database is ‘rta.
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Appendix C: Sector Aggregation in Chapter 4
Table C.1. Sector Aggregation: GTAP Version 9.1 Pre-release.
No Code Description Aggregation Market Structure
1 pdr Paddy rice Primary Food PC
2 wht Wheat Primary Food PC
3 gro Cereal grains nec Primary Food PC
4 v f Vegetables, fruit, nuts Primary Food PC
5 osd Oil seeds Primary Food PC
6 c b Sugar cane, sugar beet Primary Food PC
7 pfb Plant-based fibers Primary Food PC
8 ocr Crops nec Primary Food PC
9 ctl Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses Primary Food PC
10 oap Animal products nec Primary Food PC
11 rmk Raw milk Primary Food PC
12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons Primary Food PC
13 frs Forestry Extraction PC
14 fsh Fishing Extraction PC
15 coa Coal Extraction PC
16 oil Oil Extraction PC
17 gas Gas Extraction PC
18 omn Minerals nec Extraction PC
19 cmt Bovine meat products Beef FH
20 omt Meat products nec Processed Food FH
21 vol Vegetable oils and fats Processed Food FH
22 mil Dairy products Processed Food FH
23 pcr Processed rice Processed Food FH
24 sgr Sugar Processed Food FH
25 ofd Food products nec Processed Food FH
26 b t Beverages and tobacco products Processed Food FH
27 tex Textiles Manufactures FH
28 wap Wearing apparel Manufactures FH
29 lea Leather products Manufactures FH
30 lum Wood products Manufactures FH
31 ppp Paper products, publishing Manufactures FH
32 p c Petroleum, coal products Manufactures FH
33 crp Chemical, rubber, plastic products Manufactures FH
34 nmm Mineral products nec Manufactures FH
35 i s Ferrous metals Manufactures FH
36 nfm Metals nec Manufactures FH
37 fmp Metal products Manufactures FH
38 mvh Motor vehicles and parts Manufactures FH
39 otn Transport equipment nec Manufactures FH
40 ele Electronic equipment Manufactures FH
41 ome Machinery and equipment nec Manufactures FH
42 omf Manufactures nec Manufactures FH
43 ely Electricity Services PC
44 gdt Gas manufacture, distribution Services PC
45 wtr Water Services PC
46 cns Construction Services PC
47 trd Trade Services PC
48 otp Transport nec Services PC
49 wtp Water transport Services PC
50 atp Air transport Services PC
51 cmn Communication Services PC
52 ofi Financial services nec Services PC
53 isr Insurance Services PC
54 obs Business services nec Services PC
55 ros Recreational and other services Services PC
56 osg Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health Services PC
57 dwe Dwellings Services PC
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